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Abstract 
The dissertation conducts a rhetorical analysis of Japan’s foreign worker problem from the early 
1980s to 2005.  To this end, it provides three episodes in a two-decade case study in media 
representations of “illegal” foreign workers, specifically the emergence and the dominant 
framing of the foreign worker problem in the media and one organized resistance to the 
dominant framing of the problem.   
Chapter 2 provides an overview of Japan’s foreign worker problem to set contexts for 
rhetorical criticism in subsequent chapters.  Specifically, it outlines Japan’s immigration policies, 
offers a historical account of its foreign worker problem, and supplies statistical data to 
document the recent trends and current status of labor migration in Japan.  
Chapter 3 explores the gendered nature of Japan’s foreign worker problem.  A distinctive 
feature of the migratory pattern in postwar Japan is that those who came to Japan for work 
initially consisted overwhelmingly of women.  Nevertheless, their influx was not cast as a 
foreign worker problem; instead, it was generally framed as a peculiar issue of Japayuki-san.  
Importantly, the term Japayuki-san functioned to fixate the stereotyped image of female 
migrants as young sex workers from poor Asian countries.   
 iv
Chapter 4 demonstrates that the popular media, through a barrage of alarming crime 
reports interspersed with frightening visual graphics, play a critical role in constructing the 
public knowledge that “illegal aliens” are posing an unprecedented security threat to Japan.   
 Chapter 5 underscores the importance of collective symbolic struggles by investigating 
how overstaying foreigners, activists, and academics collaborated during a special residence 
permission campaign from September 1999 through February 2000.  The chapter also suggests 
that sustained and favorable media attention was crucial in bringing the campaign to success.   
 In conclusion, the dissertation stresses the need for contesting the very language used for 
framing the foreign worker debate.  Under the current discursive frame, foreign workers are 
inevitably reduced to economic units, which in turn limits the scope of the controversy to 
assessments of economic benefits and costs from accepting foreign workers.  A rhetorical move 
needs to be made from “foreign worker” discourse to “immigration” discourse so that full-blown 
discussions about immigration could take place.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  OVERVIEW 
 
This dissertation conducts a rhetorical analysis of Japan’s foreign worker problem from the early 
1980s to 2005.  To this end, it provides three episodes in a two-decade case study of media 
representations of “illegal” foreign workers.  More specifically, the dissertation investigates the 
emergence and the dominant framing of the foreign worker problem in the mass media and one 
organized resistance to the dominant framing of the problem.   
As the term “global migration” suggests, the influx of migrant workers has become a 
worldwide phenomenon (Harvey, 2000, p. 46).  Consequently, it poses a number of difficult 
political, economic, social, and rhetorical questions in virtually any industrialized country.  In 
particular, international migration flows call for a re-thinking of the relationship among 
democracy, (nation-) state, human rights, and citizenship in the era of global capitalism (see, for 
example, Bloemrad, 2000; Castles and Miller, 1993; Soysal, 1994).  As a democratic country 
with global economic functions that has traditionally enforced tight immigration policies, Japan’s 
response to a recent wave of labor migration “is a litmus test of the kind of nation it seeks to 
become” (Shimada, 1994, p. viii).   
While Japan was arguably a latecomer with regards to labor migration, the allegedly 
unprecedented upsurge of “illegal” foreign workers since the mid-1980s has spawned a fierce 
national debate and elicited a multitude of reactions from policy makers, businesses, the mass 
media, citizens’ groups, ethnic organizations, migration scholars, international bodies, and 
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overstaying foreigners.  Such varied responses from multiple social actors attest to the 
complexities of Japan’s foreign worker problem.  Indeed, prominent migration scholar Wayne 
Cornelius (1994) goes as far as to suggest: “Japan represents perhaps the most intriguing and 
important laboratory in the world today for studying the interplay among private market forces, 
cultural tolerance for immigration, and government attempts to regulate it” (p. 375). 
This introductory chapter consists of three major sections.  It first defines key terms and 
concepts, and then provides a description of the project as well as a justification for it.  The 
second section also lays out the major themes of the project, reviews relevant literature, and sets 
forth a theoretical framework for guiding my inquiry.  The chapter concludes with a brief outline 
of subsequent chapters in the dissertation.   
 
 
1.2 CLARIFYING KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Since the language of the “foreign worker” debate itself is controversial, a brief discussion of key 
terminology is in order at the outset.  The dissertation is mainly concerned with “illegal” foreign 
workers because as Lie (1994) concisely puts it, “the ‘problem’ of foreign workers in Japan 
refer[s] primarily to illegal workers from underdeveloped countries” (p. 3).  By “illegal foreign 
workers” I mean foreign-born migrants who are in gainful employment without proper 
documentation.  “Illegal” labor migration typically takes one of the following three forms: 1) 
overstaying of visas, 2) entering Japan illegally, and 3) engaging in remunerative activities not 
allowed under visas.   
Throughout this work no conceptual distinction is made between “foreign workers” and 
“migrant laborers.”  The adjectives “illegal” “clandestine,” “unauthorized,” and “undocumented” 
are used interchangeably.  I prefer the term “migration” to “immigration” in part because the 
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Japanese government officially denies the admission of any immigrants.  “Visa overstayers” is a 
slightly broader concept than “illegal foreign workers” as the former refers to both employed and 
unemployed foreign nationals who stay in Japan after the expiry of their visas.  “Illegally staying 
foreigners,” “overstaying foreigners,” and “visa overstayers” are synonymous, although they are 
charged with different connotations.  The term “illegal aliens” encompasses Penal Code 
offenders and illegal entrants (either by sea or air) as well as visa overstayers.     
The concept of foreign worker (gaikokujin rōdōsha), legal or illegal, is frustratingly 
elusive. In public discourse, the term most typically refers to newcomer migrants from Asia and 
South America who are engaged in so-called “simple labor” (another notoriously vague 
concept).1  Oddly, the customary use of the term excludes the vast majority of foreign nationals 
working in Japan.  For one thing, it does not include “old-comer” Korean and Chinese (who are 
legally classified as special permanent residents)2, other permanent residents, refugees3, and 
spouses and children of Japanese nationals or permanent residents.  For another, neither the 
public nor the media see foreigners taking on professional, technical, and managerial jobs as 
“foreign workers.”  As Miyajima (1993) suggests, “foreign workers” is not considered suitable 
                                                 
1 The category of “simple labor” is nowhere stipulated in the immigration or labor laws, but commonly used in the 
context that the government does not open up the labor market to “simple laborers.”  Even labor experts are puzzled 
with the concept of “simple labor” (see, for example, a forum on foreign workers problems in the August 1988 issue 
of Bulletin of the Japan Labor Association).  No matter how the term is defined, it has been imbued with negative 
meanings from the outset (Suzuki, 2004, p. 42).     
2 Special permanent residents denote the Koreans and the Chinese (including the Taiwanese) who immigrated—
either voluntarily or forcibly—to Japan prior to the end of World War II and renounced the Japanese nationality 
after the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952.  In light of this history, they are accorded special 
privileges and their status does not fall under the purview of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act.  
3 Japan began to be confronted with the issue of political refugees in 1975 as large numbers of Vietnamese fled the 
country in the aftermath of the Vietnam War (Takeda, 1998, p. 434).  Under strong international pressure, the 
government rather grudgingly decided to allow refugees mainly from the three Indochinese countries (Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos) to stay in 1978; it also ratified the UN Refugee Convention in 1981 and amended relevant 
domestic laws accordingly (most notably, the revision of the Immigration Control Act into the Immigration Control 
Act and Refugee Recognition Act in 1982).  However, Japan still maintains the infamously strict screening 
procedures for recognizing refuge status as evidenced in the remarkably low figures of refugees compared with 
other countries.  Of a total of 2,782 applicants in the 1981-2002 period, only 305 were recognized as refugees (not 
including Indochinese refugees who total over 10 thousands) (AS, 2003, July 28, p. 3).  The figures are strikingly 
low, considering that “[b]etween 1990 to 1999, Convention refugees in Japan numbered 40 compared with 
about156,700 in Germany, 73,100 in France and 82,300 in the USA” (Kondō, 2002, p. 429). 
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for “elite” foreigners staying legally in Japan as skilled workers (p. 40).4  In a similar vein, Lie 
(2001), an Asian American academic, observes that foreign workers are viewed as racial and 
class others in Japan (p. 20).  To bolster this view, he recounts his personal experience: 
“Whenever I asked Japanese people whether I should count myself as a gaikokujin rōdōsha, all 
of them denied it, and often vehemently so” (p. 20).   
Not only are foreign workers seen as racial and class others, but they are often looked 
down upon as “illegal,” “cheap,” “unskilled,” and “simple” laborers undertaking so-called 3-K 
(kitsui [demanding], kiken [dangerous], and kitanai [dirty]) work that Japanese youths are no 
longer willing to put up with.  Watanabe (1990) further spells out negative connotations attached 
to the term “foreign workers”: 
In fact, the term [unskilled foreign workers] is hopelessly vague, but what it lacks in 
meaning it makes up for in negative connotations: low wages, dirty manual labor, the 
impoverished masses of Asia.  The use of such an undefined but value-laden category 
prejudices all thinking and discussion on the subject. (p. 49) 
 
This dissertation focuses upon media portrayals of “illegal” foreign workers and thus 
sidesteps some of the problems inherent in studying foreign workers in Japan.  Accordingly, my 
definition of “illegal” foreign workers may be a little broader and more elastic than its legal 
definition.  For example, foreign students fall under the scope of this research because they are 
often portrayed as de facto “illegal” foreign workers in the media.  Many would-be migrant 
workers enter Japan on student visas because they allow for a longer stay than tourist visas.  Also 
subject to scrutiny are migrant women who legally come to Japan on entertainer visas.  Under 
the Immigration Control Act and Refugee Recognition Act (henceforth, the Immigration Control 
Act), entertainers are admitted into Japan in order to perform theatrical, musical, and 
entertainment activities (Ministry of Justice, 1996, n.p.).  In reality, the majority of them engage 
                                                 
4 All translations of Japanese texts in this work are mine unless otherwise indicted. 
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in unauthorized work as bar hostesses, nightclub dancers, strippers, and prostitutes (Piper, 2003, 
p. 738).  Hence the image of Asian migrant women “as undocumented workers associated with 
criminal background” is pervasive in the mainstream media (Pak, 1998, p. 189).  By defining 
“illegal” foreign workers in this way, I don’t intend to subscribe to the stereotypical view that 
foreign students are disguised cheap laborers or that female migrants are sex workers.  This 
delineation of “illegal” foreign workers, I believe, is adequate for my research because it mirrors 
their popular images in the media.  
 
 
1.3  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1.3.1 Research Questions and Methodology  
 
The overarching goal of the dissertation is to conduct a critical analysis of public discourse on 
“illegal” foreign workers in Japan over the last two decades.  More specifically, the following 
three questions guide my query: 
1. When and how did the narrative of the foreign worker problem emerge in the popular 
media? 
 
2. What has been the dominant discourse on the foreign worker problem? 
 
3. How has this dominant discourse been contested in public spheres?    
 
In pursing these questions, the dissertation employs a methodological approach based on analysis 
of published texts, semi-structured interviews with immigration scholars and activists, and 
participant observation of various gatherings and events organized or sponsored by foreign 
worker support groups.   
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I relied mainly on the following databases for collecting written texts: Kikuzō (the 
database of Asahi Shimbun5 articles), Nikkei6 Telecon (the database of Nikkei’s four papers), 
Nichigai: Magazine Plus (a comprehensive database of general, business, and academic 
periodicals), and Web Ōya-bunko (a database of popular magazines in postwar Japan).  In 
addition, the Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS), a Tokyo-based foreign worker support 
group, gave me access to its collection of newspaper clippings concerning the special residence 
permission campaign.  
Close inquiry into print media, especially newspapers, is crucially important in 
understanding public discourse because they are the prime sources of news even in today’s 
digital age (Schudson, 2000, p. 188).  The influence of print news is especially strong in Japan.  
For one thing, Japan has the world’s highest per capita newspaper distribution rate with average 
daily circulation reaching 575 papers for every 1,000 persons (Krauss, 2000, p. 267).  According 
to Pharr (1996), so-called “Big 5” national dailies (i.e. Asahi, Yomiuri, Mainichi, Nikkei, and, 
Sankei) sell over 50 million copies daily; Yomiuri Shimbun’s daily circulation alone exceeds 10 
million copies, which “is greater than that of the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street 
Journal, Christian Science Monitor, and New York Daily News combined” (p. 4, p. 6).  For 
another, unlike the United States, Japan’s major commercial TV networks are all affiliated with 
the Big-5 national newspapers and depend heavily on them for producing news programs 
(Westney, 1996, p. 61).  In consequence, “the popularity of television spread without 
undermining the public attachment to newspapers or trust in them” (Krauss, 2000, p. 295).  It can 
be extrapolated from this structure of heavy cross-ownership that the patterns of news coverage 
                                                 
5 Asahi Shimbun has the second largest circulation of daily newspapers in Japan.  According to the Advertising 
Division of Asahi Shimbun, its morning edition sells about 8,285,000 copies daily (n.p.).   
6 Nikkei is short for Nihon Keizai Shimbun (literally, the Japan Economic Newspaper).  The newspaper with an 
estimated circulation of 3,067,000 is regarded as the Japanese equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. 
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are not substantially different between print and broadcast media.  
References to visual texts—mostly TV programs—provide added insights into my 
analysis of written texts.  Admittedly, I watched TV news and documentaries (or “docudramas”) 
in a rather ad hoc way during my field research in Tokyo from July 2003 through February 2005.  
But time and again, I came across and, in many cases, taped (segments of) programs pertaining 
to the issue of foreign workers.  As TV shows featuring foreign crime figured prominently, I 
refer to visual texts mostly in Chapter 4.  
Collected texts are coded into the following four categories: 1) popular texts (i.e. 
newspapers, magazines, and large-circulation books as well as network TV programs), 2) 
specialized texts (notably, academic journals and labor magazines), 3) official texts (e.g. police 
white papers and immigration statistics), and 4) oppositional texts (mostly, print and online 
publications by foreign worker support groups).7  Of these four categories, popular texts are my 
primary concern as they are central to constituting public knowledge, or shared conceptions, 
values, interests, and principles in a community (Bitzer, 1978, p. 68).  I look into oppositional 
texts by grassroots organizations in order to explore how a counter discourse makes its way into 
the mainstream media and challenges dominant discourse.  As Cloud (2002) argues (following 
Mary Triece), attention to the texts of social movements must go hand in hand with the critique 
of dominant discourse if one wants to account for the process through which ordinary people 
struggle to effect social change (p. 355). 
                                                 
7 As Ono and Sloop (2002) argue, categories of discourse should be seen as “tools of criticism” rather than as 
“objective categories into which given discourses fit snugly” (p. 12).  Although this work does not use the same 
typology as theirs, I agree with Ono and Sloop on their views of the types of discourse.  As they suggest, drawing 
upon Stuart Hall, the distinctions of discourse are useful insofar as they “provide the critic with a ‘grid of 
intelligibility’ through which to make decisions concerning which discourses to investigate, to make meanings of 
discourses, and to establish ends for these investigations (Hall 1997)” (p. 12). 
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By dominant discourse, I don’t simply mean a signifying practice produced to maintain 
the interests of the dominant class.  Rather, I use the term to refer to naturalized discourse that is 
endlessly repeated and widely disseminated across the media to the point that values, beliefs, and 
logics underlying the discourse are taken for granted in society at large.  As Bourdieu (1998) 
concisely puts it, “[e]verywhere we hear it said, all day long—this is what gives the dominant 
discourse its strength” (p. 29).  Paradoxically, although dominant discourse takes on omnipresent 
characteristics, no single finished text is representative of it.  For today’s socio-cultural 
conditions have left us with “nothing but discursive fragments of context” (McGee, 1990, p. 
287).  Instead of focusing its analysis on a single text, the dissertation therefore aims to shed 
light on dominant discourse by identifying prevailing media frames, or “persistent patterns of 
cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion by which 
symbols-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7).  
To be sure, a variety of discourses are produced and circulated in the mainstream media; but 
most of them operate within certain frames (Ono and Sloop, 2002, p. 16).  For example, the 
media typically label visa overstayers as “illegal aliens” or “illegally staying foreigners” (fuhō 
zanryū gaikokujin).  This is not to say that their illegal status is always highlighted in print and 
broadcast media.  It simply indicates that the media’s association of visa overstayers with 
illegality is so strong and common as to shape public attitudes towards them.   
This leads us to the important question of what counter discourse is.  By counter 
discourse I mean the type of discourse that not simply refutes the dominant one but also 
challenges its underlying logic.  As Bourdieu (1998) sees it, counter discourse resists “verbal 
reflexes, stereotyped images and conventional words, and the effect of habituation that it [the 
symbolic violence exerted daily on TV, on the radio, and in the newspapers] produces” (p 22).  It 
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may not be powerful enough to subvert dominant discourse but works at least as an effective 
antidote to it.  Specifically, counter discourse takes one of two forms: 1) adversarial discourse 
that questions the very foundation of the dominant one and 2) outlaw discourse that operates 
outside the prevailing framework of discourse (for an elaborate explication of outlaw discourse, 
see Ono and Sloop, 2002).  Since dominant discourse is constantly reinforced through a 
relentless “dripfeed” of selective facts and views in the media (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 30), the spread 
of counter discourse requires equally “persistent and variable signifying responses” (Williams, 
1977, p. 114).     
To supplement my archival research, I conducted semi-structured interviews with several  
members of APFS and immigration scholars from October 2003 through August 2004.  Around  
the same time, I participated in various events, gatherings, and symposia organized or sponsored 
by APFS.  While the chief aim in this work is to analyze media texts from the perspective of 
communication studies, I use the methods of participant observation and interviewing as 
complementary tools for analyzing media texts as well as data for offering alternative accounts 
of undocumented migrant workers.  Materials gleaned from interviews and episodes of 
participant observation are cited mainly in Chapter 5 to provide added insights into the special 
residence permission campaign that unfolded between September 1999 and February 2000.  I 
contacted APFS because the group spearheaded the campaign for special residency.  Besides, 
APFS had long encouraged irregular migrants to take an active part in running the group.  As 
such, the group provided me with precious opportunities to glance at the everyday conduct of 
undocumented migrants and to realize that many of them did not even remotely fit the 
stereotyped images of “illegal aliens.”  The nature and goals of interviewing and participant 
observation vary and are to be spelled out in Chapter 5. 
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1.3.2 Analytical Framework 
 
 
The works of Pierre Bourdieu, Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams, and Dana Cloud provide a 
framework for analyzing public discourse on the foreign worker problem in Japan.8  What unites 
these original scholars in diverse fields is their avowed materialist approach to discourse 
analysis.  In other words, they are all committed to developing a materialist theory of discourse 
capable of reclaiming from idealism “the ‘active side’ of practical knowledge” crude materialism 
has abandoned to it (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 136).  I occasionally overstep this framework when 
I find it heuristically useful (for example, references are to be made to Edward Said and Kenneth 
Burke on pages 70-71 in Chapter 3).  Such references, however, will be kept minimal and 
congruous with the overall analytical framework.    
My method of rhetorical criticism may be called a materialist/critical rhetoric project.  
The usefulness of a theoretical approach depends on the social phenomena one is looking at.  As 
Bourdieu suggests, a theory should be construed as “a temporary construct which takes shape for 
and by empirical work” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 161).  I believe that a 
materialist/critical rhetoric project offers uniquely valuable insights into the workings of 
symbolic violence and resistance with regards to Japan’s foreign worker problem.  There are 
deep political, economic, legal, and socio-cultural barriers that inhibit “illegal” foreign workers 
from speaking out in public. Discursive aspects of the foreign worker problem cannot be 
adequately explained in isolation from these material conditions constraining their rhetorical 
agency. 
                                                 
8 In formulating a theoretical framework for rhetorical criticism, one must keep in mind Brummett’s (1984) caveats 
on its methods and theories: “Methods are usually ways of testing theories, but because rhetorical theories are 
themselves methods of experiencing and are not subject to the usual tests of social science theories, rhetorical theory 
and its methods are often merged with one another.  Therefore, if we see rhetorical theory as equipping people to 
experience rhetorical transactions more richly and consciously, and its supporting rhetorical criticism as illustrating 
how such experience might be done, then some of the problems and embarrassments of rhetorical studies disappear” 
(p. 105). 
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My critical-materialist project may need five points of clarification.  First, it is concerned 
not so much with the materiality of discourse (a la Ronald Greene’s materialist rhetoric or 
Michael McGee’s material theory of rhetoric9) as with the influence of material conditions on 
discursive practices.  Second and related to this, my theoretical approach is underpinned by the 
following two premises: 1) Material interests and resources constitute important motives for and 
constraints on the production and distribution of discourse (Cloud, 2002, p. 343) and 2) the 
dominated class has far fewer opportunities and resources to get their voices heard in public 
spheres (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 244).  These assumptions may be obvious yet are worth reiterating, 
given that the field of rhetorical studies remains largely indifferent to the role material forces 
play in shaping rhetorical action (Cloud, 2002, p. 343).  Third, like Robert Ivie (2001), I regard 
rhetorical criticism as a form of social critique.  That is, it is not simply a way of accounting for 
rhetorical practice, but a way of addressing social problems and improving human relations with 
particular emphasis on their rhetorical dimensions (Ivie, 2001, n.p.).  Fourth, I agree with 
Raymie McKerrow (1990) that a rhetorical critic is not a detached observer of discourse but “a 
rhetor advocating a critique as a sensible reading of the discourse of power” (p. 108).  
Understood this way, the primary goal of a critic/rhetor is to effect social change by 
demystifying the discourse of power and exploring possible strategies for intervening in the 
discourse (pp. 91-92).  As a critic/rhetor I undertake the following three tasks in this work: 1) to 
analyze the production and distribution of dominant discourse and to uncover taken-for-granted 
beliefs, values, and ideas that penetrate seemingly divergent texts in circulation (Bourdieu, 1998, 
p. 29); 2) to seek out oppositional information and perspectives that act to unveil the prevailing 
                                                 
9 At the heart of McGee’s (1982) materialist theory is his conception of “rhetoric as an object, as material and as 
omnipresent as air and water” (p. 26)  
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constructions of “reality” as mystifications; 3) to resuscitate the voices and standpoints of those 
who are oppressed and exploited (Cloud, 1994, p. 157).   
Although my method of rhetorical criticism is informed by McKerrow’s critical rhetoric 
project, there is a major difference between the two.  This leads to my last point of clarification: 
Unlike McKerrow’s, my critical rhetoric project is not poststructuralist but materialist.  That is, 
as with the above-noted materialist scholars, I conceive material forces as primary factors in the 
production and distribution of discourse.  As Cloud (1994) charges, by accepting a relativist 
worldview, McKerrow’s critical rhetoric risks collapsing the critique of freedom into that of 
domination and thereby renders critical judgment inconsequential.  Equally important, its neglect 
of the material realm reduces oppression and liberation to a linguistic and cultural matter.  To 
rectify these problems a critic/rhetor needs to give fuller consideration to how extra-discursive 
material conditions shape rhetorical action.   
The infusion of a materialist perspective into a critical rhetoric project is especially 
important if one is to explain the how of a counter discourse (i.e., how oppressed and exploited 
groups wage a symbolic battle for economic, political, and cultural hegemony) instead of simply 
describing the central features of alternative discourse, which Cloud (1994) denounces as “a 
merely descriptive critical project” (p. 154).  Strategic discursive action (which Cloud calls 
rhetoric) requires relentless efforts on the part of social actors to bring together their political, 
economic, and cultural capital for putting up a collective symbolic struggle against the dominant 
discourse in public spheres.  In particular, one’s opposing view must be voiced over and over 
again in the mainstream media to exert any counter hegemonic influence.  The articulation of 
radical ideas in academic journals or on the internet alone makes little difference.     
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The late French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu provides further theoretical support for my 
critical-materialist approach.  On the one hand, Bourdieu (1991) recognizes “the autonomy of 
language,” saying that “language is the exemplary formal mechanism whose generative 
capacities are without limits” (p. 41).  Elsewhere, he holds that “one can, within limits, transform 
the world by transforming its representation” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 14).  Bourdieu, 
on the other, strongly guards against overestimating the potential of symbolic struggle.  As he 
(1991) sees it, “symbolic power does not reside in ‘symbolic systems,’” but depends on the 
relative position one occupies in social space (p. 170).  Thus, “looking within words for the 
power of words” is nothing other than “looking for it where it is not to be found” (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 106). 
Since the dominant groups are in a far more advantageous position to exercise symbolic 
power, discourse tends to reproduce and reinforce the unequal social relations (p. 136).  Echoing  
Bourdieu’s view, Curran (2005) elaborates on how unequal distribution of power and resources 
favor political and economic elites on the discursive level: 
Elites have unequal access to economic and symbolic resources.  This can assist them 
to present their own special interests as being in the interests of all, and to win popular 
consent for the policies, social arrangements, and ideas they favor.  Their dominance 
can cause other perspectives to be marginalized, and result in the media defining public 
debate largely in terms of differing elite positions. (p. 126) 
 
The dominated groups, for their part, are usually resigned to, or even content with, the 
hegemonic social order.  Even when they rise up to contest the dominant social structure, they 
usually fail as they lack resources the dominant groups have: authority, wealth, and access to the 
mass media, to name but a few.  
Although the dominant groups have more symbolic resources and opportunities, this does 
not mean that discourse is a mere instrument of domination.  Discourse does have liberating 
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potential inasmuch as it is a vehicle for challenging repressive ideas and practices, advancing 
alternative lines of thought, and moving others to action.  Yet the capacity of symbolic struggle 
should not be overstated.  Since the political and economic hegemony operates in favor of 
dominant discourse, the efficacy of counter discourse, no matter how rhetorically appealing and 
logically compelling, is usually limited.  As Cloud (2001) argues, symbolic struggle could even 
take the form of violent scapegoating when undertaken in a context of material scarcity and 
inequality (pp. 253-254).   
After all, rhetoric scholars ought to acknowledge the limits of symbolic struggle in a 
materially stratified world and situate analysis of discourse within larger political, economic, and 
social circumstances.  As Phil Wander (1984) suggested over two decades ago, rhetorical 
criticism must “extend beyond the ‘text’ to include the ability to produce texts, to engage in 
discourse, to be heard in the public space” (p. 210).  A dual emphasis on material and rhetorical 
aspects of social issues characterizes my analytical framework.  It is useful, for instance, in 
understanding “multiple presents/voids related to speakers, speeches, and audiences,” which 
Wander (1996) calls rhetorical contextualization (p. 403).  A materialist perspective, on the one 
hand, helps to address questions of who gets to speak, who is allowed to listen, and what can be 
said.  A rhetorical perspective, on the other, allows for analysis of the speaker’s construction of 
self (First Persona), preferred audience (Second Persona), and negated audience (Third Persona) 
as well as what is said within texts (for a detailed discussion of the three types of persona, see 
Wander, 1984).  The dissertation combines both perspectives to investigate media 
representations, the material realities of their production and distribution, and the interplay 
between the two with regards to the foreign worker problem in Japan.   
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1.3.3 Rationales  
 
This study can be justified on several counts.  First of all, it brings a rhetorical perspective to the 
interdisciplinary field of labor migration studies.  Research on labor migration encompasses a 
wide range of issues and requires interdisciplinary approaches.  Anthropologists offer detailed 
descriptions and analyses of migrants’ life experiences by interacting or even living with them.  
Sociologists observe their social behaviors, demographics, and life patterns through qualitative 
and quantitative research.  Political scientists evaluate past, current, and proposed immigration 
policies at local, national, and international levels.  Economists weigh various economic factors 
(e.g. push and pull factors) involved in the flows of migrant workers and assess their short-term 
and long-term impacts on sending and receiving countries.  Law professors study legal issues 
pertaining to migrant workers in light of both domestic and international laws.   
 Although a host of literature has been produced on Japan’s foreign worker problem by 
scholars from a variety of disciplines and theoretical perspectives, relatively few researchers 
have fashioned a systematic evaluation of its communicative dimensions.  Even though several 
scholars address discursive aspects of the issue, their attention is fixated mostly on the repressive 
functions of discourse (for example, Herbert, 1996; Shipper 2001).  In other words, they fail to 
recognize that discourse is a contested arena where multifarious, often contradictory, voices exist 
in struggle for hegemony, not simply in service of power.  My work fills in this void; for 
communication researchers prefer to conceive discourse, especially mass-mediated discourse, as 
a site where cultural contests over meaning are waged rather than as a conduit for the articulation 
of a dominant ideology (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003, p. 161). 
 Also overlooked in current scholarship on labor migration is the liberating potential of 
discourse.  As noted in the last section, discourse is more than an instrument of domination by 
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the powerful or a record of the historical changes that have happened elsewhere; it is an agency 
of transformation as well.  A critique of domination, although valuable in its own right, has a 
serious drawback: It is unable to explain how dissenting voices get heard and exercise influence.  
The rhetorical tradition helps to illuminate the generative capacity of discourse because a 
hallmark of the tradition is the study and practice of strategic discourse.  Ever since Aristotle 
defined rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion” 
(1355a), rhetoric scholars have been concerned with how rhetors deploy discourse to influence 
particular audiences in a given situation (for example, see Wenzel, 1987).  Even Cloud (2002), 
one of the few historical materialists in our field, maintains that “rhetoric, even in the context of 
economic constraint and ideological mystification, is about human agency” (p. 343).   
 In short, there is a great deal of underutilized potential in studying Japan’s foreign worker 
problem from a rhetorical perspective.  A materialist/critical rhetoric project allows critics to 
look into available means of persuasion, while mindful of structural limitations imposed on 
them.  Specifically, the dissertation intends to illustrate the liberating potential of discourse by 
examining how undocumented migrants and their support groups use rhetoric to guide decisions 
and actions in situations of contingency and to mediate between social structures and collective 
struggles (for the functions of rhetoric, see Aune, 2003; Blumenberg, 1987; Farrell, 1993).   
 Secondly, and related to the previous point, rhetorical theories and methods of rhetorical 
criticism can be usefully applied to investigating Japan’s foreign worker problem as it entails 
rich rhetorical dimensions.  As with many other public issues, a “foreign worker” debate in Japan 
conceals more than it reveals.  As Lie (1992) astutely observes, “[w]hat is noteworthy about the 
debate is what it leaves out as much as how the issues are discussed” (p. 39).  It is important, 
then, to interrogate not only the issues explicitly discussed, but also the language of the “foreign 
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worker” debate.  Indeed, the very term “foreign worker problem” (gaikokujin rōdōsha mondai) 
merits rhetorical criticism.  Rhetorically, the term serves to reduce the issue of migration to its 
economic aspects and to limit a social controversy to economic benefits and costs from accepting 
foreign workers (Machimura, 1998, p. 190).  The popular use of “foreign workers” rather than 
“immigrants” or “foreign residents” implies that foreigners taking up unskilled jobs are seen as 
neither “(future) citizens” nor “residents,” but as “guest workers” who should be tightly 
controlled (Douglas and Roberts, 2000, p. 3).  Yet there is a significant flaw in framing the 
debate from an economic standpoint alone.  Above all, the extension to irregular migrant workers 
and their families of heath care, public education, labor benefits, and other social services is 
perceived as social “costs.”  Worse still, the term “foreign worker problem” often conjures up the 
image of foreign workers as “problematic beings.”  Many official documents in the late 1980s 
actually depicted foreign “simple laborers” as those who could cause wide-ranging problems to 
Japanese society (Suzuki, 2004, p. 42).  Herbert makes a similar point in his 1996 Foreign 
Workers and Law Enforcement in Japan: 
[T]he definition of foreign workers as a ‘social problem’ insinuates that a wide range of 
problems will occur (for example, rising crime rates) affecting the whole of society. 
Their being deemed a ‘social problem’ also implies that this is a matter to be tackled 
with counter-measures. (p. 216)   
 
Seen in this light, a public controversy over foreign workers remains fundamentally limited as 
long as the issue is argued “with the established terms of the problematic in play,” to borrow 
Hall’s words (1982, p. 81).  It is vital, therefore, to scrutinize the language of the “foreign 
worker” debate and how it influences policy and opinion.   
 In an effort to challenge such xenophobic official and public attitudes, foreign worker 
support groups struggle to present and disseminate counter discourses.  Unfortunately, they often 
presuppose and thus unwittingly reinforce the dichotomy between overstaying foreigners and 
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Japanese citizens by portraying the former as “helpless victims” or “docile workers” whose 
rights and welfare Japanese activists must protect.  Overstaying foreigners are no doubt more 
likely to encounter serious problems than the Japanese.  But, as Wilson and Gutierrez (1995) 
argue, excessive emphasis on the bizarre and unusual elements of their lives, no matter how 
well-intentioned, could perpetuate the stereotypical images of them as “‘problem people,’ groups 
either beset by problems or causing them for the larger society” (p. 26).   
 The dissertation adds to the body of labor migration research by reconsidering the 
discourse of dependency and vulnerability.  Specifically, Chapter 3 documents adverse 
consequences this type of discourse had on “illegal” female migrant workers in the 1980s.  On a 
more positive note, Chapter 5 examines the rhetorical agency of undocumented migrants, the 
representations of them as social agents, and the relation between the two.  Given that 
undocumented migrants are politically, legally, and symbolically disadvantaged, they possess 
few resources to unite against social injustices (Roberts, 2000, p. 283).  It does not follow, 
however, that foreign workers’ grassroots movements are inevitably movements by proxy.  
Rather, as many unregistered foreigners have “settled” in Japan, they have become more adept at 
using their legal rights and bringing court challenges against the government and their 
employers.  Although undocumented migrants are still generally forced to endure their hardships 
in silence, they speak out for better living and working conditions in relatively rare moments 
when concerned individuals and groups stand up to support their cause.  Social movements by 
and for foreign workers deserve rigorous academic study because as Ogawa (2000/2001) 
laments, no prior research “has showed an interest in how foreign workers have appeared on the 
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stage as agents for their rights who, with the cooperation of Japanese movements, have began to 
make their own movement” (n.p.).10   
Thirdly, the dissertation provides a case study of the possibilities within social 
movements to bridge among irregular migrants, researchers, and activists.  In most industrialized 
countries migrant workers are comprised of numerous ethnic groups of diverse nationalities.  In 
general, such diversity impedes the formation of a unifying support and advocacy network 
despite their common interest.  The fragmentation of migrant workers is a particularly serious 
problem in Japan, where different immigration policies are applied to different national and 
ethnic groups (Douglas and Roberts, 2000, p. 30; Oka, 1994, p. 51).  To further complicate 
matters, the existing ethnic associations, which are composed chiefly of “old-comer” residents, 
are reluctant to extend support to their illegal compatriots (Shipper, 2001, p. 434).11   
In the absence of formal support from governmental bodies and ethnic groups, 
unregistered foreigners in Japan have developed mutual-aid networks on their own by forming 
self-help groups, going to church, or befriending their Japanese co-workers and neighbors.  
When a serious problem arises, they usually turn to NGOs for help (Shipper, 2001, p. 434).  As 
an increasing number of migrant workers have come to Japan, a variety of groups have been 
organized to support and empower them at the grassroots level (Douglas and Roberts, 2000, p. 
10).  A close examination of the 1999-2000 special residence permission campaign by and for 21 
visa overstayers offers salient insights into the study of social movements, as it was among the 
few moments in Japan when activists, intellectuals, and unregistered immigrants united for the 
cause of social justice (AS, 1999, November 11, p. 15). 
                                                 
10 Kaoruko Yamamoto’s (2001) field research on manual laborers in the Kotobuki area of Yokohama may be a 
notable exception in this respect. 
11 A 1990-1993 fieldwork conducted by Zhu Huilin of the Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs found that only 10% 
of old Chinese migrants approved of the recruitment of newcomer compatriots into their associations while 70% of 
them held the opposite opinion (cited in Xi, 2002, p. 168). 
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 Fourth, the dissertation contributes to an interdisciplinary understanding of Japanese 
news.  News media studies in postwar Japan have developed under the heavy influence of 
American mass communication research.  As Itō (1990) sums up the origins of Japanese mass 
communication studies: 
Soon after the Second World War, many American communication theories and 
scientific methods for communication research were introduced into Japan.  In 1947, 
Iguchi introduced Lasswell’s paradigm to Japan.  This was the first occasion for 
Japanese scholars to be exposed to American communication studies. . . .  In 1954, the 
Japanese translation of Schramm’s Mass Communication (1949) further stimulated 
interest in American communication studies. . . .  [M]any Japanese scholars trained in 
American universities joined Japanese universities in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
They introduced to Japan most of the major theories and methods developed in the 
United States. (p. 430)  
 
Against this historical backdrop Japanese media researchers have used “predominantly 
quantitative methods, for example in audience research and with regard to media content and 
media language” (Gatzen, 2001, n.p.).  In other words, a major weakness in current research on 
Japanese news is the dearth of thorough qualitative analysis of media texts (Gatzen, 2001, n.p.).  
Whereas a growing number of Japanese mass communication scholars incorporate perspectives 
of political economy, cultural studies, and critical media studies into their research (e.g, Yoshimi, 
2001), they are still inattentive to the discipline of rhetoric that has been integral part of the 
American tradition of communication studies.  Their lack of interest in rhetoric is evident from 
Ito’s reductive view of communication studies as mass communications studies in the above 
quote.  Although rhetoric, media studies, and mass communications research stand as distinct 
subfields even in the United States (see, for example, Simonson, 2003), the interactions among 
these three fields are even more scarce in Japan where rhetoric as a discipline is a recent arrival 
to the academic scene and has not received much scholarly attention.  The dissertation utilizes 
approaches employed in both cultural and media studies (Bourdieu, Hall, and Williams) and 
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rhetorical studies (Burke and Cloud).  As such, it not only adds a rhetorical perspective to the 
interdisciplinary studies of Japanese news but also helps to stimulate media scholars’ interest in 
rhetorical theory and criticism.    
 Last but not least, critical inquiry into the news coverage of Japan’s foreign worker 
problem is a significant undertaking from the perspectives of communication and migration 
studies.  Specifically, the dissertation advances an understanding of news production in three 
ways: first by assessing the active role of the media in amplifying the “official” truth (in Chapter 
4), second by investigating the media strategies grassroots groups adopted to generate public 
support for the special residence permission campaign, and third by probing how journalists 
facilitated the expression of their dissenting voices under structural constraints (in Chapter 5). 
 The mass media play a crucial role in constituting the public knowledge of “illegal” 
foreign workers in any country.  This is especially the case in Japan where ordinary citizens have 
little direct contact with undocumented migrants and rely almost exclusively on the media for 
their images (Komai, 1999/2001, p. 132-133). 12  Despite their enormous influences, inadequate 
attention has been paid to the role the media play in the social construction of Japan’s foreign 
worker problem.  Not only is there a dearth of literature on this subject, most previous studies 
identify the media as a tool of oppression and manipulation by those in power.  Accordingly, 
they are mostly concerned with tracing how the media sustain and reinforce systems of 
domination.  For instance, in his otherwise laudable dissertation on foreign workers in Japan, 
Shipper (2001) tacitly subscribes to a propaganda model of media discourse:  
It then appears that the Japanese National Police Agency use unsubstantiated and 
general figures, which are taken out of their social and demographic context, to spread 
xenophobic propaganda. . . .  Japanese journalists simply report such unsubstantiated 
                                                 
12 A 1990 survey by the National Police Agency revealed that 89.2% of those surveyed had little to no contact with 
foreigners (cited in Hakoishi and Hatate, 1997, p. 335).  Although the survey is a bit dated, I believe that the same 
holds true today. 
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information in their newspapers. . . .  Hence these ‘suspects’ have already become 
‘criminals’ in the minds of the readers even before trials.  (p. 168)   
 
Implicit in this quote is the somber idea of journalists and readers as uncritical purveyors and 
believers of the state’s anti-immigration campaign.   
 However, Shipper overlooks two important features of the mass media.  First, the media 
are not simply intermediaries between government and people (Curran, 2005, p. 121), but they 
are themselves actors with interests, values, and dispositions.  Even when the media appear to 
loyally reproduce the “official” truth, they don’t simply regurgitate government views but 
transform them to fit the interests of their readers or viewers.  According to Stuart Hall et al. 
(1978):   
This process is neither totally free and unconstrained, nor is it a simple, direct 
reproduction.  It is a transformation; and such transformations require active ‘work’ on 
the part of the media.  Their over-all effect is nevertheless to help close the circle by 
which the definitions of the powerful become part of the taken-for-granted reality of the 
public by translating the unfamiliar into the familiar world. (p. 62)  
 
From this vantage point, it is simple-minded to view the production of news as a mere reflection 
of the interests of political and economic elites.  Second, the media are not a unitary organization 
but are constituted by different sectors that have different functions, structures, and relationships 
to politics (Curran, 2005, pp. 121-122).  Although “the basic orientation that takes news-making 
as a reality-constructing activity governed by elites have proved enormously useful” (Schudson, 
2000, p. 184), we should take care not to obscure the media’s complex, ambiguous, and even 
contradictory relations to states, markets, and publics (Curran, 2005, p. 121; Hallin, 2000, p. 
233).  Unfortunately, most media research ignores how journalists operate under a set of 
constraints as if appraisals of their autonomy necessitate the downplaying of political and 
economic forces as determining factors in news production (Schudson, 2000, p. 184).   
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 When we assess the autonomy of journalists and its implications for news and 
democracy, it is important to keep in mind that news production is a routine, mundane, and 
highly predictable practice (Golding and Murdock, 2000, p. 83; Schudson, 2000, p. 186).  For the 
routinization of news making both constrains and facilitates serious journalism; it imposes limits 
on as well as offers opportunities for civil society.  The downside is that the routines of news 
organizations are tilted towards supporting and sustaining the status quo because they are 
governed by organizational and occupational demands, consolidated through reporters’ daily 
interaction with government officials, and codified by professional norms.  For example, the 
nonstop news cycle, the norm of objective journalism, and competitive pressure and market 
forces within the news industry, among others, encourage a heavy reliance on official sources 
that can provide a steady and reliable supply of information (Cunningham, 2003/2004, p. 292).   
At the same time, the routinization of news making leaves journalists with relative 
autonomy for making news decisions.  They may lack power and resources to transform the 
structure of the news organization and the larger material circumstances in which the news media 
are situated; but there are many journalists who are aware of their internalized biases and willing 
to break free from the journalistic routines despite disturbing trends towards commercialization, 
ownership concentration, and homogenization (McChesney and Scott, 2004, pp. 2-3).  As Curran 
(2000) observes, “part of the media can . . . represent critical public opinion and become an 
emancipatory force,” although it takes, in the last instance, a combination of “[a]n energized civil 
society, well-developed networks of ideas and communication, professional oriented media 
staffs, and consumer pressure” (p. 134).   
The dissertation explores how part of the media “represent critical public opinion and 
exercise emancipatory force.”  Of particular concern is how “professionally oriented media 
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staffs” and “an energized civil society” provide “well-developed networks of ideas and 
communication.”  For their interaction can give journalists access to alternative news sources and 
leverage to address neglected issues, ferret out hidden stories, and rejuvenate journalism from the 
bottom up.  Grassroots organizations, for their part, can tap into the networks to advocate their 
dissenting views and mobilize public support.  Since most grassroots groups lack credentials as 
“legitimate” information sources and media connections, they are severely restricted in their 
ability to reach wider publics.  Faced with these obstacles, grassroots groups generally pursue 
two media strategies.  One way is to “adopt melodramatic demonstrations that meet the other 
media standards of acceptable news—visible drama, conflict, and novelty” (Bagdikian, 
1983/2004, p. 279).  This type of media strategy, when enacted successfully, enhances the 
visibility of grassroots groups, but it may not help them to gain trust from the public and the 
news media alike.  Besides, the media’s coverage of marginal views per se makes little 
difference because “lots of news, including dissenting or adversarial information and opinion, 
gets into the newspaper” (Schudson, 2000, p. 185).  As Schudson (2000) argues, a key question 
is “where that information appears and how it is inflected” (p. 185).  Grassroots organizations 
often stand a better chance of attracting sustained media attention through a more indirect 
approach: To feed journalists raw “news” materials and serve as grassroots experts of some sort.  
The longer they serve as alternative news sources, the more likely they are to get their activities 
reported extensively and sympathetically.   
In sum, while critical works on news content and production require attention to their 
political, economic, and legal determinants, a focus on these structural constraints presents only a 
partial picture of how news making works.  The dissertation contributes to a better understanding 
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of the news media by examining how journalists and grassroots activists join forces to challenge 
the restrictive immigration policies in Japan. 
 
 
1.4 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of Japan’s foreign worker problem to set contexts for rhetorical 
criticism in subsequent chapters.  To this end, it outlines Japan’s official immigration policies, 
offers a historical account of its foreign worker problem, and supplies statistical data to show the 
recent trends and current status of labor migration.  
Chapter 3 retraces the “beginning” of Japan’s foreign worker problem with particular 
sensitivity to female migrant laborers.  A distinctive feature of the migratory pattern in postwar 
Japan is that those who came to Japan for work initially consisted overwhelmingly of women 
(Douglas, 1993, p. 7).  Beginning in the late 1970s, tens of thousands of women have annually 
entered Japan for work on entertainer or tourist visas (Douglas and Roberts, 2000, p. 3).  In 
reality, most of them have been recruited to work in fūzoku sangyō, or “adult entertainment 
industry.”13  Despite the fact that migrant women made up the vast majority of de facto “foreign 
workers” until 1987, their growing presence “was not recognized in the context of international 
labor migration, but was treated rather as a problem of social mores, or the ‘internationalization 
of sexual exploitation’” (Mori, 1997, pp. 70-71).  Put differently, it was the upsurge of male 
migrant workers in the late 1980s that sparked a national debate over the acceptance of foreign 
workers (Shin, 2001, p. 276).  My database search found that the term “foreign worker problem” 
itself had rarely been used in the media until 1987.  Prior to that, “illegal” migrant women had 
                                                 
13 New Proceed Japanese-English Dictionary defines “fūzoku” as manners or customs (Hasegawa, Turney, and 
Hashimoto, 1995, p. 1258).  But fūzoku as in fūzoku gyō (business) is a euphemism for sex or adult entertainment. 
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been commonly called Japayuki-san (Ms. Japan-bound) which was a pejorative term derived 
from Karayuki-san, or Japanese women who went abroad as prostitutes in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.   
Chapter 3 demonstrates that the label of Japayuki-san induced the public, the media, and 
policy makers to frame the issue of female migration in terms of morality and policing at the 
neglect of its labor aspects (Mackie, 2000, p. 250).  Consequently, a public discussion of the 
foreign worker problem was geared almost exclusively towards male manual and menial 
laborers.  As Sellek (1996) holds, the predominant image of “illegal” foreign workers was that of 
“economically motivated males who take up unskilled, dirty, difficult, and dangerous jobs” (p. 
160).  Ironically, as “the fate of migrant labor became perhaps the most widely discussed social 
problem of the late 1980s” (Lie, 1992, p. 35), the public’s interests in the presence of migrant 
women subsided.  Nor did it become a subject of academic study or a serious policy concern 
(Yamanaka, 1993, p. 82).   
The neglect of women migrant workers in no way means that they suffer less than their 
male counterparts.  On the contrary, unregistered female migrants are so vulnerable to human 
rights violations and exploitation as to be viewed as “virtual prisoners” (Oka, 1994, p. 58).  In 
view of this, Douglas (1993) said it all: “Whatever the reason, the degree to which the migration 
of women is ignored in the international migration literature is striking” (p. 95).   
Scarce political, public, and scholarly attention to “illegal” migrant women raises 
intriguing questions regarding gender, race, and sex.  As Yamanaka (1993) argues, “[t]he belated 
attention of policy makers to the problem [of Asian women] suggests that both racism and 
sexism play a role in determining policy priorities, and that women’s work in the leisure industry 
is regarded not as proper employment but as immoral activity akin to crime” (p. 82).  Chapter 3 
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re-examines the “beginning” of Japan’s “foreign worker problem” by attending to public 
discourse on “newcomer” migrants during the 1980s.  In particular, it seeks to chart the process 
in which the focus of the discourse shifted from the Japayuki-san phenomenon to the foreign 
worker problem.   
Chapters 4 and 5 focus more broadly on undocumented migrants rather than “illegal” 
foreign workers.  Undocumented migrants are usually called “illegal aliens” in popular parlance.  
Strictly speaking, the problem of “illegal aliens” entails more diverse issues than the foreign 
worker problem.  However, given that a substantial portion of “illegal” foreign workers now live 
with their family members (who may or may not work), the issue of “illegal aliens” is 
inextricably bound up with the foreign worker problem.  As Kuwahara (1993) points out, the 
scope of the foreign worker problem has expanded to work-unrelated issues, including local 
community, housing, family, medical care, education, and crime (p. 133).   
 Chapter 4 illustrates that as the Japanese economy has plunged into a decade-long 
recession, “illegal aliens” have been increasingly portrayed as an unprecedented threat to public 
safety despite the fact that they accounted for only 0.4% of the total criminal suspects in 2002 
(Nakashima, 2004b, pp. 11-12).  To this end, it conducts a critical analysis of official reports and 
popular texts about foreign crimes with particular emphasis on the latter.  Whereas many 
criticisms have been leveled against official crime reports (e.g. Friman 1996, 2001), the news 
coverage of foreign crime in Japan has rarely been a subject of rigorous study.  Inquiry into 
official reports, though no doubt valuable in its own right, offers only an incomplete explanation 
of the growing national hysteria over an alleged foreign crime wave.  For state officials are but 
one, albeit important, actor in shaping the public knowledge about “illegal aliens.”  In the final 
analysis, the association of unauthorized migrants with atrocious crimes is not simply a product 
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of state authorities’ political maneuvering, but a result of “the combined effects of the activities 
of relatively autonomous fields (the general public, mass media, police and judiciary)” (Herbert, 
1996, p. 163).   
 Building on Stuart Hall et al.’s model of crime reporting, Chapter 4 shows that the 
popular media play an active role in hyping up the threat of crimes by Chinese “illegals.”  For 
instance, they tend to characterize Chinese criminals as irrevocably cruel, naturally wicked, and 
qualitatively different from their Japanese counterparts.  Equally problematic is the way “illegal” 
Chinese newcomers are linked with transnational crime syndicates, notably the Chinese Mafia, 
as if they entered Japan with the intention of committing crimes.  Despite the media’s frequent 
reference to “the Chinese Mafia,” the term is nowhere used in official reports.  What official 
reports state is that Chinese nationals are more likely to commit crimes in groups than the 
Japanese.  Too often, this official account is translated in the popular media that “illegal” 
Chinese migrants are members of organized criminal rings.  In this way, the popular media fuel 
the public anxiety over the danger of Chinese “illegals.”   
 The period under study in this chapter spans January 1997 to February 2005.  This time 
period was chosen because government officials and the media alike began to express grave 
concern about criminal activities involving Chinese “illegals” around 1997 (Friman, 2001, p. 
299).  As samples of popular texts on the theme of foreign crime, the chapter scrutinizes 
bunkobon (pocket-sized paperbacks) and mook (magazine-style books).  Bunkobon is the most 
popular book format in Japan and available in most bookstores at reasonable prices (from $5 to 
$15).  Almost all major publishing companies have a good collection of bunkobon.  According to 
the website of the Book and the Computer (1999), “Japanese publishers have so far issued some 
50 extensive ‘pocket libraries,’ with over 5,000 new titles appearing every year.  More than 100 
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million bunkobon are sold annually, ranging from classical literature to contemporary 
bestsellers” (n.p.).  In short, the fact that a publisher decides to reprint a book as a small, 
inexpensive paperback is a good indicator of its popularity.  Mook is a coined Japanese term that 
is an amalgam of book and magazine.  As the term suggests, mook falls somewhere between a 
book and a special issue of magazine.  Many publishers put out mook titles on a regular basis at 
affordable prices (from $10 to $20).  Each mook is dedicated to a single topic, and multiple 
authors contribute articles to it.  Some mook even have issue and volume numbers.  In addition to 
mook and bunkobon, the chapter looks into articles on a Chinese crime wave in popular 
magazines as they are major venues for self-proclaimed Chinese experts to put out sensational 
crime reports.  Lastly, the chapter occasionally references national dailies and TV programs to 
supplement my analysis of these written texts. 
 In searching bunkobon and mook titles on foreign crime, I utilized multiple online 
catalogues and search engines of major libraries and bookstores—including the National Diet 
Library, the Tokyo Metropolitan Library, Kinokuniya Book-Web, and Amazon.co.jp—to access 
as many books on the topic as possible.  In the absence of any bibliography on the subject, this 
sort of search was the only way to collect relevant titles.  As far as magazine articles are 
concerned, I relied on Nichigai: Magazine Plus and Web Ōya-bunko.  Regarding TV programs, I 
taped or watched dozens of shows featuring crimes by “illegal” Chinese migrants broadcast from 
July 2003 through February 2005.   
 Chapter 5 investigates how overstaying foreigners, citizens’ groups, and academics 
collaborated during the special residence permission campaign during September 1999 and 
February 2000.  Special residence permission is dispensation the Justice Minister gives to a small 
fraction of undocumented foreigners on humanitarian grounds.  Unlike a general amnesty 
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program, special residence permission is granted only in the last stage of deportation.  In other 
words, undocumented foreigners must first surrender to the Immigration Bureau before filing a 
petition for special residency.  At present, appealing for special residence permission is the only 
recourse for undocumented migrants to get their status regularized. 
 One notable trend in recent years is that a considerable number of once-thought 
temporary foreign workers have become long-term residents despite their illegal status.  
However, the Japanese government has been keen on regulating “illegal aliens,” but not on 
regularizing their status.  Clinging to the decades-long legal framework, the government has 
failed to take adequate measures conducive to the rights and benefits of undocumented migrant 
workers and their families.  Against this backdrop, the campaign for special residence permission 
could be understood as a challenge to the state’s inaction.   
 On September 1, 1999, 21 visa overstayers—five families and two individuals from 
Bangladesh, Iran, and Myanmar—turned themselves in to the Tokyo Immigration Bureau to file 
petitions for special residence permission.  Five lawyers and about 30 supporters accompanied 
them.  This was the first collective petitioning for normalized status by visa overstayers neither 
married nor related to native residents.  Owing to relentless campaigning efforts by diverse social 
actors at various levels, then Justice Minister Hideo Usui conceded special residency to 16 out of 
the 21 applicants, or 4 Iranian families, in early February.  A Burmese family of three and two 
individuals were denied their petitions.   
The granting of special resident permission to the 16 undocumented migrants was 
“landmark approval” (JT, January 29, 2000, p. 2) and thus provides a fascinating case for the 
study of social movements.  For one thing, overstaying foreigners acted not simply as 
“marginals,” but as “crafters” of the campaign, to borrow Touraine’s (1984/88) words (p. 73).  
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At least, they were represented as such throughout the campaign.  As special residence 
permission had been rarely granted to those overstayers neither married nor related to native 
residents, APFS initially hesitated to resort to political action.  In APFS’s narrative, it was the 
overstaying foreigners that persuaded them to fight for special residency.  For another, the 
campaign was effectively coordinated through national networks of advocacy groups and 
concerned individuals.  Indeed, the campaign might well be viewed as a quintessential case of 
“new social movements” in that it was led by spontaneously organized, heterogeneously 
constituted, and widely-dispersed groups outside of existing political institutions (for the features 
of new social movements, see Habermas, 1981/1987).   
 The specific purpose of this chapter is two-fold.  First, the chapter analyzes the rhetorical  
and media strategies the overstaying foreigners and their support groups deployed in negotiating 
with state officials, combating public indifference, and challenging the unsavory images of 
“illegal aliens.”  Close scrutiny of their discursive struggle is important because social activism 
owes a great deal to the strategic mobilization of symbolic resources for a common political goal.  
Equally significant in this respect is the involvement of journalists in the campaign.  Chapter 5 
illustrates that the special residence permission campaign was among rare movements in which 
journalists within the mainstream media developed a trusting relationship with foreign worker 
support groups and enabled them to generate public pressure on immigration authorities.  Also of 
interest in this chapter is how scholars worked in close liaison with the visa overstayers and 
activists to support the campaign, while maintaining their critical and autonomous functions.  In 
October 1999, 12 concerned migration scholars formed a group to endorse the special residence 
permission campaign.  Until then, migration scholars in Japan had never been collectively 
involved in social movements (Ishii, Sadamatsu, and Ikeda, 2000, n.p.).  Although I don’t intend 
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to write a celebratory, triumphant piece commending the long awaited collective engagement by 
Japanese academics, I would argue that the scholarly group contributed to this momentous 
campaign chiefly by making public use of their expertise in an “activist mode,” to borrow 
Bourdieu’s (1998) phrase (p. 57).   
 A brief concluding chapter follows to summarize the major findings in this work and 
make several suggestions for future research. 
 
1.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
All in all, this dissertation is an attempt to write about and for “illegal” foreign workers, not as 
an activist but as a researcher.  Soon before Bourdieu died, he (2001/2003) delivered an address 
to students at Humboldt University, calling for more political engagement on the researcher’s 
part:  
Given the particular role of “ideas” in this scheme, researchers have a key part to play.  
They have to provide political action with new ends—the demotion of the dominant 
beliefs—and new means—technical weapons—based on research and a command of 
scientific knowledge, and symbolic weapons, capable of undermining common beliefs 
by putting research findings into an accessible form. (p. 36)  
 
Bourdieu’s passionate appeal reverberates throughout this work.  In particular, it is 
intended to contribute to public discourse on undocumented foreign workers by illuminating the 
neglected history of migrant women (Chapter 3), critiquing the media hype over irregular 
Chinese migrants’ crimes (Chapter 4), and analyzing the agency and representation of 
unregistered foreigners as social actors (Chapter 5).  I believe that such counter narratives could 
promote a better understanding of undocumented migrants, supply the reader with resources for 
challenging their popular images, and contribute to a more vigorous public debate on the foreign 
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worker problem.  Hopefully, this work will provide a starting point for exploring alternative 
rhetoric that better accounts for the lives of unregistered foreigners and helps to empower them.  
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2.0  JAPAN’S FOREIGN WORKER PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides an overview of Japan’s foreign worker problem to set contexts for 
rhetorical criticism in subsequent chapters.  To this end, it consists of three major sections.  The 
chapter begins by reviewing Japan’s official policies towards the employment of foreign 
nationals.  It then offers a historical background to its foreign worker problem with primary 
emphasis on post-war Japan.  The chapter concludes by providing basic data on the recent trends 
and current status of labor migration in Japan.   
 
 
2.2 JAPAN’S OFFICIAL IMMIGRATION POLICIES  
 
Japan has never officially accepted unskilled foreign workers despite the fact that they “have 
proved a valuable solution to the chronic labor shortage suffered by small-scale, labor-intensive 
industry” (Yamanaka, 1993, p. 86).  According to the Immigration Control Act, foreign 
nationals, in order to obtain work visas, must possess specialized skills native workers are unable 
to master (Spencer, 1992, p. 762).  Low-skilled or semi-skilled workers have been strictly barred 
from entry in postwar Japan on the grounds that their admission would 1) take away jobs from 
the elderly, 2) hinder improvements in labor productivity, and 3) generate unbearable social costs 
(YS, 2001, April 24, p. 23).  The only exception is foreigners of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin).  No 
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restriction on work is placed on Nikkeijin who hold long-term visa status.  In reality, the vast 
majority of Nikkeijin engage in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs as contract workers.  In view of 
this Tezuka (2004) considers Nikkeijin “Japan’s first legally admitted foreign workers” (p. 123). 
The number of “illegal” male foreign workers began to increase at a rapid rate in the mid-
1980s as the so-called bubble economy engendered a chronic demand for a cheap, unskilled, and 
flexible labor force legally and symbolically distinct from permanent residents, professional 
foreign workers, and Japanese citizens.  The vast majority of such “newcomers” initially came 
from the Philippines, Iran, Bangladesh, and Pakistan until the Japanese government suspended 
its bilateral visa-waiver accords with Bangladesh and Pakistan in January 1989 and with Iran in 
April 1992 (Tanaka, 1995, p. 200).  Unskilled foreign workers now hail mostly from other parts 
of Asia and South America.  They typically enter Japan on short-term visas and overstay after 
their visas expire.  Some of them enter Japan with forged passports; a few smuggle themselves 
into Japan as stowaways with the aid of underground brokers.  Illegal entrants14 and stowaways 
usually pay lucrative commission fees to private agents and labor brokers for assisting them to 
enter and find jobs in Japan.  “Illegal” foreign workers, unlike resident Korean and Chinese or 
Nikkeijin, are not ethnically, legally, and socio-culturally deemed to be Japanese (for the 
typology of foreigners in Japan, see Shipper, 2001, p. 89).  Not surprisingly, they are susceptible 
to various social injustices, including unpaid wages, unlawful dismissal, lack of compensation 
for work-related injuries, housing discrimination, physical abuse, and forced prostitution.  
“Illegal” foreign workers are also ineligible for national health insurance, unemployment 
benefits, livelihood protection, and pension insurance accorded to all citizens and legal aliens in 
Japan (Shipper, 2001, pp. 101-102).  
                                                 
14 Although official immigration documents separate illegal entry (via air route) from illegal landing (via sea route), 
the term “illegal entrants” encapsulate both categories in this work. 
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 2.3 A HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN WORKER PROBLEM IN MODERN JAPAN 
 
2.3.1  The Problem of Foreign Workers in Prewar Japan (1868-1945) 
 
 
Contrary to popular beliefs, the foreign worker problem is not unprecedented in Japan.  Indeed, 
Japan has a rich history of labor migration dating back to the Meiji Restoration of 1868.  
Initially, foreigners were allowed to reside only in designated foreign settlements in such major 
port towns as Yokohama, Kōbe, and Nagasaki.  As Yamawaki (2000b) explains:  
Those who occupied the settlements were Westerners, mainly British and American, 
the Chinese.  Many of the Western merchants came from China as agents of firms 
already trading in the Chinese ports of Canton, Hong Kong, Shanghai and elsewhere.  
Therefore, most of the Chinese were brought to Japan by those western merchants as 
compradors, cooks, servants, and longshoremen.  The Chinese were not officially 
allowed to reside in the settlements, but their existence in them was overlooked by the 
Japanese authorities because they were employed by the Westerners. (p. 40) 
 
As Yamawaki’s sustained historical analysis illuminates, the acceptance of Chinese workers had 
been a major topic of policy debate since the late 19th century.  He (2000b) points to a striking 
resemblance in newspaper reporting on the issue of foreign workers between pre-war and post-
war periods: 
Common opinion among the mass media during this period [the 1880s and 1890s] was 
that Japan could not help but accept Westerners, but it should reject the Chinese.  For 
example, an editorial entitled “The Joy and Anxiety of Mixed Residency,” in Jiji 
Shinpō on 20 February 1884 argued that there was a serious problem with Chinese 
workers in the United States, and that Japan would have a more serious problem if it 
opened its borders since it was situated much closer to China than was the United 
States. (p. 41)    
 
 The abolition of the foreign settlements and the introduction of imperial ordinances in 
1899 ushered in a new era of Japan’s immigration policy.  These political changes enabled 
Westerners to live and work freely in Japan, while confining Chinese workers to the former 
foreign settlements (Yamawaki, 2000b, p. 39).  This indicates that ever since the government 
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began to recruit foreign workers, it has adopted a two-pronged approach, inviting Westerners as 
skilled professionals and utilizing Asians as low-skilled laborers.  In consequence, Asians have 
been perceived, treated, and represented as second-class foreigners distinct from Westerners.15         
While Lie (2001) rightly points out that the “foreign workers” is a racialized and class-based 
label (p. 20), such a conception existed long before the term came into popular use.  Indeed, 
Utsumi (1990) traces the beginning of Japan’s foreign worker problem to the implementation of 
the imperial ordinances in 1899 (p. 114).  Along similar lines, Weiner (1994) sums up the 
ordinances:  
The most important of these [laws and ordinances restricting the entry of foreign 
workers], Imperial Ordinances 352 and 421 introduced in July 1899, stipulated that 
aliens were prohibited from taking up employment outside the foreign concession 
areas as general laborers engaged in agriculture, fishing, mining, construction, 
engineering, manufacturing and transportation without the expressed approval of the 
competent prefectural authorities. . . .  While these laws, as well as those which they 
supplemented, were applied to all foreigners irrespective of national origin, both 
appear to have been drawn up with the intention of restricting the employment of 
Chinese coolie labour in particular. (pp. 52-53) 
 
The ordinances, however, had only limited effects in curbing the entry of Chinese immigrant 
workers.  Yamawaki (2000b) documents that the admission of Chinese workers remained a 
serious social issue during the 1920s (p. 43).  Similarly, Furuya (2004) estimates that thousands 
of Chinese nationals continued to work in Japan at that time (p. 30).  They typically “worked in 
three professions which required the use of knives or razors, i.e., as barbers, cooks and tailors, 
and also kimono fabric merchants, coolies, longshoreman, laborers” (Komai, 1999/2001, p. 13).  
While most Chinese immigrants returned home after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 (Komai, 
                                                 
15 Ōno and Yoshida (2001) write that “Japan’s policy for accepting foreign workers since the 1960s has persistently 
distinguished between those regarded as professionals or technicians, and the unskilled welcoming the former but 
shunning the latter” (n.p.).  Although this observation is accurate in the context of postwar Japan, it should be noted 
that such a distinction is much older than they postulated.  
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2000, p. 13), Mori (1986) notes that about 10,000 Chinese still resided in Japan at the end of 
World War II in 1945 (p. 200).   
Although some Koreans immigrated to Japan as early as the late 1890s, the vast majority 
of them came to Japan after its annexation of Korea in 1910.  In particular, Japanese enterprises 
and brokers aggressively recruited Korean workers to alleviate labor shortages in the face of a 
booming economy during World War I.  As imperial Japan got entangled in World War II, an 
enormous volume of Korean labor force became mobilized to take up manual and menial jobs in 
industrial, mining, and construction sectors.  As a result, Korean immigrants, who numbered 
only 791 in 1910 (Herbert, 1996, p. 22), surpassed 10,000 in 1917, 129,000 in 1925, and about 
two million in 1945 (Utsumi, 1990, pp. 115-117).  Over 720,000 Koreans were forced to move to 
Japan as manual and menial laborers from 1939 to 1945 alone (Zhuo, 1992, p. 15).  According to 
Weiner (1994), they were “disproportionately represented within the day-labouring population” 
(p. 91).  After Japan’s defeat in 1945, more than 1.5 million Koreans returned to their homeland; 
roughly 500,000 others chose to stay on in Japan “in part because of the political uncertainty and 
high inflation in their homeland and because of the difficulties of repatriating the property they 
had accumulated” (Komai, 1993/1995, p. 234).  
Since Chinese and Korean immigrants generally belonged to the lower strata of the 
society, they were subject to various levels of discrimination and even violence.  The most 
striking instance of this public animosity was the massacre of thousands of Korean immigrants in 
the aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923.  The army, the police, and vigilante groups 
were mobilized when scurrilous rumors spread of armed uprising and disturbances (such as 
poisoning wells or setting fires) by Korean immigrants and Japanese sympathizers (for details, 
see Weiner, 1994). 
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Seen in this historical context, the influx of foreign workers since the 1980s is but the 
latest phase of long-lasting labor migration.  Too often, this historical perspective is overlooked 
in a contemporary debate over the foreign worker problem.  As Yamawaki (2000b) astutely 
observes: 
The growth of the foreign worker population has become a major issue in Japan since 
the late 1980s.  When the nationwide debate on the question was at its height in 1988 
and 1989, it was assumed by many commentators, both for and against the influx of 
foreign workers to Japan, that it was a new and unprecedented phenomenon….  Any 
serious student of Japanese history, however, knows that prewar Japan faced a grave 
problem regarding Korean and Chinese immigrant workers. (p. 38)   
 
In sum, Japan has a long history of utilizing foreign nationals as cheap laborers to sustain 
its economy.  It is a popular misconception that Japan had not encountered any foreign worker 
problem until the 1980s.  If anything, the thesis that the foreign worker problem is 
unprecedented is a recurring narrative.  By saying this, I don’t mean to claim that the ongoing 
foreign worker problem is little different from the previous waves of labor migration.  What 
marks the current phase of labor migration is the massive uncontrolled inflows of “undesirable” 
foreign workers.  This point is to be elaborated in the next section.  
 
2.3.2 A History of the Foreign Worker Problem in Postwar Japan 
 
 
The Immigration Control Act of 1952 set a fundamental legal framework for immigration 
policies in postwar Japan.  As Komai (1999/2001) puts it, the law “ignored or placed little 
emphasis on human rights, while imposing a system of strict surveillance” (p. 15).  Due to the 
restrictive immigration politics and the devastated economy, there had been no large-scale influx 
of foreign workers into Japan until the 1980s.  On the contrary, “Japan was an exporter of labor 
until the mid-1970s when the last ship—taking workers to Brazil—departed” (Goodman, Peach, 
Takenaka, and White, 2003, p. 3).  As 40% of the GNP was lost and over 6.6 million of civilians 
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and military personnel returned from the former colonies, the Japanese government officially 
promoted overseas emigration mainly to North and South America after Japan regained its 
independence in 1952.  Postwar emigration reached its peak in the 1950s and began to decrease 
in 1962; the total number of emigrants had dropped from 110,000 in the 1950s to 79,000 in the 
1960s (Mori, 1997, pp. 34-35; Tsuchida, 1998, p. 106).   
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Japanese economy embarked on a long period of 
expansion.  Notably, Japan, unlike many other indurialized countries, did not rely on foreign 
labor force to achieve its rapid and sustained economic growth.  As Douglas and Roberts (2000) 
explain, while European countries, particularly West Germany and France, were aggressively 
recruiting “guest workers” from abroad in the 1950s-1970s period, Japan was still able to utilize 
rural migrants and working-age women as a large pool of low-wage and flexible labor (p. 6).  
Besides, Japanese employers immensely benefited from disproportionately longer working hours 
at that time (Kajita, 1994; Kondō, 2002).16  On top of that, Japanese firms opted to develop 
“labor-saving” technologies, to promote automation in manufacturing facilities, and to transfer 
labor-intensive production and assembly operations overseas in efforts to overcome domestic 
labor shortages.   
While many Japanese policymakers proudly claim that Japan was the only industrial 
nation that achieved a remarkable economic growth without relying on foreign workers, it is 
little known that mounting pressure from industry led policy makers to deliberate on the 
importation of foreign labor force in the mid-1960s, especially after the ratification of the Treaty 
on Basic Relations with the Republic of Korea in 1965 (Utsumi and Matsui, 1988, p. 39).  
However, the Ministry of Labor took a firm stand against the acceptance of foreign workers, 
                                                 
16 Kondō (2002) documents that “[i]n the mid-1960s, Japanese workers clocked 2,660 at work; in 1982, the number 
of annual work hours declined to 2,100 hours, but this was still higher than 1,690 in then West Germany and 1,650 
in France” (p. 416). 
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insisting that it was too early even in the wake of an increasingly acute labor shortage (AS, 1966, 
August 20, p. 1).  This “closed-door” policy was officially decreed at a Cabinet meeting on 
March 14, 1967 in conjunction with the First Basic Plan on Employment Measures 1967-1971.  
The Cabinet’s decree was renewed in 1973 and 1976, which cemented the official position 
against the introduction of foreign labor force (Herbert, 1996, p. 23).  Partly because the decision 
was made behind closed doors, the issue did not draw extensive media attention; the debate over 
the acceptance of foreign workers had eventually subsided with the onset of an economic 
recession following the oil crisis in October 1973 (for details of the debate during this period, see 
Murashita, 1999, especially Chapter 2).17
Although the large-scale inflows of male foreign workers did not take place until the mid-
1980s, this needs to be put into perspective.  It is especially important to bear in mind that 
Japan’s growing economic presence in Asia since the late 1960s provided a condition for the 
influx of male migrant workers in a later period. 18   As the government lifted its overseas 
investment restrictions, Japan’s foreign direct investment surged from around 100 million yen to 
over one billion yen in 1972 (the year often referred to as the first year of foreign direct 
investment) (Athukorala and Manning, 2000, p. 37).  Since then, Japan has exerted strong 
economic influence in the Asia Pacific region through direct investment, trade, and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) as well as the large-scale relocation of production plants and the 
establishment of foreign branches.  The huge economic presence of Japan in the region has 
                                                 
17 The issue of migrant workers, particularly trainees, was sporadically reported in the early 1970s.  It is noteworthy 
that the term “foreign labor force” (gaikokujin rōdōryoku) was commonly used during this period.  See, for example, 
Ochiai’s Ajiajin Rōdōryoku Yunyū (The Import of Asian Labor Force) (1974); Tokushū: Gaikokujin Rōdōryoku No 
Jidai Ga Kita? (Special Reports: Is It Time for Accepting Foreign Labor Force?) in the December 29, 1970 issue of 
Gekkan Ekonomisuto (Monthly Economist); “Gaikokujin Rōdōryoku Takamaru Dōnyū No Koe” (Growing Demands 
for Introducing Foreign Labor Force), Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 22, 1970, p. 11. 
18 At a theoretical level, see Sassen’s Mobility of Labor and Capital (1988) and Globalization and its Discontents 
(1998).  Both works offer a compelling analysis of how foreign direct investment in third-world countries has 
provided a condition for international migration flows from the South to the North. 
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provided incentives for prospective migrant workers to choose Japan as a country of destination.  
Besides, the large-scale influx of foreign workers into Japan must be understood in the context of 
the international flows of migrant workers that had already existed in Asia (for a detailed 
analysis of the structural labor migration phenomena in East Asia, see Athukorala and Manning, 
1999).   
More specifically, the rapid increase of male foreign laborers in the mid-1980s was 
spawned by a number of interlocking factors at home and abroad.  Principal among them were 
the appreciation of the Japanese yen following the 1985 Plaza Accords; acute domestic labor 
shortages; faltering economies in neighboring Asian countries and their official policies to 
promote overseas labor migration; the decline of oil prices and the ensuing recession in the 
Middle East (a major source of jobs for Asian migrants)19; the prolonged Iran-Iraq War; Japan’s 
strong economic and cultural presence in the Asia Pacific region; and huge wage differentials 
between Japan and sending countries (see Table 2.1).  It should also be noted that large 
reservoirs of hitherto under-utilized female and rural workers in Japan dried up by the early 
1980s.   
 
Table 2.1: Per-capita GNP of Asian Countries in 1987 (in US dollars) 
 
  Country  GNP (US Dollars) Ratio (%)  
 Japan   15,770   100.00 
  Thailand  840   5.3 
  The Philippines 590   3.7 
  Indonesia  450   2.9 
  Pakistan  350   2.2. 
  Bangladesh  160   1.0   
 
Source: World Bank Atlas, cited in Kantō Bengoshikai Rengōkai (Kantō Lawyers’ Association), 1990, p. 112 
 
                                                 
19 According to United Nations Centre for Regional Development (1991), about 80% of Asian migrants went to the 
Middle East for work during the 1970s and 1980s (cited in Iyotani, 1996, p. 49). 
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To top it off, the structure of Japan’s capitalist system necessitates small and medium-
sized firms, which account for two-thirds of Japan’s economic output (Papademetriou and 
Hamilton, 2000, p. 57), to hire cheap foreign laborers to stay in business.  That is, unable to 
relocate their production and assembly bases abroad, small and medium-sized businesses are 
forced to take orders from large corporations on unfair terms that would never pay off if they 
hired native workers.  In particular, smaller subcontractors that cannot afford to hire Nikkeijin 
have no choice but to employ clandestine workers for survival.  By extension, even large 
corporations would run into severe difficulties carrying on with their normal operations absent 
unskilled foreign workers (for illustration of this point, see Cornelius, 1993, pp. 439-440).   
The massive influx of unskilled foreign workers since the mid-1980s was often depicted 
as foreign pressure (gaiatsu) calling for “a third opening of the country” (daisan no kaikoku).  
The implication is that the inflow of “illegal” foreign workers is comparable in magnitude to the 
arrival of Commodore Perry-led “black ships” in 1853 and Japan’s defeat in World War II in 
1945.  For example, Kanji Nishio (1990), a staunch opponent of the “open-door” policy, 
contends:  
Japan has been fundamentally and extensively shaken by the actions of foreigners twice 
in the course of its modern history: first by the arrival of the ‘black ships,’ the 
American fleet that forced the opening of the country in the mid-nineteenth century, 
and then by the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. . . . The 
arrival of foreign workers in large numbers might be a third major shock from the 
outside. (p. 56) 
 
Such a historical account is one-dimensional at best as it posits that “illegal” foreign workers are 
external forces disrupting otherwise tranquil Japan.  What is missing is that Japan had kept 
exporting capital abroad for nearly 20 years before the advent of the foreign worker problem 
(Athukorala and Manning, 1999, pp. 6-7, pp. 36-37).  Nevertheless, the metaphor of “open-door 
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vs. closed door” dictated the “foreign worker” debate.  Accordingly, a major focus of the debate 
was over whether unskilled foreign workers were boons to or drains on the national economy. 
   The rapid rise in unauthorized foreign workers prompted the government to make the 
biggest amendments to the Immigration Control Act since it took effect in 1952.  A revision to                      
the Immigration Control Act was passed in a regular Diet session in December 1989 and enacted 
in June 1990.  The government’s ambivalent attitudes towards unskilled foreign workers were 
reflected in the revised law.  Reduced to essentials, the goal of the revision was to “facilitate the 
immigration of professional and skilled personnel, while confirming its basic principle of not 
accepting ‘unskilled’ foreign labor” (Kashiwazaki, 2002b, n.p.).  Although numerous changes 
were made, the following three changes deserve particular mention.  To begin with, the revised 
law has expanded the number of visa categories from 18 to 28 to match the actual flows and 
stocks of foreign nationals in Japan.  Among them, 16 categories are work-related (Noro, 2002, 
p. 6).   The new law has also streamlined the screening procedures for the entry of professional 
and skilled foreign workers and their families.  At the same time, the revised Immigration 
Control Act has strengthened sanctions for brokers and employers who knowingly recruit or hire 
unauthorized foreign workers.  Under the new law, they could be sentenced to a maximum of 
three-year imprisonment or two million yen (approximately $18,000) fines. 20   Also, “[i]n 
contrast to standard international practice at the time, the 1990 law allows not only deportation 
but also fines and imprisonment for apprehended unauthorized workers” (Papademetriou and 
Hamilton, 2000, p. 38).   
While the amended law toughened sanctions against the illegal employment of foreign 
nationals, it also included three side-door policies to allow for the continued entry of de-facto 
                                                 
20 All figures in this work are converted at the rate of 110 yen to the dollar.  Note that the figures are rounded for the 
sake of readability. 
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unskilled foreign workers.  First of all, the maximum working hours for foreign students with 
work permits were extended from 20 hours a week to 28 hours a week.  Secondly, the new 
immigration law and the Justice Ministry’s supplementary directives in August overhauled the 
foreign trainee program.  Notably, they exempted companies “from a 5 percent ceiling on the 
proportion of trainees to regular workers” (SOPEMI, 1999, p. 167), which enabled small 
businesses with less than 20 employees to accept up to three foreign trainees through 
intermediate organizations.  Until then, the acceptance of foreign trainees had been restricted to 
large corporations with overseas operations.  These policy changes greatly facilitated the entry of 
foreign trainees.  Although the trainee visa status itself was introduced into the immigration law 
in 1981, the number of trainees had shown only a modest increase until 1988 (see Table 2.2 on 
the next page).  The government implemented additional measures to improve the foreign trainee 
programs in the early 1990s.  In September 1991, the Japan International Training Cooperation 
Organization (JITCO) was set up under the joint jurisdiction of four ministries—the Labor 
Ministry, the Justice Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry; the Construction Ministry joined the body later (Shimada, 1994, p. 72).  The 
organization was designed primarily to assist small- and medium-sized companies in accepting 
foreign trainees (Yamawaki, 1996, p. 23). 21   
According to the JITCO’s website, “[t]raining means to learn the technology, skills, and 
knowledge of industry, and not to work [italics added]” (n.p.).  For this reason they receive only 
petty amounts of “training allowances” which are even lower than the wages foreign students 
                                                 
21 The applicant must meet a set of conditions to be admitted as a trainee.  According to Hanami (1998), “(1) they 
must be older than 18 years; (2) their aim must be to gain a skill, technique or knowledge which they are unable to 
get in their home country; (3) they must return to the home country ready to work at a job which requires the skill, 
technique or knowledge gained during their stay in Japan; (4) the skill, technique or knowledge gained through 
training must not be acquired by mere repetition of the same activities; and (5) training must be conducted under the 
leadership of regular employees with more than 5 years’ experience” (pp. 228-229).   
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and clandestine workers gain (Mori, 1997, pp. 129).  According to Migration News, trainees 
receive a monthly stipend of $661 to $744 on average, which is remarkably low given that 
domestic workers earn $2,000 to $3,000 for undertaking the same work (“Japan: Trainees and 
Illegal Migration”).  Despite the Labor Ministry’s stated goals to transfer skills and technology to 
developing countries, to redress trade imbalance, and to promote international cooperation, many 
foreign trainees are virtually hired to perform full-time menial jobs (Meissner, et al., 1993, p. 
71).  Of 597 companies surveyed during the 1989-1990 period, Komai (1992) found that 72% 
used trainees as de facto cheaper laborers (cited in Athukorala and Manning, 1999, p. 46).   
The government further conceded industry’s demands for foreign labor force by 
instituting the Technical-Intern Training Program (TITP) in April 1993.  The program was 
intended to allow the trainees who demonstrated a certain level of techniques, skills, and 
knowledge to continue to work in the same company as interns.  The maximum length of stay for 
technical and intern training is three years.   Once accepted as interns, trainees’ visa status will 
be switched to that of designated activities, which will entitle them to the same legal protections 
as native workers except that they don’t have the freedom to change their occupations. 
According to Asahi Shimbun on June 6, 2000, some 50,000 foreign nationals entered Japan on 
trainee visas in 1998; 45% of them were Chinese nationals (p. 15).  Approximately 13,000 
continued to stay in Japan as technical interns after the completion of the trainee program (AS, 
2000, June 6, p. 15; see also Table 2.2 on the next page).   
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Table 2.2: Flows and Stocks of Trainees and Interns (1982-2003) 
 
Y 1982 1983 1984  1985  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990  1991 1992 
a 9,973 11,929 13,262 13,987 14,388 17,081 23,432 29,489 37,566 43,649 43,627 
b n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Y 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
a 39,795 36,612 40,591 45,536 49,594 49,797 47,985 54,049 59,049 58,534 64,817 
b 160 1,861 2,296 3,624 6,339 13,066 12,422 16,107 22,268 22,977 27,233 
 
Notes: Y = year, a = newly entered trainees, b = technical internship program applicants  
Sources: Hōmu Daijin Kambō Shihō Hosei Chōsabu,1983-2004; Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 2003, p. 180;  
JITCO, n.d. 
 
 
 
The TITP, although a step forward from the trainee program, still leaves much to be 
desired.  Kuwahara (1998) isolates the shortcomings of the intern program. 
This program will not effectively reduce the influx of illegal immigrants; it mitigates 
but cannot stop it. . . .   Although it is officially characterized as a new means of 
training and skills transfer, many employers want to utilize it as a way to meet their 
labor shortage. . . .  Many [small and medium-sized enterprises] cannot afford the time 
and resources required for training, and immigrants want to work for immediate wages 
rather than train for semi-skilled positions.  Both employers and immigrants are asking 
for a more straightforward way to satisfy their needs. (p. 379)    
 
Likewise, Kashiwazaki (2002a) suggests that although technical interns are "workers" in the 
legal sense, they are paid much less than Japanese workers due to a series of deductions 
unilaterally imposed by employers:  
JITCO statistics show that approximately half of the 16,100 prospective technical 
interns in 2000 were expected to receive a monthly wage of less than 120,000 yen 
(US$900), and those who could expect 150,000 yen or more accounted for only 3 
percent. These figures are substantially lower than the average wages of Japanese 
workers, aged 20-29, in the manufacturing sector: approximately 240,000-280,000 yen 
for males and 190,000-210,000 for females, according to the 2002 Japan Statistical 
Yearbook. (n.p.) 
 
Last but not least, the revised immigration law has created a new visa category of “long-
term resident.”  In principle, a long-term visa is issued to those foreign nationals who prove to 
have close social or ancestral ties with Japanese society  (Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 1998, 
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p. 95).22  The visa is good for up to three years and indefinitely renewable.  Since a one-year, 
renewable visa is also issued to the dependants of long-term residents, it encourages Nikkeijin 
families to come to Japan for work. 
Many pundits decry the creation of the long-term visa status as a stopgap measure to 
admit unskilled foreign workers in a controlled, predictable, and arguably “culturally ‘safe’” 
fashion (Papademetrious and Hamilton, 2000, p. 37).  In response to this charge, the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) maintains that “ethnic Japanese” are entitled to work freely in 
their ancestral “homeland.”   For example, in conjunction with the amendment to the 
Immigration Control Act in 1990, the chair of the LDP’s foreign worker problem special 
committee claimed: “Some are of opinion that [Nikkeijin] should be treated in the same way as 
other foreigners.  But it is too painful to exclude Nikkeijin as they are an ethnic group related to 
us by blood” (cited in Niwa, 1998, p. 68).  The government’s real motive aside, the addition of 
the long-term resident visa category, coupled with the sluggish economy in South America, has 
resulted in a drastic increase in Nikkeijin and their families, mostly from Brazil and Peru.  As 
Athukorala and Manning (1999) note, the number of Nikkeijin skyrocketed from 4,000 in the late 
1980s to over 136,000 in 1992 (pp. 47).  Tsuda (1999) also estimates that “about 18 percent of 
the entire Japanese-Brazilian population currently resides in Japan” (p. 713). 
On a separate track, the 1980s witnessed a growing number of foreign students entering 
Japan.  Most of them were pre-college students who attended non-accredited Japanese-language 
schools.  Under the strong initiative of then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, the government 
initiated the 100,000 Foreign Student Program for the 21st Century in 1983.  As the name 
                                                 
22 Japan’s Nationality Law operates on the principle of blood lineage (jus sanguinis,) not of birthplace (jus soli).   
Apparently, this principle provides a rationale for the special treatment of foreign nationals with Japanese ancestry.  
The Immigration Bureau’s 1998 report on immigration control, for instance, rationalizes special measures taken for 
“foreigners who ‘share blood with Japanese society’” (Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 1998, p. 95).   
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suggests, the program was designed to bring in 100,000 foreign students at the turn of the 
century.  As the Japanese economy gained global presence, Nakasone reportedly felt the need to 
“internationalize” Japan’s educational system on a par with other G-7 countries by accepting 
50,000 foreign students (as in the United Kingdom) by the early 1990s and 100,000 students (as 
in France) by 2000.  To this end, the Justice Ministry simplified the administrative procedures 
for issuing pre-college student visas in October 1984.  The streamlined immigration procedures 
contributed greatly to boosting the number of pre-college students from 2,556 in 1982 to 35,107 
in 1988.  Of them, over 28,000 were Chinese nationals.  A large number of Chinese students 
came to Japan for study during this period because the Chinese government relaxed its visa 
restrictions on those studying abroad at their expense at the end of 1985 (Xi, 2002, p. 159).  
Concomitantly, the number of Japanese language schools soared around 1986 and amounted to 
414 in 1990 (Tanaka, 1995, p. 1990).  As of May 2003, 10, 9508 foreigners were admitted into 
Japan as students (Kitamura, 2004, p. 60). 
 
Table 2.3: Number of foreign nationals who newly enter Japan on college or pre-college visas (1982-
1992) 
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
College 3,410 3,912 4,329 4,797 5,419 5,812 6,435 7,777 9,528 9,620 10,368 
Precollege   2,556 3,448 4,140 8,942 12,637 13,915 35,107 18,183 20,851 20,654 27,367 
 
Sources: Hōmu Daijin Kambō Shihō Hosei Chōsabu, 1983-1988, Nyūkan Kyōkai, 1989-1993;  
Gurūpu Akakabu, 1989, p. 29  
 
 
 
Japanese language schools are often indicted as fronts for bringing in illegal unskilled 
laborers (Spencer, 1992, p. 764).  A considerable number of pre-college foreign students are 
believed to enter Japan for the purpose of work partly because Japanese schools aggressively 
recruit students from overseas with the promise of employment (Komai, 1993/1995, p. 55).  In 
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some cases, people linked with brokers in the entertainment business run Japanese language 
schools and recruit female students to work as hostesses and dancers (SS, 1988, May 9, cited in 
Komai, 1993/1995, pp. 55-56).  In a similar vein, Sakai (1989) charges: 
[O]ften enough, school managers have little, if any, connection with or interest in 
language education, given their prime occupations as real estate agents or bar owners 
and their preoccupation with the importation of cheap labor through their language 
schools.  By and large, many Japanese-language schools do not deserve to be called 
educational facilities.  (p. 411)    
 
All in all, while the Japanese government has steadfastly refused to allow the 
employment of unskilled foreign workers to date, the revised immigration law and the attendant 
policy changes have crystallized the three legal loopholes for the de-facto entry of unskilled 
foreign workers: Nikkeijin workers, trainees, and students (Athukorala and Manning 1999, p. 
51).  Partly due to these loopholes, the 1990 immigration law proved largely ineffective in 
stemming the tide of clandestine migration (Mori, 1997, p. 102).  As a result, the number of 
“illegal” foreign workers continued to rise until the mid-1990s. 
 
 
2.4 RECENT TRENDS AND CURRENT STATUS OF LABOR MIGRATION IN 
JAPAN  
 
As the Japanese economy slipped into a deep recession in the early 1990s, the anti-immigration 
sentiment began to arise among the general public.  Yet the prolonged economic stagnation has 
had little impact on the inflow of undocumented foreign workers (Watanabe, 1998, p. 235).  
While the number of foreign workers has been declining since the mid-1990s, Watanabe (1998) 
attributes it to tighter immigration control measures rather than the ailing economy (p. 235). 
The Japan Immigration Association places the number of registered foreigners at 
approximately 1.85 million as of December 2002 (Nyūkan Kyōkai, 2003, p. 3).  They account for 
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1.45% of the total population (p. 3).  Koreans compose by far the largest ethnic group with a 
population of 632,405, followed by Chinese (381,225), Brazilians (265,962), and Filipinos 
(156,667).  About 40% of the registered foreigners are permanent residents, the majority of 
whom are former colonial immigrants from Korea and Taiwan and their descendants (see Tables 
2.4-2.5). 
 
Table 2.4: Stocks of Foreign Population by Nationality as of December 31, 2002 
 
Country  N/S Korea China Brazil Philippines Peru USA Thailand 
Number 625.422 424,282 268,332 169,359 51,772 47,970 33,736 
Percentage 33.80% 22.90% 14.50% 9.10% 2.80% 2.60% 1.80% 
 
Country  Indonesia Vietnam UK Others Total 
Number 21,671 21,050 18,508 169,656 1,851,758 
Percentage 1.20% 12% 1.00% 9.10% 100% 
 
Source: Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 2003, p. 33 
 
 
Table 2.5: Number of Permanent Residents, Long-term Residents, and Foreign Workers as of 
December 2002 
 Permanent resident Long-term 
resident
Foreign workers
Number 713.775 522,746 179,639
Breakdown Special         489,900               a. 271,719 
 Others          223,875            b. 7,576 
               c. 243,451 
 
Notes: 1. a. = spouse or child of Japanese national, b. = spouse or child of permanent resident, c. = others (mostly  
Nikkeijin) 
2. Foreign workers denote registered foreigners with work permits 
3. The category of “others” composes mostly of accompanying family members, students, and trainees. 
Source: Nyūkan Kyōkai, 2003, pp. 14-21 
 
 
Japan’s tight immigration policy is evident in light of the percentage of foreign workers 
in the total labor population.  The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare estimates that some 
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710,000 foreign workers, legal or illegal, reside in Japan as of 2002 (Suzuki, 2004, p. 42).  They 
represent a meager 0.2 percent of the total work force in Japan, which is remarkably low 
compared with 6.0% in France, 8.8% in Germany, and 12.4% in the United States (see Table 2.6 
on the next page).  Of all the foreign workers in Japan, approximately 180,000 possess work 
visas.  Conversely, over 530,000 foreign nationals are believed to stay in Japan as so-called          
“simple laborers,” the type of workers the Japanese government has officially never admitted.  
Although the number of foreign workers is strikingly small relative to other industrialized 
countries, the government and the public are increasingly wary of a recent upsurge in “illegal” 
foreign workers (Komai, 1999/2001, p. 29).   
 
Table 2.6: Percentage of Foreign and Foreign-born Labor Force in the Total Labor Population in 
Selected OECD Countries (listed in alphabetical order) 
 
 Country   Number (in thousands) Percentage   
 Austria   345.6    10.5% 
 Australia*   2364.5    24.5%   
 Belgium (1999)   387.2    8.9%  
 Canada* (1996)  2839.1    19.2% 
  France    1577.6    6.0% 
 Germany   3546    8.8% 
 Italy    850.7    3.6% 
 Japan    154.7    0.2% 
 Korea    122.5    0.6% 
 Netherlands (1998)  235    3.4% 
 Switzerland   717.3    18.3% 
 United Kingdom  1229    4.4% 
 United States   17,400    12.4  
 
Note: * denotes figures of foreign-born labor force                                       Source: SOPEMI, 2003, p. 298 
 
The exact figures of “illegal” foreign workers are unknown, but according to OECD’s 
report, “illegal” foreign workers are estimated to constitute one third of the total foreign 
workforce in Japan (i.e., 232,000 out of 710,000) (SOPEMI, 2003, p. 208; see also Table 2.7).   
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Table 2.7: Stocks of Foreign Workers in Japan (Excluding Permanent Residents) during 1997-2000 
(in thousands) 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total 
660 670 670 710 
Diplomat and official business 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Foreign residents with work visas 107.3 119.0 125.7 154.7 
   Specialists in humanities or international    
       Services 
22.9 31.3 31.8 34.7 
   Entertainer 22.2 28.9 32.3 53.8 
   Engineer 12.9 15.2 15.7 16.5 
   Skilled Laborer 9.6 10.0 10.5 11.3 
   Instructor 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.4 
   Intra-company transferee 6.4 6.6 7.4 8.7 
   Professor 5.1 5.4 5.9 6.7 
   Investor and business manager 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.7 
   Religious activities 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 
   Researcher 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.9 
   Journalist 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
   Artist 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
   Medical services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
   Legal and accounting services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Trainees and working holiday makers 
12.1 19.6 23.3 29.7 
Estimates of Nikkeijin engaged in remunerative 
activities 
32.5 38.0 47.0 59.4 
Estimates of students engaged in part-time jobs 
234.1 220.8 220.5 233.2 
Estimates of Illegal workers 
276.8 271.0 251.7 232.1 
 
Note: Diplomats and government officials are not required to register and thus not reflected in the figures.  
 
Source: SOPEMI, 2003, p. 207. 
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In the absence of precise data, the number of “illegal” foreign workers is usually 
extrapolated from data on foreigners apprehended for immigration law violations and estimates 
of visa overstayers (tabulated from a discrepancy between entry and departure records).  The 
Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry estimated that 220,552 visa overstayers existed in 
Japan as of January 2003.  Looking by nationality, Koreans topped the list at 49,874 (22.5%), 
followed by Filipinos (30,100, or 13.6%), Chinese (29,676, or 13.5%), and Thais (15,693, or 
7.1%).  While visa overstayers were predominantly women until the mid-1980s, male migrants 
have outnumbered their female counterparts since 1988.  The majority of undocumented female 
migrants are believed to work in the entertainment industry as hostesses, waitresses, dancers, and 
prostitutes, whereas their male counterparts are filling a much wider band of occupations in 
construction, manufacturing, and service sectors (Douglas and Roberts, 2000, p. 7).  As a result 
of the stricter law enforcement measures and, to a less extent, the prolonged economic 
depression, male migrants have been decreasing in recent years, whereas migrant women have 
been on a slow yet constant rise.  As of 2003, a roughly equal number of male and female 
foreigners (52.2% and 47.8%, respectively) were considered to stay on after the expiry of their 
visas (see Table 2.8 on the next page). 
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 Table 2.8: Stocks of Visa Overstayers by Sex and Nationality (1990-2003) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total 106,497 159,828 278,892 298,646 293,800 286,704 284,500 282,986 276,810 
Male 66,851 106,518 190,996 192,114 180,060 168,532 160,836 155,939 149,828 
Female 39,646 53,310 87,896 106,532 113,740 118,172 123,664 127,047 126,982 
Korea 13,876 25,848 35,687 39,455 43,369 47,544 51,580 52,387 52,123 
Philippines 23,805 27,228 31,974 35,392 37,544 39,763 41,997 42,547 42,608 
China 10,039 17,535 25,737 33,312 39,738 39,511 39,140 38,296 37,590 
Thailand 11,523 19,093 44,354 55,383 49,992 44,794 41,280 39,513 37,046 
Malaysia 7,550 14,413 38,529 30,840 20,313 14,511 11,525 10,390 10,141 
Taiwan 4,775 5,241 6,729 7,457 7,871 7,974 8,502 9,409 9,430 
Peru 242 487 2,783 9,038 12,918 15,301 13,836 12,942 11,606 
Indonesia 315 582 1,955 2,969 3,198 3,205 3,481 3,758 4,692 
Sri Lanka 1,668 2,281 3,217 3,763 3,395 2,980 2,783 2,751 3,071 
Myanmar  1,234 2,061 4,704 6,019 6,391 6,189 5,885 5,900 5,829 
Others 3,1470 45,059 83,223 75,018 69,071 64,932 64,491 65,093 62,674 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total 271,048 251,697 232,121 224,067 220,552 
Male 145,225 134,082 123,825 118,122 115,114 
Female 125,823 117,615 108,296 105,945 105,438 
Korea 62,577 60,693 56,023 55,164 49,874 
Philippines 40,420 36,379 31,666 29,649 30,100 
China 34,800 32,896 30,975 27,582 29,676 
Thailand 30,065 23,503 19,500 16,925 15,693 
Malaysia 9,989 9,701 9,651 10,097 9,442 
Taiwan 9,437 9,243 8,849 8,990 9,126 
Peru 10,320 9,158 8,502 7,744 7,322 
Indonesia 4,930 4,947 5,315 6,393 6,546 
Sri Lanka 3,734 3,907 3,489 3,730 3,909 
Myanmar  5,487 4,986 4,473 4,177 3,890 
Others 59,289 56,284 53,678 53,616 54,974 
 
Source: Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 2003a, n.p.  
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According to the Ministry of Justice, 75.2% of those deported for violating immigration 
laws in 2002 were found working illegally (see Table 2.9).   
 
Table 2.9: Number of Foreigners Deported on Charges of Immigration and Criminal Laws 
Violations (2000-2002) 
 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total 51,459 40,764 41,935 45,910 
Illegal entry 9,186 8,952 8,388 9,251 
Illegal landing 748 826 789 777 
Overstay 40,756 30,063 31,520 34,266 
Illegal activities 476 594 859 1,119 
Criminal code offenses 296 329 388 417 
     
Illegal workers 44,190 33,508 32,368 34,325, 
Sources: Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 2003b, p. 54; Nyūkan Kyōkai, 2004, p. 69 
 
 
 
Broken down by visa status, two thirds of the deportees in 1997 entered Japan on tourist visas, 
followed by students and trainees (14%) and entertainers (3%); 16% of them were believed to 
have entered the country unlawfully (Watanabe, 1998, p. 247). 
 
 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of Japan’s foreign worker problem by placing it in a 
reasonably informed context of history and social circumstances.  The reader might get the 
impression that insufficient attention was paid to the post-1990 period.  But my historical 
account was deliberately left incomplete as its principal goal was to set contexts for rhetorical 
criticism in succeeding chapters.  More historical narratives will follow as I undertake a 
rhetorical analysis of media portrayals of “illegal” foreign workers. 
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3.0 THE “BEGINNING” OF THE FOREIGN WORKER PROBLEM IN JAPAN: 
FORGOTTEN FEMALE MIGRANTS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
Chapter 3 investigates the gendered nature of the foreign worker problem in Japan by 
reconsidering how the “beginning” of the problem was narrated in the 1980s.  Specifically, it 
puts forth three lines of arguments.  First, I argue that although female migration for sex work 
preceded the influx of male migrant laborers, it was not perceived as a foreign worker problem.  
Instead, migrant women were commonly called Japayuki-san, and their inflow was cast as the 
Japayuki-san phenomenon (Japayuki-san genshō) or the Japayuki-san problem (Japayuki-san 
mondai) (Sellek, 2001, p. 158).  This indicates that the term gaikokujin rōdōsha (foreign 
workers) is not only a racialized and class-based concept but also a gendered category.  Second, 
the mass media resorted to the moralistic language in narrating the lives of irregular female 
migrants.  The moralistic frame in turn circumscribed the terms of understanding female 
migration and induced the media to represent migrant women as trafficking victims at best, but 
rarely as workers whose labor rights ought to be protected.  Lastly, while women’s groups fought 
hard against the stereotypical images of female migrants as Japayuki-san, they left unchallenged 
the premise of the Japayuki-san discourse that posited migrant women as powerless and passive 
subjects.  Women’s groups’ portrayal of migrant women as innocent victims certainly helped to 
highlight their sufferings, but at the price of constraining their agency.  In other words, their 
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counter discourse was fraught with tensions between the goal of empowering migrant women 
and the strategy of stressing their victim status. 
Japan’s foreign worker problem is widely believed to have cropped up in the late 1980s 
as the number of newcomer male migrant workers soared.   But if we follow Sellek’s historical 
narrative, a sharp increase in male foreign workers constituted the second stage of labor 
migration in postwar Japan.  In her account, the first wave of labor migration was marked by the 
inflow of Asian female sex workers from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s.  As Table 3.1 shows, 
migrant women made up the majority of “illegal” foreign workers until 1987, although they were 
not labeled as such.  In 1983, for example, 92.6% of foreigners apprehended for engaging in 
“unqualified activities” were female.  Of them, Chinese, most of whom were Taiwanese, topped 
the list at 657, followed by Filipinos at 123, Koreans at 107, and Thais at 55 (Kawakita, 1983, p. 
58).  In 1985, over 90% of apprehended migrant women were found working in the sex industry 
(Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 1987, p. 108).  Their occupations comprised hostesses (83.1%), strippers 
(6.8%), and prostitutes (5.8%) (Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 1987, p. 108).   
 
Table 3.1: Number of Foreigners Apprehend for Immigration Law Violations (1981-1989) 
 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Female 1,226 1,705 2,139 4,433 4,942 5,945 7,018 5,385 4,817 
Male 208 184 200 350 687 2,186 4,289 8,929 11,791 
Total 1,434 1,889 2,339 4,783 5,629 8,131 11,307 14,314 16,608 
 
Source: Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry, cited in Sellek, 2001, p. 32 
 
 
 
Even though most migrant women were exploited as cheap laborers in the sex industry in 
the 1980s, they were not regarded as foreign workers in the media and official documents 
(Sellek, 2001, p. 158).  The Public Policy Research Committee (Kōkyō Seisaku Chōsakai) 
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(1991), for instance, defined foreign workers as “those who recently came to Japan from Asia or 
Central and South America and engage or intend to engage in unskilled jobs in restaurants, 
factories, or construction sites irrespective of their visa status” (p. 190).  Absent from this 
definition were female sex workers who still accounted for a significant portion of the foreign 
labor population at that time.  Consequently, a public discussion about the acceptance of foreign 
workers was geared almost exclusively towards male manual and menial laborers.  Ironically, the 
emergence of the foreign worker problem drew public attention away from the presence of 
female migrants. 
This chapter probes why foreign workers were associated predominantly with male 
manual and menial laborers in the 1980s despite the fact that the majority of migrant workers had 
been women until 1987.  Specific guiding questions include: 1) How were female migrants 
depicted in the mass media in the 1980s? and 2) how did these depictions help to shape the 
public images of newcomer female migrants?  In addressing these two questions, I explore how 
political and economic forces, gender, and sex factored in framing a certain pattern of labor 
migration as a foreign worker problem and others as peculiar issues in sex and entertainment 
businesses.     
My contention is that female migrants received little recognition in the “foreign worker” 
debate because they were both materially and symbolically disadvantaged for being women, 
“illegal aliens,” and sex workers.  Migrant women workers occupied the lowest position within 
Japan’s political, economic, and social structures in the 1980s.  Their subordinate status is best 
encapsulated by the fact that job opportunities for migrant women were limited mostly to sex-
affective types of jobs during this period.  The vulnerable position of female migrant workers not 
only subjugated them to harsh exploitation and abuse but also placed severe constraints on their 
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rhetorical agency.  A close examination of media portrayals of migrant women workers in the 
1980s, therefore, elucidates the prominence of masculinity, the prosperity of the sex industry, 
and the prevalence of covert racism in contemporary Japan.  As Leheny (1995) puts it, “Japan, 
like many other countries, has witnessed an interesting conflation of nationalism and sexuality in 
the past century.  Power relationships are frequently embedded in sexuality, and the combination 
of sex markets with questions of citizenship and nationality has further highlighted these” (p. 
376).   
As samples of media texts, I investigate articles, commentary, and editorials on    
newcomer migrant women in national dailies and general-interest magazines in the 1980s as 
indexed by the following three databases:  Web Ōya-bunko, Nichigai: Magazine Plus, and 
Gaikokujin Rōdōsha Mondai Bunken Shūsei (Catalogue of Literature on the Foreign Worker 
Problem).23  Also subject to my analysis are books for general readers that bear on the topic of 
migrant women.  For the purpose of comparison, I perused specialized texts—in particular, 
articles in labor magazines and scholarly journals—that addressed the issue of female migration.  
While I browsed through relevant written texts published throughout the 1980s, my analysis is 
primarily focused on the 1987-1989 period because these three years witnessed a drastic shift in 
the media’s interest from the Japayuki-san phenomenon to the foreign worker problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Published by the National Diet Library of Japan and Nichigai Associates, Magazine Plus “covers 8,500 scholarly 
journals in various fields and general interest periodical titles, and provides bibliographical references to 4,850,000 
articles from 1975 to the present” (California Digital Library, n.d., n.p.).  According to the East Asian Library of 
Princeton University, Web Ōya-bunko is “a useful addition to Magazine plus” as it “includes over 1.7 million journal 
articles since 1988, collected from 370 magazines including many minor ones” (n.d.). Gaikokujin Rōdōsha Mondai 
Bunken Shūsei is a comprehensive bibliography on foreign worker problems at home and abroad compiled by the 
Japan Institute of Labour in March 1995.  It has an independent section on female migrants under the title of “Asian 
migrant laborers  (‘Japayuki-san,’ ‘Japayuki-kun’).” 
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3.2 KARAYUKI-SAN, JAPAYUKI-SAN, AND FEMALE FOREIGN WORKERS 
 
Although thousands of Asian women began to come to Japan for work in the late 1970s, they 
were not recognized as foreign workers.  Indeed, the term gaikokujin rōdōsha (foreign workers) 
itself was rarely used in the media during this period.  A keyword search on the Asahi Shimbun 
Headline Database found that the term came into popular use only in 1988 (see Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2 also indicates that “foreign worker problems” had been occasionally referenced in the 
newspaper but only as problems in other countries until 1986.   
 
 
Table 3.2: Keyword Search for Gaikokujin Rōdōsha on the Asahi Shimbun Headline Database 
(1945-1988) 
 
Year        Number of Articles   Countries Addressed in the Articles         
1945-1965       0   n/a 
1966   1    Japan  
1967 1    Switzerland 
1968-1972       0   n/a 
1973 1   France 
1974-1977       0    n/a 
1978 1   Iran 
1979-1982        0   n/a 
1983 9    Nigeria, Ghana, & EC 
1984 1    Switzerland 
1985 3   Libya 
1986 1    Iran & Iraq 
1987 5    4 articles on Japan 
1988      65   61 articles on Japan    
 
 
Instead of “foreign workers,” migrant women were commonly called Japayuki-san, or 
Ms. Japan-bound in the 1980s.  Japayuki-san typically referred to unauthorized sex workers who 
hailed from other Asian countries.  The term was coined in the early 1980s and became a buzz 
word around 1985 as the figures of apprehended migrant women skyrocketed (Kakiage, 1987, p. 
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32).  Japayuki-san was neither an academic nor official term, but a popular expression widely 
used in the mass media during the 1980s.   
The term Japayuki-san was etymologically derived from Karayuki-san (literally, Ms. 
Bound for China or Abroad), a label for Japanese women who migrated abroad as prostitutes in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Non-fiction writer Tomoko Yamazaki (1972/1999) glosses 
Karayuki-san in her best seller Sandakan Hachiban Shokan (Sandakan Brothel No. 8): 
[T]he term karayuki-san is a contraction of karahitoyuki [a person going to Kara, i.e., 
China, or abroad] or karankuniyuki [going to China, or a country overseas].  It refers to 
overseas prostitutes who, from the final stages of the Tokugawa shogunate in the mid-
nineteenth century through the Meiji period (1868-1911) and until the middle of the 
Taisho period (1912-1925) at the end of World War I, left their native country behind 
and traveled north to Siberia or continental China, or south to the various countries of 
Southeast Asia, or even to India and Africa, to sell their flesh to foreigners. These 
women came from all over Japan, but it is said that the great majority came from the 
Amakusa Islands and the Shimabara Peninsula.24 (pp. 5-6)  
 
Some scholars take issue with this equation of Karayuki-san with overseas prostitutes.  For 
instance, by carefully tracing the historical changes in the usage of Karayuki-san, Mihalopoulos 
(1994) documents that “[t]he ways of presenting the karayuki-san are a very selective practice, 
dismissive of other competing explanations and descriptions of what the women signify” (p. 
161).  The historical usage of the term aside, it is clear that Karayuki-san was used as a synonym 
for overseas prostitutes in the 1980s.  Labeled as Japayuki-san, female migrants were, therefore, 
inevitably associated with this image of prostitutes. 
Karayuki-san were often forcibly recruited as part of Japan’s imperial policy to cater to 
those stationed in its colonial territories in Southeast Asia.  Many others willingly became 
overseas prostitutes in order to subsist or support their parents, siblings, and children.  Yet some 
others were sold to pimps and racketeers and coerced into prostitution.  According to Kajita 
                                                 
 24 Yamazaki (1972/1999) details historical, economic, and geographical reasons for a mass exodus of Karayuki-san 
from these regions in the final chapter of Sandakan Brothel No. 8.   
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(2005),  “Karayuki-san, together with other Japanese women who served as prostitutes 
elsewhere, including Siberia, Hawaii, Australia and some parts of India and Africa, were said to 
be the third-biggest foreign currency earner for Japan at the turn of the 20th century” (n.p.). 
While Karayuki-san were sometimes featured in radio dramas during the 1960s (notably, 
radio dramas on NHK Radio 1 in 1960 and 1961), the term had not entered popular parlance 
until Yamazaki’s Sandakan Hachiban Shokan became a national best seller in 1972.  The book 
won the prestigious Soichi Oya Non-fiction Award and has been in print for over 30 years 
(Warren, 2000, n.p.).  Following the best selling book, Yamazaki penned two more books on 
Karayuki-san: Sandakan No Haka and Amayuki-san No Uta.  Together, they are called a 
Karayuki-san trilogy.  In all the three works, the lives of Karayuki-san are dramatized as tragic 
tales of Japanese women who are oppressed under the dual yoke of class and gender in imperial 
Japan.  A typical story of Karayuki-san as Yamazaki narrates it runs like this: “Poor families 
may sell daughters to a trafficker, who will buy the girl outright or provide a loan which the girl 
must pay trough prostitution.  In some cases girls are simply kidnapped and placed in the 
industry” (Yamazaki, 1972/1999, ix).   
Another influential writer in this field was Kazue Morisaki who put out Karayuki-san 
from Asahi Shimbun Sha in 1976.  As with Yamazaki’s works, her book was not so much an 
academic work as a heart-wrenching narrative on the lives of young Karayuki-san, particularly 
Okimi and her adopted daughter Aya with whom Morisaki was personally acquainted.  The book 
was written in the first-person and interspersed with the author’s commentary, which reflected 
the general tone of the book.  For example, after recounting the pervasive practice of trafficking 
in young Japanese girls in the early 20th century, Morisaki (1976) confessed how hard it was to 
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dissociate herself from them: “It is painful to write this because I cannot help thinking of these 
young girls.  Since I am close to Okimi-san and Aya-san, I feel like getting choked up” (p. 31).   
To sum up, the lives of Karayuki-san were typically narrated as tragic stories involving 
sexual exploitation, the patriarchic family system, imperialism, young women, and poverty.  
Indeed, Yamazaki’s and Morisaki’s books became best-sellers because their almost soap-
operatic narrative elicited public sympathy to the tragic fate of Karayuki-san.  As Mihalopoulos 
(1994) explains: 
Yamazaki’s and Morisaki’s accounts [of karayuki-san] are persuasive precisely 
because they are semifictional rather than historical.  They are able to draw the 
attention of their nonacademic/popular audiences to the plight of the karayuki-san and 
of the oppression of women in general, because the life of the karayuki-san was 
presented in such a way as to be of human rather than historical interest.  Yamazaki 
and Morisaki are successful in addressing the silencing of women in history, not 
because their accounts are historically accurate, but because they claim to be “realistic”  
representations or unfettered “expressions” of the individuality of the women they base 
their narratives on. (p. 168)  
 
Perhaps by virtue of their ethical and emotional appeals, the stories of Karayuki-san were 
frequently featured in films, TV dramas, and theater plays, including the film Zegen directed by 
Shohei Imamura in 1987 and Seinenza’s play Karayuki-san in 1990.  As many of them were 
based on—at least inspired by—Yamazaki’s and Morisaki’s books, their depiction of Karayuki-
san turned out to reach far wider audiences beyond the readers of the original books.   
The obvious implication of the term Japayuki-san is that they are present-day Karayuki-
san.  That is, the term conjures up the image of poor Japanese women who had to sell their 
bodies to support their family members.  Incidentally, the majority of prostitutes in Manila of the 
early 20th century were Karayuki-san from impoverished farm villages, which fueled the 
tendency to cast Japayuki-san as the obverse of Karayuki-san (for example, see Nishio, 1988, p. 
7).  The term sometimes extended to Asian brides of Japanese men, especially of farmers in rural 
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areas as some local governments promoted a form of arranged marriage for those who were 
unable to find Japanese brides (Sellek, 1996, p. 172; for a critique of this stereotypical image of 
Japanese grooms, see Suzuki, 2002).  However defined, the term Japayuki-san suggested that 
just as poor Japanese women used to emigrate overseas for sex work, destitute Asians women 
were now heading for affluent Japan to work in the sex industry.   
 While it is not entirely futile to draw a parallel between female migrants in the 1980s and 
Japanese overseas prostitutes in the early 20th century, the analogy obscures the fact that the 
current influx of female migrants into Japan is a form of labor migration for filling job vacancies 
in its informal service sectors (Ballescas, 2003, p. 567).  Unfortunately, the Japayuki-san 
discourse was not well suited to highlight the labor aspects of female migration.  Instead, they 
focused mostly on the misery of poor young women who had to take sex-affective types of jobs 
for their family’s survival.  Consequently, the sexualized images of migrant women figured 
prominently in the mass media throughout the 1980s.  
 
 
3.3 POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCES BEHIND THE 
JAPAYUKI-SAN PHENOMENON 
 
While economic reasons predominate in motivating labor migration across borders, a migratory 
process cannot be explained in economic terms alone.  Rather, political, economic, historical, 
and cultural factors in both sending and receiving countries have combined to make Japan a 
magnet for prospective migrant women to the point that it is infamously called “the only country 
in the world for which the vast majority of women have been largely and illegally recruited for a 
single purpose: sexual services” (Douglas, 1993, p. 92).25
                                                 
25 It should be noted, however, that a substantial number of Asian migrant women engage in sex work in other 
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 From an economic standpoint, a huge wage gap between Japan and Southeast Asian 
countries encouraged would-be migrant women to choose Japan as a country of destination (see 
Table 2.1 on p. 41).  The strong economic presence of Japanese companies in the Asia Pacific 
region has provided additional incentives.  For example, Japan has been the largest national 
investor in Thailand since 1986; it also provides almost 70% of foreign aid to the country 
(Sellek, 1996, p. 168).  The large-scale inflows of Thai women into Japan need to be understood 
in this light.  
Culturally, as a growing number of Japanese corporations opened their branches and 
launched joint ventures in Southeast Asia, Japanese goods and media products came to suffuse 
shops, streets, and houses throughout the region.  The ubiquitous Japanese goods and products in 
turn created the illusion of Japan as a dreamland.  According to Yayori Matsui (1995b), a 
founder of the Asian Women’s Association, “[c]onsumer culture and the cash economy . . . 
affect the minds of rural people [in Thailand].  They are motivated to earn money by any means 
and are easily cheated by agents who describe Japan as money making paradise” (p. 31).  Along 
the same line, Yoshioka (1989) observes:   
Various aspects of Japan, not only numerous Japanese consumer goods, but also 
Japanese management practices in factories, Japanese department stores and their sales 
methods, Japanese fashion, Japanese TV programmes, Japanese actors/actresses, 
Japanese magazines, Japanese life-style, etc., have penetrated deeply into Thai society. 
(cited in Sellek, 1996, p. 169) 
 
The image of Japan as a money making-paradise holds equally true for the Philippines (see, for 
example, Newsweek’s article “‘Japayuki-san’ go home” on January 19, 1987). 
The flows of Asian migrant women since the late 1970s ought to be placed in proper  
historical perspective as well.  While prostitution has been widely practiced in Southeast Asia (as 
                                                                                                                                                             
industrialized countries as well (for example, see Thorbek and Pattanaik’s edited volume Transnational Prostitution, 
2002).  To be more precise, a major difference between Japan and other countries is that employment opportunities 
for migrant women without skills are restricted mostly to sex-affective work in Japan. 
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anywhere else) throughout its history, the recent development of the sex industry in the region 
can be attributed chiefly to the huge presence of U.S. military bases and the massive rural-urban 
exodus (Itō, 1992, pp. 316-317).  In particular, large numbers of women were deployed in “rest 
and recreation” services for the U.S. military in the Vietnam War era (Suzuki, 2000, p. 432).  
After the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Vietnam, the sex industry in Southeast Asia did not 
shrink but rather flourished by cashing in on state-promoted international tourism and the growth 
of so-called package tour prostitution.  As Sellek (1996) notes, Japanese male tourists were 
major customers in this burgeoning sex tourism (p. 170).  According to Thanh-Dam (1983), “[i]n 
1982 . . . more than one million Japanese tourists visited Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong on tours called ‘trips for men only’ which explicitly include visits to 
brothels” (p. 533).     
Sellek (1996) holds that the growth of sex tourism in Asia developed highly 
institutionalized “networks comprising an enormous number of agents, scouts, impresarios and 
promoters, all of whom had dealings with tourists from Japan” (p. 170).  The formation of the 
international social networks in sex business in turn facilitated the influx of female migrant 
workers into Japan.  As Sellek (2001) analyzes: 
It is highly probable that the networks used for facilitating the inflow of foreign female 
workers intending to work in the entertainment industry in Japan were originally 
established when sex tourism was highly lucrative in the 1970s, and the existence of 
these networks was critical in fostering female migration centered on the entertainment 
industry in Japan. (p. 168)  
 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, women’s organizations launched vigorous protests against 
Japanese sex tours, first in South Korea and later in the Philippines and Taiwan (Piper, 2003, p. 
738).  They advocated a ban on the sex tours on the grounds that they were degrading and 
humiliating to Asian women (Suzuki, 2000, p. 432; Tsuda, 2002, p. 24).  Such anti-sex tourism 
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campaigns eventually resulted in the Japanese government’s intervention against the organized 
sex tours in the early 1980s (Suzuki, 2000, p. 432).  This official counter-measure helped to curb 
sex tourism, but did little to uproot the international sex industry itself.  Rather, “enterprising 
criminal groups seized the opportunity and started to bring Filipino women to Japan to work in 
the entertainment industry” (Tsuda, 2002, p. 24).  Especially as fewer Japanese women were 
willing to enter the sex industry, swelling numbers of migrant women were recruited into the 
highly exploitative and abusive industry to fill vacancies (Komai, 1990, pp. 16-17).  In view of 
this, the Japayuki-san phenomenon can be understood as the import of sexual services as 
international commodities (Itō, 1992, p. 319).  Sellek (1996) concurs: 
It was the natural course of action to ‘import’ both legal and illegal female workers, 
since agents and others involved with the business on the Japanese side as well as the 
side of the sending country, not to mention the women themselves, were able to make 
far more profit owning to the availability and low ‘purchasing costs’ of such women 
and their much higher ‘selling’ price (value) in yen. (pp. 170-171)  
 
It should also be noted that Japan has been culturally and historically tolerant of the sex 
industry.  As Yoneda (1998) pointed out, licensed prostitution had been practiced until 1946 
when the Occupation Forces ordered to abolish the system (cited in Group Sisterhood, 1998, p. 
90).  Japan’s sex industry is still highly lucrative and omnipresent.  Daily sport newspapers 
available at newsstands carry information and ads on nightclubs and brothels.  It is not so 
unusual to see a businessman reading the so-called “adult entertainment” section on a train.  
Drawing on various studies, Ballescas (2003) estimates that Japan’s sex industry rakes in $5-
billion profits every year, “an amount equal to the entire defense budget of the nation” (p. 569).  
According to Azu (1997), the work available to migrant women in the sex business is not limited 
to prostitution, but encompasses a wide-range of sex-affective types of services, including risqué 
dancers and bar hostesses (p. 17, see also Suzuki, 2000, p. 434).  Although not every job requires 
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direct sexual services, “the basic premise of the industry is,” as Ballescas (1992) aptly puts it,  
“for the females to provide pleasures to the males” (p. 111).   
Politics has played a significant role in shaping the current migratory pattern of female 
workers, too.  Ballescas (2003), for instance, explains the flows of Filipino women into Japan 
from a political perspective: 
Filipino migration to Japan followed the Japanese reentry into the Philippines after the  
Second World War.  The turning point in postwar Philippine-Japanese relations was 
facilitated by the dictatorial Marcos regime when the Philippines-Japan Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation was ratified in 1973.  This treaty opened Philippine 
doors to massive Japanese trade and investments, making Japan a top-trading partner, 
foreign investor, and most generous donor of official development assistance to the 
Philippines. (p. 564) 
 
She then concludes that “[m]igration could not have been possible without the open policy of the 
Philippines and Japanese government” (p. 565). 
Lastly, there is a legal reason for fostering the employment of overseas women in Japan’s 
sex industry.  Although its immigration laws prohibit female migrants from engaging in any type 
of sex work, “the legal category of ‘entertainers’ provides a mask for a continuum of sexualized 
activities from singing and dancing, waitressing and hostessing, to prostitution” (Mackie, 1998, 
p. 605).  Besides, Japan has no comprehensive anti-trafficking laws to stem the tide of human 
trafficking.  Instead, as the Human Rights Watch charges, the government still relies on 
“outdated laws (such as antiprostitution legislation) and restrictive visa policies that have created 
‘extraordinary opportunities for profit’ for those who facilitate illegal immigration into Japan” 
(cited in McNeil, 2004, n.p.).  All in all, the large-scale entry of female migrants into Japan for 
sex work could be traced to these multiple, interlocking factors as well as the presence of the 
international networks of the sex industry.  
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3.4  TRACING THE “BEGINNING” OF THE FOREIGN WORKER PROBLEM 
  
This section interrogates rhetorical dimensions entailed in narrating the “beginning” of the 
foreign worker problem.  Its primary goal is to demonstrate that the mass media rarely portrayed 
the influx of female migrants as a foreign worker problem.  Instead, their growing presence was 
by and large framed as a peculiar moral issue concerning Japayuki-san.   
Edward Said (1975) suggests that any beginning is an act of differentiation (xiii).  That is, 
beginning does not simply mean the start of an event or a story; rather it authorizes what follows 
from it and represents discontinuity from what precedes it (p. 34).  If beginning is an act of 
differentiation, it is also a rhetorical act because rhetoric, especially the act of naming, operates 
to create unity and division.  According to Kenneth Burke (1966), a name provides a “terministic 
screen” that directs our ways of seeing (and not seeing) things:  
Not only does the nature of our terms affect the nature of our observations, in the sense 
that the terms direct the attention to one field rather than to another.  Also many of the 
“observations” are but implications of the particular terminology in terms of which the 
observations are made.  In brief, much that we take as observations about “reality” may 
be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms. (p. 46) 
 
In Burke’s (1984) view, naming can never be a neutral interpretation; rather it is quintessentially 
a rhetorical act aimed at changing attitudes and inducing action (p. 4).  Taking a cue from Burke, 
McKerrow conceives naming as a significant rhetorical act that both reflects and reinforces 
power relations in society.  In the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric he (2001) spells out the interplay 
between naming and power:  
[I]n naming, one at least momentarily concretizes that which is so named, and thereby 
confers and confirms one’s own relation to the object or person named.  Power is a 
concomitant of naming as well, because it enacts one’s relationship within (as well as 
potential resistance to) what the names conjure. As name changes, so does the power 
relation that inheres within the name employed. (p. 621)   
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What McKerrow suggests here is that as naming is implicated in power relations, it deserves 
close scrutiny in a critical rhetoric project.  In a similar yet distinct line, Bourdieu (1991) holds 
that “[b]y structuring the perception which social agents have of the social world the act of 
naming helps to establish the structure of this world, and does so all the more significantly the 
more widely it is recognized, i.e. authorized” (p. 105).      
 Building on this premise, the remainder of this section seeks to show that the term 
Japayuki-san served as a terministic screen to guide the media and the public to frame the 
inflows of female migrants as moral—rather than labor—issues.  As Suzuki (2000) observes, 
“[m]agazines, tabloids, and newspapers voluminously disseminated allegories of ‘Japayuki’ as 
the ‘immoral’ Other, linking sex work with eroticized bodies and criminal syndicates operating 
in forced prostitution (Sharaku, 1983)” (p. 433).  Put differently, partly because the Japayuki-san 
problem was discussed on a moral ground, the inflow of female migrants was not understood as 
the “beginning” of Japan’s foreign worker problem.   
 
3.4.1 1984-1985: The Birth of the Japayuki-san Phenomenon  
 
 
The year 1979 later came to be known as “the First Year of Japayuki-san” (Japayuki-san 
Gannen).  Due to the relaxation of overseas travel restrictions, a growing number of Taiwanese 
women began to enter Japan for work on tourist visas.  As a result, the cases of immigration law 
violations for engaging in unqualified activities doubled from the previous year.  The number of 
migrant women from Taiwan soon decreased after reaching its peak in 1982.  Instead, Filipino 
and Thai women began to rise to prominence in apprehension statistics (Yamawaki, 1996, p. 12; 
see also Table 3.3 on the next page). 
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Table 3.3: Number of Apprehended Foreigners by Nationality (1981-1986) 
 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total 1434 
(208) 
1889 
(184) 
2339 
(200) 
4783 
(350) 
5629 
(687) 
8131 
(2186) 
Thailand  223 
(28) 
412 
(25) 
557 
(39) 
1132 
(54) 
1073 
(120) 
990 
(164) 
S. Korea 37 
(12) 
132 
(35) 
114 
(24) 
61 
(34) 
76 
(35) 
119 
(69) 
Philippines  288 
(14) 
409 
(13) 
1041 
(29) 
2983 
(96) 
3927 
(349) 
6297 
(1500) 
China (Taiwan) 641 
(107) 
775 
(84) 
528 
(85) 
466 
(136) 
427 
(126) 
356 
(161) 
Others  245 
(47) 
161 
(27) 
99 
(23) 
141 
(30) 
126 
(57) 
369 
(292) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses denote the number of apprehended male foreigners in the total. 
 
Sources: Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 1987, p. 106.  The data for 1986 were taken from Sellek, 2001, pp. 32-33 
 
 
 
The important point is that the term Japayuki-san did not enter popular parlance during 
this period.  In general, Tetsuo Yamatani’s 1985 documentary reportage Japayuki-san is credited 
with popularizing the term.  Yamatani (1985) himself claims to have coined the term from 
Karayuki-san in 1983 (p. 285).  His claim is questionable given that the term “Japayuki-san” 
was used as early as December 1981 (for example, see Mizoguchi, 1981).  Whoever actually 
coined Japayuki-san, it is safe to say that the term had yet to come into popular use in the early 
1980s.  As a keyword search on Nichigai: Magazine Plus reveals, Japayuki-san became widely 
used in magazines only around 1986 (see Table 3.4 on the next page). 
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Table 3.4: Keyword Search for Japayuki on Nichigai: Magazine Plus (1981-2004) 
 
Year Number of Articles Year Number of Articles Year Number of Articles 
1981 1 1991 4 2001 2 
1982 0 1992 7 2002 1 
1983 1 1993 8 2003 0 
1984 7 1994 10 2004 0 
1985 5 1995 1   
1986 33 1996 0   
1987 32 1997 1   
1988 37 1998 3   
1989 15 1999 0   
1990 1 2000 0 Total 169 
 
 
Until the mid-1980s migrant women were not assigned any particular name.  In the 
absence of a generic label, female migrants were described as young Asian women coming to 
Japan for “night jobs” (yoru no shōbai), “temporary migrant hostesses” (dekasegi hosutesu), and 
“Thai prostitutes,” just to name a few (e.g. Gekkan Jiyūminshu, 1983, p. 168; Yoshioka, 1982, p. 
45).  Immigration authorities usually employed roundabout expressions such as foreign women 
engaged in unqualified activities (for example, see Kawakita, 1983, p. 56; Nagayama, 1984, p. 
19).   
Moreover, references to migrant women were mostly concentrated in official documents 
and political parties’ magazines during the early 1980s.  Both of them typically raised concerns 
about adverse effects the increase in female migrants could have on work ethics and public 
morals in Japan.  A good illustration of this point is an article entitled “Tracking Down Illegal 
Stayers Hiding in the Sea of Neon Lights!” in the November 1983 issue of Monthly Liberal 
Democrat (Gekkan Jiyūminshu).  Notably, female migrants tended to be portrayed as immoral 
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yet sexually titillating others in the article, typified by the reference to an unfounded rumor that 
local residents were troubled by Thai cabaret hostesses bathing half-naked on a riverbank.  
As Japayuki-san became a popular expression in the mainstream media in the mid-1990s, 
it functioned to frame public discussions of female migration in certain ways.  Specifically, the 
term induced the media to portray the influx of female migrants “as a peculiar phenomenon of 
the entertainment industry in Japan” (Sellek, 1996, p. 160).  For example, Shūkan Yomiuri 
(Weekly Yomiuri) ran a three-part article on the lives of Filipino Japayuki-san from May through 
June 1984.  Its suggestive title “Japayuki-san ‘Banana White Paper’” encapsulated the general 
theme of the article.  First, it contained sexual innuendo with “banana” being a metaphor for 
“penis.”  The title also implied that just as Japan imported bananas from Southeast Asia, it 
imported sex workers from the region as well.  Part 2 of the article (dated May 27, 1984) 
explicitly stated: “‘Japayuki-san’ who are in the frontline of the sex industry has been sent to 
Japan one after another as if they were ‘commodities’ on a conveyer belt” (p. 148).  As this quote 
illustrates, the article by and large depicted overseas sex workers as poor, naïve women being 
abused by their brokers.  Besides, the overall tone of the article was racy and voyeuristic.  In a 
follow-up piece in the June 3rd issue, Alice, an ex-Filipino hostess, was quoted to make a rather 
risqué comment: “Why do the Japanese [men] rush into sex so impatiently?  Well, quick sex 
[with a guy] with a small penis is welcomed by me, though” (pp. 26-27).  Elsewhere, Fuwa 
(1984) wrote that many Japayuki-san were “childlike” (kodomo no yōna), “cheerful” (yōki), and 
“incredibly jolly” (sokonuke ni akarui) despite the fact that they were forced into overseas sex 
work out of poverty (p. 365).  Implicit in his portrayal was the image of female migrant women 
as “exotic others” who acted cheerfully even under highly exploitative conditions.  To mention 
yet another example, Shūkan Asahi (Weekly Asahi) (1985, July-August) ran article series on the 
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lives of Asian migrant workers under the title “Women who Hailed from Manila.”  As the title 
suggests, 6 out of the 7 articles were devoted to the lives of Filipino bar hostesses, strippers, and 
prostitutes.  Interestingly, male Filipino migrants were called “foreign workers” (August 9, p. 
63), whereas their female counterparts were not.  Filipino women, most of whom reputedly 
worked in informal service sectors, were called “Japayuki-san,” “hostesses,” “prostitutes,” and 
so on. 
 
3.4.2 1986: Japayuki-san (Ms. Japayuki) and Japayuki-kun (Mr. Japayuki)  
 
 
Female migrants continued to be labeled as Japayuki-san in 1986.  Although the mass media 
began to take note of the rise in male migrant workers, they remained primarily interested in 
migrant women working in the sex industry.  Worthy of particular mention is the article series 
Tochigi-based Shimotsuke Shimbun carried from February through March 1986.  As the title 
“Waiting for Spring in a Foreign Country: the Circumstances of Japayuki in Tochigi” indicates, 
the series was mainly concerned with female migrants.  Out of the 20 articles, the first 14 
featured migrant women.  Only five articles touched on male migrants; of the five, three articles 
addressed the problems concerning foreign trainees, not foreign workers.  More important, the 
issue of male migrants was subsumed under the discourse of Japayuki-san.  In the 19th article, 
for example, an immigration official was quoted as saying that the upsurge in male migrant 
workers was “a new kind of the Japayuki problem” (1986, March 19, p. 1).  In addition, the 
image of Japayuki-san as poor Asian sex workers was prevalent throughout the article series.  
The first two articles, for instance, recounted the incident of Filipino dancer Christy severely 
beaten by a Yakuza gangster.  When asked about her family background, she remarked: “My 
family consists of my mother and nine siblings.  My father died of heart attack six years ago.  
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My mother is currently unemployed.  I remit half of my 750-dollar salary to my family every 
month” (1986, February 22, p. 1).  As the portrayal of Christy’s life illustrates, the article series 
was generally sympathetic to migrant women.  Part 9 of the series (dated March 5, 1986) printed 
an interview with an immigration official who felt “empty and angry” when he saw Japanese 
brokers pick up and drive away foreign women (p. 1).  Near the end of the interview, the 
immigration official expressed “righteous indignation” towards the Japanese praying on foreign 
women and stressed the need to crack down on them (p. 1).  
 One notable trend in 1986 was that the media often used Japayuki-san as a general label 
for migrant workers irrespective of gender.  For example, Nihon Keizai Shimbun on December 6, 
1986 reported on the Justice Ministry’s plan to introduce employer sanctions in an effort to curb 
the entry of “Japayuki-san” (p. 7).  By “Japayuki-san,” the report meant illegal foreign workers 
in general.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun of January 6, 1988, by contrast, covered similar punitive 
measures under the heading “the Justice Ministry Will Also Set up an Investigative Committee 
within the Immigration Bureau; a Step to Relax the Restrictions on Foreign Workers [italics 
added]” (p. 30).  Notice that the two articles used different terminology to refer to similar 
legislative efforts, which signaled that a discursive shift from Japayuki-san to foreign workers 
took place in these two years. 
In this discursive transition period the popular media often referred to male migrant 
laborers as “male Japayuki” (Otoko Japayuki) or “Mr. Japayuki” (Japayuki-kun) despite the fact 
that few, if any, of them actually worked in the adult entertainment industry.  Inyaku (1987), for 
instance, pointed out that it was becoming customary to dub migrant women Japayuki-san and 
migrant men Japayuki-kun (p. 60).  Similarly, Asahi Shimbun of July 15, 1986 stated that male 
migrant workers from Southeast Asia were deemed as a male version of ‘Japayuki-san’” (p. 23).  
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In the article “Japayuki phenomenon,” Usuki (1986b) also portrayed the growing presence of 
migrant male workers as “a ‘male Japayuki’ problem” (p. 94).  These articles exemplify that the 
influx of migrant workers was still narrated under the discursive frame of Japayuki in 1986.26  
They also indicate that female migration attracted more media attention than its male counterpart 
at that time.  In fact, Usuki’s article dealt mostly with Asian migrant women and mentioned male 
migrant workers only in passing.  Perhaps most tellingly, Nihon Keizai Shimbun selected 
“Japayuki-san” among the top words of the year 1986, but not “foreign workers” (December 15, 
1986, p. 3).  This talk-based article read: 
An indispensable subject of pictorial magazines is Japayuki-san.  It is surprising to see  
Southeast Asian women in entertainment districts throughout Japan, no matter how 
rural the area is.  The news that Japayuki-san was found to be infected with AIDS put 
a small local community into turmoil.  The term Otoko-Japayuki has also appeared.  
(p. 3) 
 
 Equally important, the Japayuki-san phenomenon was rarely depicted as a foreign worker 
problem in the mass media.  For example, Masao Hirai, staff writer for Asahi Shimbun, wrote on 
July 26, 1986:  
The term Japayuki-san who migrates from Southeast Asia for work conjures up the 
image of women who color nights in streets with glaring neon signs.  In recent years, 
the number of Asian men who work in Japan on temporary tourist visas has been 
skyrocketing. . . At this rate, the presence of foreign workers might become a social 
problem as in some European countries such as West Germany. (p. 3)   
 
Notice that Hirai distinguished the influx of female migrants from that of male migrants and 
regarded only the latter as a harbinger of Japan’s foreign worker problem.   
Probably because women still made up the vast majority of foreigners arrested for 
immigration law violations, the term “foreign worker” had yet to catch on in 1986.  On 
                                                 
26 The gender-neutral term “illegally working foreigner” (fuhō shūrō gaikokujin) seems to have been preferred in 
official documents during this period.  For example, read The Actual Condition of Labor Brokers with Regards to 
Illegally Working Foreigners, a report released by the Ministry of Justice on March 13, 1986 (cited in Utsumi and 
Matsui, 1988, p. 26).   
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November 23, 1986, the Japan Times ran an article on the growing cases of immigration law 
violations; yet nowhere was the term “foreign worker” used.  Instead, the article used such 
roundabout expressions as “foreigners staying in Japan under circumstances other than those 
outlined by their visa status” (p. 2).  
 
3.4.3 1987: A Year of Transition  
 
 
Although the year 1987 witnessed growing media interests in the upsurge of male migrant 
workers, the issue of migration was still generally discussed under the rubric of the Japayuki-san 
phenomenon.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun of March 9, 1987, for example reported on the National 
Police Agency’s plan to solicit experts’ insights into the “male-Japayuki” problem (p. 13).  In a 
similar vein Asahi Shimbun of December 6, 1987 pointed to a steep rise in “male Japayuki-san” 
coming to Japan for simple labor (p. 3).  In some cases “Japayuki-san” was still used 
interchangeably with unauthorized migrant workers in general (e.g. YS, 1987, May 3, p. 8).   
 While the vocabulary of Japayuki-san continued to dictate public discussions about 
cross-border migration around 1987, some media outlets, especially labor journals and 
progressive magazines, recognized the sexist/gender bias in the Japayuki-san narrative and 
sought to reformulate the issue of female migration as a foreign worker problem.  The September 
1986 issue of Shin Chihei (New Horizon) was probably one of the earliest print media that 
framed female migration as a foreign worker problem.  In the first of a series of articles on Asian 
migrant workers, Kyoda (1986) of the Japan-Korea Solidarity Movement made a rigorous 
analysis of Japan’s structural need for utilizing foreign workers.  Notably, he viewed Asian 
migrant women as exploited, cheap laborers (p. 38).  Shin Chihei continued to feature the issue 
of Asian migrant workers throughout 1987.  In its September 1987 issue, attorney Yōko Hayashi 
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(1987b) argued that Japan’s foreign worker problem was characterized by a preponderance of 
female sex workers: “I think that when we think about the foreign worker problem in Japan, we 
cannot avoid facing the fact that about 90% of the foreign workers are women and that about 
90% of those [women] work in the sex industry” (p. 41).  Around the same time, Kazuo Ōishi 
(1987) of the Philippines Study Group stressed the need for understanding the Japayuki-san 
problem from a labor perspective.  Indeed, he was among few writers who maintained that the 
Japayuki-san phenomenon was essentially a foreign worker problem (p. 57).  Ōishi’s perceptive 
views, however, drew little public attention chiefly because his article was printed in the 
progressive journal Impaction.     
 On the whole, while the media began to pay serious attention to the upsurge of male 
migrant workers, a discursive shift from Japayuki-san to foreign workers was still underway in 
1987.  The use of the term “foreign worker problem” had been mostly confined to left-leaning 
journals until mid-1988 when the problem triggered a nationwide debate.   
 
3.4.4 1988-1989: A Discursive Shift from Japayuki-san to Foreign Workers 
 
 
1988 was a watershed year with regards to Japan’s foreign worker problem.  Statistically, 
apprehended male migrants for the first time outnumbered their female counterparts, which 
signaled a limit to the Japayuki-san discourse in capturing the reality of migratory flows (see 
Table 3.5).  Of more importance, as large numbers of male foreigners came to Japan for simple 
labor, gaikokujin rōdōsha mondai (foreign worker problem) became a major topic of debate and 
commentary in political arenas and public spheres.  It was also during this period that academics 
began to show interest in the issue of foreign workers as well (Nimura, 1992, p. 246).  In short, 
the year 1988 was considered the “beginning” of Japan’s foreign worker problem.  
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Table 3.5: Number of Apprehended Foreigners by Sex (1984-1989) 
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Male 350 1,687 2,186 4,289 8,929 11,791 
Percentage 7% 30% 27% 38% 62% 71% 
Female 4,433 4,942 5,945 7,018 5,385 4,187 
Percentage 93% 70% 73% 62% 38% 29% 
 
Source: Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry, 1991, cited in Spencer, 1992, p. 757 
 
 
 
This section first reviews policy responses to the emerging foreign worker problem and then 
explores how the media’s interests shifted from the Japayuki-san phenomenon to the foreign 
worker problem in the late 1980s. 
 
3.4.4.1 Policy Responses The rapid increase of male foreign workers elicited myriad responses 
and policy recommendations.  The Labor Ministry set up the Study Group on Foreign Worker 
Problems (Gaikokujin Rōdōsha Mondai Kenkyūkai) in December 1987 (YS, 1987, December 13, 
p. 2).  According to Hachiya (1990), this was the government’s first policy initiative to tackle the 
issue of foreign workers (p. 35).  Following the Labor Ministry’s move, a number of similar 
research committees were launched within the Cabinet, political parties, ministries, employers’ 
associations, and labor unions to weigh the pros and cons of accepting unskilled foreign workers.  
As Table 3.6 (on the next page) shows, most policy proposals on foreign workers were issued in 
1988 or later.  The dearth of policy proposals prior to 1988 indicates that the growing presence of 
Japayuki-san did not generate much policy discussion at government and business levels.   
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Table 3.6: Number of Policy Proposals by Business Organizations, Labor Unions, Government 
Agencies, and Local Governments as Indexed by the Employment Development Center 
 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total 
Number 1 8 11 22 6 48
 
Source: Koyō Kaihatsu Sentā  (Employment Development Center), 1991, pp. 145-147 
 
 
Many organizations also conducted opinion surveys to grasp public opinions as well as the 
members’ views on the employment of so-called simple laborers.  Some of them even dispatched 
their staff to Western Europe to learn the situation of its foreign worker problem first-hand.   
 To give a brief summary of major ministerial responses, the Immigration Association 
established the Committee for Investigating the Problem Concerning the Entry of Foreign 
Workers in January 1988 (AS, 1988, January 22, p. 3); the committee issued a summary report in 
May (Shimada, 1994, p. 51).  The Justice Ministry conducted an opinion survey inquiring about 
the employment of foreigners in October 1987; the survey results found that 64.5% of the 
respondents were opposed to the illegal employment of foreigners (Yamatoya, 1994, p. 4).  
Following the release of the survey, the Justice Ministry unveiled a draft of the revision to the 
Immigration Control Act in April 1988 (Matsumoto, 1989, p. 10; Yamatoya, 1994, p. 13).  The 
Economic Planning Agency published the result of a similar questionnaire survey in March 1988 
(Yamatoya, 1994, p. 11).  Contrary to the Justice Ministry’s opinion poll, the survey unveiled 
that about 74% of the respondents favored the conditional or unconditional acceptance of foreign 
workers.  The conflicting results of the two surveys indicated that the employment of unskilled 
foreign workers was a sharply divisive issue during this period.  In March 1988 the Labor 
Ministry’s study group submitted a report entitled Future Directions Regarding the Acceptance 
of Foreign Workers.  In a nutshell, the report called for wider acceptance of professionally 
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skilled foreigners, while restricting the entry of unskilled workers (Rōdōsho Shokugyō Antei 
Kyoku, 1988, pp. 35-40).   
Around the same time, many business organizations articulated their views on the foreign 
worker problem.  Those representing the interests of large corporations by and large took a 
cautious stand on the introduction of unskilled foreign workers.  Alternatively, they advocated 
the overhaul of the trainee system or similar schemes (Komai, 1993/1995, p. 213).  The Business 
Policy Forum Japan (Kigyō Katsuryoku Kenkyūjo) and the Kansai Employers’ Association 
(Kansai Keieisha Kyōkai) announced their respective proposals in July 1988; both of them 
objected to the admission of unskilled migrant laborers (Komai, 1993/1995, p. 212).  In May 
1988, the Foreign Worker Problem Study Group of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Tokyo Shōkō Kaigisho) dispatched its representatives to four European countries to 
learn the actual situations concerning foreign workers in Europe (AS, 1988, August 10, p. 26).  
The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry also conducted a survey in April 1988, which 
found that some 40% of the member companies would consider hiring unskilled foreign workers 
if legalized.  Yet the organization remained cautious about the employment of unskilled foreign 
workers in its September report (Komai, 1993/1995, p. 212).  The Japan Federation of 
Employers’ Association (Nikkeiren), for its part, formed the Foreign Worker Problem Study 
Group as a sub-group of the Special Committee for Employment in June 1988.  The study 
group’s report (released in January 1989) upheld the continued closed-door immigration policy 
(Hachiya, 1991, pp. 142-143). 
Trade unions were a bit more divided over the issue of foreign workers.  The National 
Federation of Construction Workers’ Unions (Zenken Sōren), which represented 385,000 
construction workers, was reportedly the first trade union to address the issue in response to the 
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pervasive illegal employment of migrant laborers in the construction sector.  According to 
Nimura (1992), Zenken Sōren took a firm stand against hiring unskilled foreign workers as early 
as 1986: 
In October 1986 and again in May 1987, Zenkensōren called on major construction  
companies and housing companies, ‘not to make use of foreign labour as illegal 
workers’.  This led to the first case of conflict between workers over the issue when in 
June 1987, an organization calling itself the Karabaw Group, which supports Filipino 
workers in Japan, complained that Zenkensōren’s campaign ‘infringed the human 
rights of foreign workers’. (p. 255) 
 
Most national trade unions including the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sōhyō) and 
the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengō) took a similar position on the grounds that the 
admission of simple laborers would impair the working conditions and wage levels of native 
workers (Weiner, 1998, pp. 16-17).  In particular, Rengō, Japan’s largest trade union, 
vociferously objected to the acceptance of unskilled foreign workers in its policy statements in 
March 1988 (Nimura, 1992, pp. 251-254).  Although the position of trade unions was largely a 
passive one, a few trade unions such as Edogawa Union and Union Higoro expressed positive 
attitudes about the employment of foreign workers (Nimura, 1992, pp. 257-260).  Notably, they 
were all small-scale unions comprised mostly of day laborers, part-timers, and employees of 
small businesses (Nimura, 1992, p. 260). 
The upsurge in “illegal” male foreign workers spawned a heated debate among policy 
makers as well.  Put simply, the national government opted to maintain the rigid immigration 
procedures, whereas some local governments called for more liberal immigration measures.  The 
Planning and Investigation Office (Kikaku Shingi Shitsu) of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
represents the latter.  Its June 1988 report Towards the Formation of a City Open to the World 
proposed a series of open immigration policies, including the orderly acceptance of non-skilled 
workers (p. 57).  The Local Autonomy Research Center of Kanagawa Prefecture (Kanagawa-ken 
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Jichi Sōgō Kenkyū Sentā) made even more progressive policy suggestions in its March 1988 
report Local Governments in a Globalizing Age.  At the national level, the ruling LDP 
established several sub-committees in early 1988 to weigh up the pros and cons of accepting 
foreign workers (for a list of the committees, see Shimada, 1994, p. 51).  The sub-committees’ 
interim reports laid a foundation for the government’s basic policy on foreign workers to be 
outlined in the Basic Plan for Employment Measures (Koyō Taisaku Kihon Keikaku) and the 
Economic Plan (Keizai Keikaku) in mid-1988.  Both proposals basically stipulated that Japan 
should stay strict on the employment of foreign workers. 
Importantly, the principal task of these study groups, committees, and advisory councils 
was to assess the advantages and disadvantages of accepting male foreign workers in the labor-
intensive sectors.  In other words, female migrants who still occupied nearly half of the foreign 
labor population were not their primary concerns.  Although the study groups did not dismiss 
female migrant workers altogether, even a cursory glance at their reports revealed that the 
consideration of female migrants took a back seat to vigorous discussions about the acceptance 
of male manual and menial laborers.  Unfortunately, the heated policy debate over the foreign 
worker problem did not help to raise awareness of female migrant workers in political arenas, 
business circles, and trade unions. 
 
3.4.4.2 Media Responses  As with policy makers, business organizations, and trade unions, the 
mainstream media began to take seriously the issue of foreign workers around 1988.  
Yamatoya’s 1994 Development of the Foreign Worker Problem in Japan is a useful reference to 
document how the media’s interest in the foreign worker problem grew in the late 1980s; for it 
draws on myriads of newspaper articles for charting the development of Japan’s foreign worker 
problem from 1984 to 1992.  It is telling that the volume spends only one page on the first three 
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years (1984-1986), five pages on 1987, and devotes the remaining 240 pages to the next five 
years (see Table 3.7).  This evidences that the mainstream media did not regard the upsurge of 
female migrant workers as the “beginning” of the foreign worker problem in Japan.  
 
 
Table 3.7: Amount of Space Devoted to Chronicling the Foreign Worker Problem in Yamatoya’ 
Development of the Foreign Worker Problem in Japan 
 
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Pages 1 1 1-2 2-6 6-46 46-122 122-164 164-207 207-246 
Total 1 1 2 5 41 77 43 44 40 
 
 
The media’s obsession with the foreign worker problem even intensified in the next few 
years to the point that “the influx of foreign workers . . . became perhaps the most discussed 
social problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s” (Lie, 1994, p. 3).  According to Lie (1992), 
“[o]ver twenty books on the topic were published between 1989 and 1990, when countless 
newspaper and journal articles as well as special programs on television appeared” (p. 39).  In a 
similar vein, the Kantō Lawyers’ Association (1990) wrote: “It is no exaggeration that no week 
goes by without coming across press reports on the foreign worker problem.  Books on this topic 
have been published one after another, and a special section [on this issue] has been set up in a 
large book store” (p. 51).  To corroborate this point, I performed title searches for Japayuki-san, 
male Japayuki (Otoko japayuki and Japayuki-kun), foreign worker (gaikokujin rōdōsha) and 
foreign worker problem (gaikokujin rōdōsha mondai) on multiple databases (see Table 3.8 on the 
next two pages) 
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Table 3.8: Title Searches for Japayuki-san, Male-Japayuki-san, and Foreign Worker Problems 
1. Nikkei Telecon 21  2. Yomidasu Bunshokan 
(Nikkei Major Article Database) (Yomiuri Shimbun Database) 
Year J M FWP FW  Year J M FWP FW 
1984 2 0 1 98  1984 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1985 0 0 1 50  1985 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1986 16 1 0 85  1986 22 2 0 3 
1987 33 1 10 128  1987 45 5 2 15 
1988 18 2 76 341  1988 59 10 38 109 
1989 8 0 93 548  1989 19 1 36 116 
1990 4 0 101 576  1990 3 0 68 153 
1991 2 0 63 525  1991 6 0 33 159 
1992 6 0 39 520  1992 5 0 32 188 
1993 2 0 28 297  1993 8 0 18 140 
1994 1 0 13 154  1994 3 0 5 77 
1995 0 0 7 92  1995 0 0 11 60 
1996 3 0 2 66  1996 4 0 1 32 
1997 1 0 1 61  1997 3 0 5 16 
1998 0 0 0 58  1998 1 0 2 36 
1999 0 0 2 61  1999 2 0 1 46 
2000 0 0 4 66  2000 0 0 2 57 
2001 0 0 4 87  2001 1 0 6 62 
2002 0 0 1 66  2002 1 0 3 43 
2003 0 0 3 46  2003 0 0 5 65 
2004 1 0 4 113  2004 2 0 7 67 
Total 98 4 453 4038  Total 184 18 275 1444 
      
       3. Mainichi Shimbun Kiji Jōhō 
      
4. Kikuzō (Asahi Shimbun & AERA database) 
Year J M FWP FW  Year J M FWP FW 
  1984 n/a n/a n/a n/a  1984 1 1 0 2 
  1985 n/a n/a n/a n/a  1985 7 0 0 16 
  1986 n/a n/a n/a n/a  1986 35 2 0 16 
  1987 27 0 2 13  1987 39 2 1 22 
  1988 20 0 23 63  1988 57 8 52 182 
  1989 0 0 22 74  1989 29 2 59 312 
  1990 0 0 26 115  1990 11 0 70 389 
  1991 3 0 38 184  1991 9 0 57 429 
  1992 3 0 21 152  1992 7 0 72 522 
  1993 2 0 12 107  1993 2 0 46 307 
  1994 4 0 14 128  1994 8 0 17 217 
  1995 4 0 11 77  1995 5 0 21 150 
  1996 5 0 7 88  1996 3 0 6 112 
  1997 2 0 6 80  1997 4 0 6 124 
  1998 3 0 4 72  1998 4 0 4 97 
  1999 2 0 1 54  1999 2 0 7 101 
  2000 1 0 4 68  2000 1 0 5 116 
  2001 0 0 4 66  2001 0 0 6 119 
  2002 0 0 0 64  2002 3 0 5 78 
  2003 0 0 3 81  2003 1 0 3 101 
  2004 3 0 4 75  2004 1 0 4 78 
Total 79 0 202 1595  Total 145 15 441 3490 
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5. Nichigai: Magazine Plus  
Year J M FWP FW  
1 1975 0 0 1  
1 1976 0 0 0  
4 1977 0 0 0  
3 1978 0 0 2  
1 1979 0 0 0  
1980 0 0 1 0  
1981 1 0 0 9  
1982 0 0 0 19  
1983 1 0 3 14  
1984 8 0 0 6  
1985 6 0 8 8  
1986 37 2 1 27  
1987 32 1 2 28  
1988 44 9 150 401  
1989 16 0 118 442  
1990 1 0 184 607  
1991 6 0 75 441  
1992 7 0 154 558  
1993 8 0 87 336  
1994 11 0 68 238  
1995 1 0 20 83  
1996 0 0 7 46  
1997 1 0 8 61  
1998 3 0 7 65  
1999 0 0 7 49  
2000 0 0 8 77  
2001 0 0 8 63  
2002 4 0 16 77  
2003 0 0 20 62  
2004 0 0 10 68  
Total 187 12 965  3795  
     
    Notes: 
      
     
1.  J = Japayuki, M = Male Japayuki, FWP = Foreign Worker Problem, FW= Foreign 
Worker 
      
     2. Figures under J, M, FWP, and FW denote the numbers of articles. 
      
     
3. All the searches were conducted on July 25, 2005. The key words used for the 
searches were 1) Japayuki (for Japayuki-san), 2) Otoko-Japayuki, Japayuki-kun, and 
Danseiban Japayuki-kun (for Male-Japayuki), 3) gaikokujin rōdōsha mondai (for 
foreign worker problem), and 4) gaikokujin rōdōsha (for foreign worker). 
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A few comments on the findings are in order.  To begin with, the data show that the 
media coverage of the Japayuki-san phenomenon was concentrated around the 1986-1989 
period.  The term itself has been rarely used since then partly because it was denounced as a 
pejorative term.  The keyword searches also unveil that the foreign worker problem has been far 
more frequently reported than the Japayuki-san phenomenon.  This suggests that the media took 
the inflows of male migrant workers far more seriously than their female counterparts.  More 
important, increased attention to the foreign worker problem corresponded with the declining 
coverage of Japayuki-san, which indicated that the media’s interest in migrant women subsided 
in the wake of a nationwide debate over the foreign worker problem.   
Public opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office (Sōrifu, henceforth 
PMO) also reflected this discursive shift from the Japayuki-san phenomenon to the foreign 
worker problem.  The PMO’s first opinion survey on this subject matter was carried out in 1980 
under the title Public Opinion Survey Concerning the Entry and Stay of Foreigners.  As the title 
attests, the term “foreign worker” was nowhere used in this survey.  Also worthy of mention is 
that the survey paid equal attention to female and male migrants coming to Japan for the purpose 
of work.  For example, the sixth question in the survey asked the respondents (N = 2,388) the 
following question: “Many cases have been reported that foreigners who come to Japan under 
the guise of tourists earn money by working as hostesses, cooks, factory workers, and manual 
laborers in engineering work.  What do you think about this?” (n.p.).  Implicit in the question 
was the recognition of both female and male migrants as unauthorized workers. 
The second survey was conducted in 1988 under the same title with 7,648 respondents.  
The fact that the PMO didn’t undertake a survey on this matter for eight years signified that the 
government didn’t give serious consideration to the upsurge of female migrant workers.  The 
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term “foreign workers” was still nowhere used in the survey.  Instead, the opinion survey 
sometimes employed the terms “Japayuki-san” and “Japayuki-kun” to refer to “the foreigners 
who enter Japan as tourists and earn money by working as hostesses, manual laborers in 
engineering work, and factory workers” (n.p.).  At the same time, questions were included in the 
survey asking about how “illegally working foreigners” (fuhō shūrō sha) should be treated or 
whether or not “simple laborers” (tanjun rōdōsha) should be accepted (n.p.).  If the word choice 
in the 1988 opinion survey was any indication, a discursive shift from the Japayuki phenomenon 
to the foreign worker problem were underway but had yet to be completed at that time.  
The third survey was undertaken only two years later with 3,681 respondents.  This time, 
the title was changed to Public Opinion Survey Concerning the Foreign Worker Problem, 
signaling that the term “foreign worker problem” had entered popular parlance by then.  Not only 
was the term Japayuki-san no longer used in the 1990 survey, but many questions about foreign 
workers were also tacitly gendered as they asked the respondents primarily about the acceptance 
of “simple laborers” in construction and manufacturing sectors.   
 To recapitulate the main points, this section has shown that policy makers, business 
organizations, trade unions, scholars, and the mass media began to pay serious heed to the issue 
of foreign workers in the late 1980s when the number of male migrant workers grew 
exponentially.  However, just because they got interested in the issue of foreign workers in the 
late 1980s, it does not follow that the foreign worker problem had not existed until then.  Indeed, 
a significant number of Asian women had come to Japan as de facto foreign workers since the 
late 1970s.  Yet the issue of migrant women was framed first and foremost as the Japayuki-san 
phenomenon, not as a form of labor migration.  Ironically, the “beginning” of the foreign worker 
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problem rendered the issue of migrant women secondary at best and obsolete at worst, despite 
the fact that a good number of migrant women still worked in Japan.27   
 
 
3.5  JAPAYUKI AND GAIKOKUJIN RŌDŌSHA (FOREIGN WORKERS) AS 
TERMINISTIC SCREENS 
 
As Yamanaka (1993) pointed out, female migrant workers hardly became subjects of rigorous 
scholarly analysis or of serious policy discussion in the 1980s; rather, they were mostly objects 
of mass media attention (p. 82).  Worse, the popular media too often linked the theme of female 
migration to sex business, exploitation by underground brokers, and poverty in developing 
countries as if migrant women were newsworthy only as poor sex workers.  As Yamanaka 
(1993) observes:  
Journalistic documentaries tend to be sensational appeals to curiosity, and prompt both 
sympathy and revulsion toward these Asian women.  The public perceives Japa-yuki-
san less as persons and more as sex objects, and associate them with their male clients 
and underworld exploiters.  (p. 83). 
 
While the bulk of literature on the theme of female migration was published in the latter 
half of the 1980s, most publications reduced them to human interest stories of poor sex workers 
from Asian countries.  By human interest stories, I mean stories that are dramatized to arouse the 
pathos and indignation of the audience or the tedious moralizing of others (Bourdieu, 1996/1998, 
pp. 51-52).  Besides, human-interest stories usually present public and social events as private 
and individual ones.  As Edelman (1988) explains:  
Human interest stories are political events because they reinforce the view that 
individual action is crucial. . . .  A focus upon the “private” lives of celebrities 
underlines their significance as public figures.  Stories about the heroic actions of 
                                                 
27 The media’s interest in Japayuki-san was briefly rekindled in 1992 and 1994 owing to the mysterious death of 
Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson and the confession by Ruby Moreno, an award-winning Filipino actress, that she 
was Japayuki-san. 
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ordinary people and the disasters from which they suffer similarly erase structural 
conditions form notice, even while they divert attention from the rest of the political 
spectacle. (p. 99) 
 
The titles of the books on migrant women published in the 1980s illustrate that the lives 
of female migrants were narrated primarily as human-interest stories.  As Table 3.9 shows, the 
word “stories” was included in many book titles (see the next page).  Plus, the use of “angels,” 
“love,” “raped,” and “prostitutes” in some titles illuminates the way the issues of migrant women 
were framed during this period.  Moreover, the inclusion of personal names such as Mary and 
Cecil in several book titles symbolizes that these writers were inclined to spotlight the personal 
lives of Japayuki-san.  
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Table 3.9: List of Books on Female Migrants in the 1980s (in chronological order)28
 
Title (English Translation)   Author   Publisher   Year  
 
Contemporary Comfort Women: From  Keiko Usuki  Tokuma Shoten   1983 
Military Comfort Women to Japayuki-san   
 
Japayuki-san: Asia is a Woman    Tetsuo Yamatani   Johō Sentā Shuppan Kyoku,  1985 
Angels in Bangkok    Kan Takanaka   Sanichi Shobō   1985 
Japayuki-san Stories    Shinji Ishii (ed.)  JICC Shuppan Kyoku  1986 
The Lives of Cecil and Her Likes    Noriko Takazawa Asahi Shimbun Sha  1987 
Japayuki-san’s Now: The Issues   Hiroshi Tanaka and  Shimbun Dō     1988 
Surrounding Foreign Workers  Ayako Miyoshi (eds.) 
 
Raped Asia: Thai Japayuki-san Stories  Ryōsuke Mizumachi Brain Center    1988 
Migrant Workers from Asia   Aiko Utsumi and  Akashi Shoten   1988 
     Yayori Matsui 
 
Prostitutes Stories in Manila   Natsuko Hama  Sanichi Shobō   1988 
Brides from Asia     Kyōko Shukuya   Akashi Shoten   1988  
Japan Seen through the Eyes of HELP  Shizuko Ōshima  Asahi Shimbun Sha  1988 
     and Caroline Francis  
The Men who Fell in Love with Filipinas  Megumi Hisada  Bungei Shunjū Sha  1989 
Japayuki Mary     Jun Hirako   Fubai Sha    1990 
Accusations by the “Lapin”    ALS No Kai (ed.)  Takushoku Shobō  1990 
Case: Fighting Filipinas 
      
              
 
Note: In compiling the list, I consulted “Catalogue of Literature on the Foreign Worker Problem” in Journal of   
Ōhara Institute for Social Research (1989), Japan Institute of Labour (Nihon Rōdō Kenkyū Kikō)’s Catalogue of 
Literature on the Foreign Worker Problem (vol. 1) (1995), and Kazu’s Club (http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~rx7k-
mtst/fili2.htm). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 For the original titles, see the bibliography under the authors. 
 92
The books listed on Table 3.9 can be roughly divided into three types.  The first type of 
book was a personal narrative essay based on an author’s intimate relationship with Japayuki-san 
(e.g. Hisada; Takazawa).  While female writers mostly penned books of this type, a few men, 
who were typically Japayuki-san’s (ex-)boyfriends or regular customers, wrote about their 
personal experiences too.  One such example was Koichi Ōya’s (1986) “Marian, My Angel from 
a Southern Country” in Japayuki-san Stories.  The article was a diary-style documentary on his 
four-month dating of a Filipino stripper.  Such female writers as Hisada and Takazawa featured 
several Japayuki-san and their families and Japanese boyfriends to recount their personal lives.  
Notably, they often portrayed Japayuki-san as upbeat and wily women who used Japanese men 
for their financial advancement.  Takazawa (1987), for instance, wrote a chapter on Eileen, a 20-
year old Filipina, dating two middle-aged Japanese men at the same time.  According to 
Takazawa, she became attracted to one of them because he owned a luxurious Toyota car and 
bought her a stereo set and an audio-tape player (p. 180).  But Eileen was not entirely selfish 
because she was dating rich Japanese men and asking them for financial help in order to support 
her parents and siblings who were “parasitic on her” (p. 171).  As Takazawa put it, Eileen 
willingly worked in the sex business to build a house for her parents and to buy souvenirs for her 
relatives and friends back home (p. 195).  Another Filipina nonchalantly told Takazawa about 
her Japayuki-san life despite the fact that she was constantly exploited and abused by her boss: 
“I like Japan.  The customers were kind.  When I told a customer the truth that I got paid only 
60,000 yen [$ 545] once two months ago, he tipped me out of pity.  Even Yakuza29 members 
were nice if I was nice to them too” (p. 195).    
Just as important, the authors in the first category tended to typecast Japayuki-san’s 
boyfriends and husbands as either rich middle-aged men or naïve, unattractive guys unable to 
                                                 
29 Yakuza refers to Japanese organized crime groups.  They largely control the sex industry in Japan. 
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date Japanese women.  Nonfiction writer Megumi Hisada’s works on Japayuki-san are 
illustrative of this point.  In addition to her 1989 Men who Fell in Love with Filipinas, she also 
published several magazine articles on Japayuki-san.  In “Japayuki-san go home” she wrote 
mainly about Eleanor and her boyfriend Morita.  Prior to Eleanor, Morita dated a money-greedy 
Filipina who spent all of his savings in one month.  According to Hisada, they soon broke up 
after he found out that she had three sex friends.  Although the fault was all hers, Morita still felt 
guilty when he heard her saying in tears “you are the kindest and I like you . . .” (p. 191).   
The second type of book was more of a journalistic report based on official data and an 
author’s interviews with brokers, agents, and Japayuki-san (e.g. Hinago; Yamatani).  Since most 
books in this category were written by male writers, they internalized a male, even voyeuristic, 
gaze at the subject matter.  For example, many books contained graphic descriptions of Japyuki-
san’s sexual services along with their nude or racy pictures (e.g., Yamatani, 1985).  Although 
many authors were sympathetic to Japayuki-san, they didn’t take any moralistic stand on the 
issue.  Instead, they were mainly concerned with picturing the Japayuki-san problem as a tragic 
story of poor Asian women.     
The third type of books generally regarded female migration as a feminist or human 
rights issue, seeking to highlight the problems of human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and 
domestic abuse that beset migrant women workers (e.g., ALS No Kai; Tanaka and Miyoshi; 
Usuki; Utsumi and Matsui).  Notably, all the books but Usuki’s in this category were published 
by small, independent publishers, which indicated that major publishing companies found the 
first two types of books more marketable.  Consequently, the sensationalized stories of Japayuki-
san turned out to reach far wider audiences.  Usuki’s works supposedly made their way into the 
mainstream media because they overlapped with the first two types of books in many ways.  For 
 94
example, Usuki (1986b) not only denounced wicked brokers and agents for abusing migrant 
women, but also wrote about a naïve Japanese man who went crazy about Japayuki-san (pp. 36-
37).  Besides, she sometimes pictured Japayuki-san as jocular, upbeat, and sexually attractive 
girls as many authors in the first two types of books did (for example, see Usuki, 1983, p. 183).  
Usuki (1986b) even surmised that Japayuki-san may be living a rather full-filling life:   
The lives of Japayuki-san in Japan are certainly miserable and full of humiliation.  But 
I don’t think that properly captures their real images.  Even though these girls are much 
poorer than the Japanese, it does not mean that their hearts are poor.  It seems to me 
that their hearts are much stronger, bigger, and fresher than those of the Japanese who 
look slack and lazy. (p. 36)      
 
 As these texts illustrate, the popular media by and large molded the experiences of 
migrant women into tragic stories of sex workers from poor Asian countries.  That is, their 
readers, mostly businessmen, enjoyed Japayuki-san stories not because they identified with 
female migrants but because they saw them as “exotic others” (cf. Hughes, 1937/2004).  This is 
epitomized by the description of Japayuki-san as Asian women “adding exotic colors” to Japan’s 
sex industry in the May 20, 1984 issue of Weekly Yomiuri (Shūkan Yomiuri) (p. 22).  Indeed, the 
Japayuki-san problem became a favorite media topic precisely because young, female sex 
workers from overseas were quintessential “exotic others” in the eyes of Japanese men.  The 
representation of female migrants as exotic others may partly explain why the public’s interest in 
the Japayuki-san phenomenon quickly subsided in the late 1980s.  As Usuki (1986) lamented,  
[T]he vast majority of Japanese would not know, think about, and socialize with them 
[Japayuki-san].  Nor would they show interest in their countries and cultures as well as 
the peoples.  They are only interested in them as commodities, namely “how much 
[they would cost].” (p. 93)   
 
By contrast, the large-scale entry of male migrant workers attracted sustained media attention 
plausibly because the media and the public understood it as their own problem.   
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Why were the lives of female migrants narrated primarily as tragic stories of overseas sex 
workers in the 1980s?  There are two possible explanations.  For one thing, the term Japayuki-
san functioned as a terministic screen to fixate the unreflective and stereotyped image of female 
migrants as young sex workers from poor Asian countries.  As the term was reminiscent of 
Karayuki-san, the melodramatic stories of Japanese prostitutes in the early 20th century impinged 
on the ways the experiences of overseas female migrants were told.  As a result, the stories of 
Japayuki-san came to bear a striking resemblance to those of Karayuki-san.  For example, 
Takezawa’s award-winning Cecil Tachi No Ikikata (The Lives of Cecil and Her Likes) (1985) 
was a recollection of her personal encounters with several Filipino nightclub dancers and 
hostesses. 30   The narrative based on her encounter with several Japayuki-san was akin to 
Morisaki’s and Yamazaki’s works on Karayuki-san in many ways.  In a Yomiuri Shimbun 
interview Yamazaki (1987, November 2) herself pointed to similarities between Japayuki-san 
and Karayuki-san (p. 7).  The introduction to Japayuki-san Stories (1986) even drew an explicit 
analogy between Japayuki-san and Karayuki-san:  
When our country was poor, it witnessed the miseries of Japanese women called 
Karayuki-san who sold their fleshes abroad, mainly in Southeast Asia.  But as they 
remained silent, they were left in the dark in history. . . .  Now that this country has 
become wealthy, women from poor Asian countries keep flowing into Japan. (p. 2)  
  
Just as the image of Japayuki-san led the public to conceive of female migrants in particular 
ways, the term gaikokujin rōdōsha (foreign workers) also served as a terministic screen to create 
“a stereotypical image among the populace that illegal migrant workers in Japan are 
economically motivated males who take up unskilled, dirty, difficult, and dangerous jobs” 
(Sellek, 2001, p. 158).  Accordingly, the “foreign worker” debate centered on the pros and cons 
of accepting male manual and menial laborers.   
                                                 
30 Cecil-Tachi No Ikikata was originally printed in Asahi Journal on November 20, 1985.  Asahi Shimbun Sha 
published it in book form in 1987. 
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The gendered nature of Japan’s foreign worker problem may be due to four reasons.  First 
of all, it was generally assumed from the past migration patterns in Western Europe that foreign 
workers were predominantly men who were later joined by their spouses (Inaba, 2004, p. 89).  
Against this historical backdrop few people envisaged the rise in the entry of female migrants in 
the 1980s as a foreign worker problem.  Male dominance in political leadership, senior 
management positions, and academia reinforced the gender bias embedded in the existing 
literature on labor migration (Tōno, 1989, p. 35; Yamanaka, 1993, p. 82) 
Second, sex work is an illegitimate occupation for foreign women.  While many sex-
affective types of jobs, including hostessing and stripping, are legal in Japan, foreigners without 
permanent residency or spouse visas are forbidden from engaging in any sex work.  As a labor 
ministry official candidly stated in 1990, the issue remained unresolved if female migrants 
engaging in sex work ought to be recognized as laborers (Hachiya, 1990, p. 44).  Hence, 
problems concerning female migrants were considered to fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
Labor Ministry.  By the same token, while White Paper on Police made frequent use of the term 
“male foreign workers,” it nowhere employed the term “female foreign workers” (for example, 
see its 1993 edition).  The NPA’s avoidance of the latter term probably reflected the official view 
that migrant women in the sex business were not legitimate workers.  To further complicate 
matters, foreigners who enter Japan on entertainer visas are legally classified not as laborers but 
as “sojourners” to whom the domestic labor laws do not apply (Ballescas, 1996, p. 100).  As a 
ranking labor ministry official once testified in a Diet session, entertainers were distinguished 
from “regular workers” because their work, unlike normal labor, owed a great deal to the display 
of their artistic talent (Koyama, 1992, p. 332).  This is to say that if entertainers fight to secure 
their labor rights, they will have to risk deportation.  Because the overwhelming majority of 
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migrant women engaged in sex-affective services neither socially nor legally recognized as 
work, they were hardly treated as workers worthy of protection.   
Third, Sellek (2001) cites Japan’s cultural norm that “consider[s] a woman’s primary role 
to be that of a housewife/mother and not that of a wage earner” (p. 38).  Partly because this 
cultural norm persists, “NGOs and other not for profit community groups tend to support 
primarily concerns of male workers (e.g. injury at the workplaces and unpaid wages)” (Stevens 
and Lee, 2002, p. 100).  Perhaps for similar reasons, labor unions have been inattentive to the 
exploitation of sex workers, native or not.  As Ōishi (1987) charged, the Socialist Party, the 
Communist Party, and those involved in labor movements showed little interest in the Japayuki-
san problem and left it mostly to Christian women’s groups (p. 53).  Sex workers, for their part, 
face almost insurmountable obstacles in organizing for their labor rights because of the 
clandestine nature of their occupations.  To my knowledge, no sex workers’ union has been 
established in Japan.  While the first advocacy group for sex workers’ rights Sex Workers! 
Encourage, Empower, Trust and Love Yourselves (SWEETLY) was founded in 1996, little has 
been known about the nature, size, and activities of the group.31  In short, the marginal status of 
women within the labor market and the lack of unionization in the sex sector greatly discouraged 
migrant women workers from campaigning for their rights in the 1980s.
Lastly, since migrant women were actually more vulnerable to coercive migration than 
their male counterparts, they were seen more as trafficking victims than as autonomous actors in 
sympathetic accounts of female migration (Inaba, 2004, p. 90).  Even though, the emphasis on 
their “victim” status does not necessarily preclude the recognition of migrant women as laborers, 
the issues of trafficking and sex work have long been neglected within the existing literature on 
labor migration (Piper, 2003, p. 724).  It is instructive that “Basic Knowledge in Considering the 
                                                 
31 For a brief profile of SWEETLY, read an article by Momocca Momocco (1998), a co-founder of the group. 
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Foreign Worker Problem,” a column in the 1993 edition of annual Issues for Japan (Nihon No 
Ronten)32 made no mention of female migrant workers (pp. 238-239).  Instead, female migration 
was usually cast as a problem affecting public morals and decency in official documents and 
popular texts alike (for example, see Sōrifu, 1986, p. 141).  Partly because the rise in female 
migrants tended to be discussed from a moral standpoint, neither the government nor the industry 
paid much attention to them in the midst of a heated debate on foreign workers (Hachiya, 1990, 
p. 44).   
In the absence of formal support, Christian women’s groups were among the few 
organizations that vigorously spoke out for distressed migrant women (Shipper, 2001, p. 278).  
Notably, many of the groups had taken active part in anti-prostitution movements before they 
extended support to newcomer migrant women.  Prominent in this respect was House in 
Emergency of Love and Peace (HELP), a Tokyo-based women’s shelter founded in April 1986 
by the Japan Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU).  WCTU has been involved in 
anti-prostitution campaigns since its inception in 1886 (YS, 1986, December 17, p. 13; see also 
Pak, 1998, p. 206); it even had a history of providing shelters for Karayuki-san (International 
Labour Organization, 2004, p. 56).  Hence the abolitionist viewpoint defined the terms of WCTU 
and many other Church-based groups’ discourse on female migration.  As Shipper (2002) 
explains: 
Japanese women assist foreign women for two reasons.  First, many of these groups 
are Christian-influenced and thus hold Christian values on fidelity.  They hope to sway 
other Japanese people’s views on prostitution by pointing to various abuses that 
foreign women face due to their disadvantaged positions.  Second, they are part of the 
women’s movement in Japan that seeks sexual equality and the protection of women 
rights. (pp. 27-28) 
 
                                                 
32 Nihon No Ronten is published by Bungei Shunjū Sha and billed as a collection of articles on hot issues in 
contemporary Japan. 
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Specifically, women’s groups situated the Japayuki-san phenomenon in the context of 
global human trafficking and attributed its root cause to the international sex tourism in the 
1970s.  In other words, by highlighting institutionalized violence and deep-rooted sexism 
inflicted on woman migrants, they sought to counter the media’s inclination to privatize, 
personalize, and thereby trivialize the Japayuki phenomenon as human interest stories.  For 
example, the September 18, 1987 issue of Ekonomisuto (Economist) printed an interview with 
Shizuko Ōshima, then director of HELP.  In the interview she registered her objection to 
reducing the image of female migrants to Japayuki-san and treating them as criminals (pp. 48-
49).  Alternatively, she claimed that female migrants should be treated as victims of organized 
prostitution who were coerced to work like “slaves” (p. 49).  Likewise, the January 1990 issue of 
Sekai (The World) carried an interview with Mizuho Matsuda of HELP.  As she put it, Thai 
women were typically forced to sell their bodies until they paid back a three million yen 
($27,000) debt; some worked under complete surveillance so that they would not escape (p. 80).  
Seen in this light, the reality of female migration, Matsuda continued, was but “human 
trafficking” (p. 81).   
Rhetorically, women’s groups presented emotionally intense stories and images of female 
migrants in an effort to elicit public sympathy and support.  Their rhetorical strategies were 
encapsulated in the inaugural issue of Voices from Japan, the English-language newsletter 
published by Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Center.  In the article entitled “Trafficking in Asian 
Women and Prostitution in Japan” Matsui (1995b) detailed the suffering of migrant women 
working in the sex industry.  The article started out with excerpts from letters two Thai sex 
workers wrote to their lawyers and support group members.  They were both held in detention 
centers accused of murdering their bosses.  A Thai woman confessed in a letter that she was sold 
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three times and forced to sleep with men even during menstruation to pay back a debt she wasn’t 
aware of (p. 29).  After stressing her wretched conditions, the Thai woman went on to appeal to 
the reader’s sympathy: “I was intimidated, fearing that when I escaped, I would be traced and 
killed, and my parents in Thailand killed as well” (p. 29).  Matsui then offered a sympathetic 
account of why the Thai women were driven to stab their boss to death.  In her estimation the 
Thai women “were always under surveillance,” “had to endure violence, abuse, slander, 
confinement and, above all, forced prostitution,” and “had killed the boss in order to escape from 
sexual slavery” (p. 30).  After citing two more murder cases involving Thai women, Matsui 
spoke of their slave-like working conditions in more general terms:  
Trafficking in Thai women is organized systematically. . . .  They are treated not as 
human beings, but as mere commodities from which recruiters, brokers, bar owners 
and other related agents extort a huge profit.  This is why the women are confined like 
slaves, and if they try to escape are severely punished by beating, being burned by 
cigarettes, rape, and psychological intimidation.  Still, some successfully escape. . . . 
And those who fail to escape, take the tragic method: murder. (pp. 30-31) 
 
By comparing Thai sex workers to slaves, Matsui pleaded the extenuating circumstances that 
drove the two women into murdering their bosses.  Whether or not this was a typical case of 
migrant women in Japan during the 1980s, it was a typical story women’s organizations told 
about them.  
Although female migrants received far less public attention than their male counterparts, 
women’s organizations were not alone in speaking out for them.  Several human rights groups, 
among others, advanced similar arguments out of concern for the rights of migrant women.  For 
example, the Kantō Lawyers’ Association (1990) urged the government to take active measures 
to protect the rights of female migrants, contending that most of them were duped into 
prostitution: 
Those [Filipina and Thai] women from these [rural] areas (as with those from such 
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urban areas as Manila) are hardly informed of what they are really going to do in 
Japan. . . .  The Philippines is a Catholic nation and Thailand is a Buddhist nation.  
Those who worked as prostitutes in Japan must conceal the fact.  Because recruiters 
cook up stories and those who returned from Japan won’t talk about their true 
experiences, migrant women are handed over to recruiters without knowing anything 
about Japan. (pp. 58-59) 
 
Finding such an emotive story newsworthy, the mainstream media often echoed the 
plight of innocent, powerless female migrants as women’s organizations and human rights 
groups narrated it.  One such example is an article in the December 17, 1987 issue of Shūkan 
Shinchō (Weekly Shinchō) on the apprehensions of Thai Japayuki-san in Chōshi City.  Despite 
the fact that the Thai women were law violators, they were generally depicted as pitiful, frail 
women (p. 28).  This does not mean, however, that the media representations of migrant women 
always jibed with those by grassroots organizations.  As shown earlier, migrant women were as 
likely, if not more, to be depicted as calculating, cheerful, and even cunning women who would 
willingly use their sexual charms to cheat naïve, gullible Japanese men.  In this instance female 
migrants might be portrayed as those who struggled to improve their lives under highly 
exploitive working conditions.  But they were in no way seen as capable of resisting the 
oppressive conditions themselves.  Interestingly, the ostensibly contradictory images of migrant 
women as cunning, jocular sex workers and helpless, innocent victims shared one underlying 
assumption: In both cases they were not represented as active social agents who were able to 
speak up against their plight and claim their own rights.  Besides, both strands of narratives had 
all the elements necessary for heart-wrenching human-interest stories: poverty, exploitive 
employers, debt-bondage, deception, and sex.  The term Japayuki gained popularity plausibly 
because it captured all of these elements. 
The struggle of women’s groups to counter the stereotypical image of female migrants 
was definitely laudable, but their narrative was not without its problems.  That is, while women’s 
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groups did a good job of resisting the objectification of migrant women as commodities in sex 
businesses, they didn’t do much to have them recognized as legitimate workers.  For they 
moralistically maintained prostitution as an illegitimate occupation.  Shizuko Ōshima (1988) of 
HELP, for instance, furiously rebuffed the view of overseas sex workers as willing participants 
in the sex trade: 
Not a few Japanese arrogantly state that “they [overseas sex workers] came to Japan, 
knowing that they would work as prostitutes.”  But if I recall the pain and agony of 
each and every woman I met in HELP, I can in no way subscribe to such a ridiculous 
discourse.  I don’t think that promoters and recruiters are the only villains.  I think those 
Japanese who are around them and pretend not to see the plight [of overseas sex 
workers] are also accomplices. (in Miyoshi, 1988, p. 103)  
 
Women’s groups, as typified by this quote, seldom addressed the issue of migrant women in the 
context of global labor migration.  Consequently, the voices of female migrants were selected to 
support their political cause, and their life experiences were reworked through the eyes and 
words of women’s groups.   
 By saying this, I don’t mean to blame women’s groups for the misrepresentation of 
migrant women.  There was little doubt that female migrants were actually more susceptible to 
trafficking than their male counterparts.  Moreover, by acting as outspoken advocates and 
alternative sources of information, women’s groups helped to raise public awareness that 
irregular female migrants were triply disadvantaged for being women, illegal aliens, and 
trafficking victims.  HELP, above all, served as an invaluable primary source for many media 
outlets (for example, see Yomiuri Shimbun’s report on forced prostitution, unpaid wages, and 
human right infringements against foreign women on April 22, 1988).  If it were not for 
women’s groups, many more female migrants would have had to endure horrible exploitation 
and abuse in silence.   
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Still, it is important to illuminate the dilemma facing women’s organizations in dealing 
with the Japayuki-san problem.  According to Tōno (1989), some women’s groups 
acknowledged that the legalization of simple laborers, including sex workers, would help to 
protect their human and labor rights at least in the short term.  Nevertheless, they generally opted 
to place female migration in the context of international human trafficking because they 
considered the admission of simple laborers tantamount to condoning prostitution as a form of 
legitimate work (p. 36).   
Their abolitionist views on prostitution led women’s groups to picture migrant women as 
helpless victims rather than “foreign workers.”  In particular, they argued that since migrant 
women were weak and powerless, they must be rescued as victims.  It is telling that women’s 
shelters were often called kakekomidera (literally “temples to run into for refuge”).  According to 
Tsuda (2002), the term was reminiscent of feudal times “when peasants took refuge in local 
temples in times of social and political crisis” (p. 24).  Yokohama Women’s Association (1997) 
defined the term more narrowly as “Buddhist temples which provided, in feudal times, refuge for 
distressed wives or victims of forced marriages and obtained divorces for them” (n.p.).  Either 
way, the use of the term kakekomidera suggested that just like peasants or women in feudal 
times, female migrants were now subjugated to unscrupulous exploitation by money-greedy 
brokers and agents.  Along this line, Matsui (1995a) underscored the vulnerability and 
submissiveness of Asian migrant women, claiming that “[t]hey are in no position to resist their 
employers’ demands or to fight for their rights” (p. 311).  In a similar vein, attorney Yōko 
Hayashi (1987a) maintained that no Asian woman she had spoken to engaged in prostitution of 
their own will (p. 37).  As a matter of fact, “they were duped, threatened, and beaten [into 
prostitution]” (p. 37).  In an effort to challenge the popular image of Japayuki-san as “those who 
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voluntarily came to Japan for working illegally and making quick money in a short time” (p. 37), 
she emphasized the innocence of young migrant women who were forced into prostitution.  
Hayashi opened the article by recounting the tragic story of Kitty, a 18-year old Filipina.  The 
story ran like this:  Kitty came to Japan on a tourist visa, believing that she would work as a 
waitress and get paid 100,000 yen ($900) a month.  When her boss told her to perform sexual 
services, Kitty resisted.  Even when forced to go to a hotel with a customer, she cried and refused 
to have sex.  Infuriated by Kitty’s behavior, her boss raped her.  That was her first sex.  Even 
though Kitty had engaged in sex work for two months, she had never gotten paid.  Luckily, Kitty 
managed to escape from her slave-like workplace and asked K, a member of a local Christian 
group, for help.  K requested Hayashi to “rescue” Kitty and six other Filipinas (aged 15 through 
18) who were “virtually held in confinement” (p. 34).  Women’s groups maintained that a girl 
like Kitty was a typical female migrant in Japan.  For example, Yūko Abe (1993) of Mizula, a 
female migrant support group, argued that since most female sex workers, especially from 
Thailand, were confined and monitored, only a few of them were able to escape and seek the 
group’s help (p. 37).  By implication, the majority of migrant sex workers suffered even more 
than Kitty.   
The representation of sex workers as innocent victims, however, has a serious drawback.  
As Dozema (1998) holds, it “shows an underlying rejection of prostitution as a profession—no 
‘normal’ woman would choose the work [of prostitution] unless ‘forced’ by poverty” (p. 44).  It 
follows that unauthorized migrant women deserve legal protection as innocent victims of forced 
prostitution, not as legitimate workers.  In other words, the rhetoric of protection, though morally 
appealing, does not help female migrants working in the sex industry to secure labor rights.  As 
Delmeitner (2001) puts it:   
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Although compelling depictions of victimhood may be able to counteract the negative 
constructions of the women, they also carry with them dangers as they construe women 
generally as helpless and in need of rescuing.  Since many migrant women do not fit 
this image, they are unlikely to benefit from a framework that aids only the “typical” 
victim.  Therefore, the depiction of trafficking victims as victims may not provide 
substantial assistance to most of the women. (pp. 258-259) 
 
While women’s groups insisted that most migrant sex workers were duped into the sex 
trade and treated as “commodities,” several academic studies showed that the majority of them 
knew about the nature of work they would have to do in Japan (e.g. Watanabe, 2000).  Similarly, 
Yoshioka (1988) pointed out that many migrant women could have made a living in their 
countries of origin; nevertheless they decided to come and work in Japan for higher wages (p. 14, 
p. 18).  Although few disagreed that most migrant sex workers were not fully informed of the 
terms and conditions of work and the situations of debt-bondage, the homogenized image of 
unauthorized female migrants as trafficking victims did not fully capture the real situation of 
female migration in the 1980s.  
All in all, whereas women’s groups successfully highlighted the plight of female 
migrants by telling heart-wrenching stories, their counter discourse was neither empowering nor 
appealing to many women migrant workers.  For it elevated migrant women to the status of 
deserving victims at the price of leaving out the voices of those who wanted to claim their labor 
rights.  According to Watanabe (2000), “the main reason Thai women do not seek help at 
Catholic churches seems to be . . . that those churches, as well as women’s organizations in the 
case of feminism, are not always sympathetic towards sex workers because of their views against 
prostitution” (p. 329).  In similar fashion, Piper (2003) suggests that the activities of women’s 
groups focus mostly on anti-prostitution campaigns and thus create some unease among the 
Filipino women (p. 740).  Seen in this light, it was problematic for women’s groups to generalize 
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the experiences of female migrants from a selective sample of prostitutes who absconded from 
their exploitive employers and brokers.  
 
3.6 MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF FEMALE MIGRANTS SINCE THE 1990s 
 
The Japayuki-san discourse in the 1980s foregrounded the sexuality and poverty of young 
migrant women.  This discursive frame stayed long after the term Japayuki-san became obsolete.  
The December 5, 1995 issue of Mainichi Shimbun, for example, observed that Filipinos were 
still subject to harsh discrimination and prejudices in part because the stereotyped image of 
Japayuki-san resonated so strongly (n.d.).  This indicates that once the Japayuki-san discourse 
set the parameters for the narrative construction of migrant women, the term per se mattered 
little.   
The mass media began to refrain from using Japayuki-san around 1990 largely because 
the term was denounced as derogatory and offensive (see Table 3.8 on pp. 86-87).  Lie (2001) 
ascribed their decision to the shifting gender composition of foreign workers and progressive 
intellectuals’ public protests (p. 20).  Equally important was ethnic groups’ movements to 
extirpate the use of the term (see, for example, YS, 1988, May 3, p. 27).  The disappearance of 
Japayuki-san from the media discourse, however, did not lead to the decline of female migration 
for sex work.  Even though the number of apprehended female foreign workers momentarily 
decreased since it peaked in 1987, it took an upward turn again in 1990 (see Table 3.10 on the 
next page).  Besides, the temporary decrease in unauthorized female migrant workers was largely 
a result of tightening immigration measures targeting the sex industry (for details on this point, 
see former Tokyo Immigration Bureau chief Hidenori Sakanaka’s Nyūkan Senki).   
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Table 3.10: Number of Apprehended Foreign Workers by Sex (1990-2003) 
 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Male 4,289 8,929 11,791 24,176 25,350 47,521 45,144 40,029 32,106 
Female 7,018 5,385 4,817 5,708 7,558 14,640 19,197 19,323 17,328 
          
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
Male 31,160 25,781 24,808 26,418 23,949 19,313 18,610 20,274  
Female 16,625 15,823 15,727 19,840 20,241 14,195 13,754 14,051  
 
Sources: Sellek, 2001, p. 33; Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku (Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry), 2004, p. 75 
 
 
 
Furthermore, while the case for doing away with the term Japayuki-san was well 
grounded, it did not help much to improve the public image of migrant women.  Rather, the 
media’s avoidance of the term was less an indication of their heightened sensitivity to female 
migrants than their lack of concern for their plight.  As JNATIP and F-GENS (2005) noted, the 
problem of trafficking in migrant women was rarely reported throughout the 1990s unless they 
got involved in such shocking incidents as murders (pp. 9-11).  When the media occasionally 
covered the issue of female migration, they continued to place it in the context of sex trade.  
Sometimes, undocumented foreign women were even blamed for corrupting “public morals.”  
Perhaps most illustrative of this point was then Justice Minister Seiroku Kajiyama’s political 
gaffe in September 1990.  After observing a police operation in Tokyo’s entertainment area, 
Kajiyama told reporters: “[T]he foreign women [accused of working as prostitutes] had lowered 
the tone of the surrounding area.  ‘It’s like in America when neighbourhoods become mixed 
because blacks move in and whites are forced out’” (Sullivan, 1990, n.p.).  Confronted with 
mounting criticisms from U.S. media, the Congress, and African American groups, Kajiyama 
retracted his statement a few days later and denied any racist intent.  Yet his apologia was not 
directed at foreign sex workers who were singled out for destroying the environment just as “bad 
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money drives good money out” (Sanger, 1990, A7).  Kajiyama’s denigration of foreign sex 
workers as morally suspect itself went largely uncriticized in the media.   
This pattern of news coverage remains largely unchanged to date.  The October 21, 2003 
issue of the Weekly Pictorial Flash, for example, reported that local foreigner pubs (gaikokujin 
pabu) in Tokyo’s Ueno area were increasingly thriving on “Asian gals.”  After describing how 
Asian gals lured men into their places and underscoring the risks of being ripped off, the article 
ended with an alarming yet humorous note “Beware of the sexual charm [iroka] of Asian gals!” 
(p. 82).  Likewise, the Weekly Shinchō of October 8, 2003 stated that “the purification of 
Kabukichō” had driven out “Columbian prostitutes” to Tokyo’s suburban areas.  The article 
argued that there was no use “purifying Kabukichō” because foreign prostitutes would simply 
move to other red-light districts and continue to solicit customers (p. 47).  Similarly, the June 20, 
2003 issue of Yomiuri Shimbun (Chūbu edition) printed an article on the local police’s sweeping 
“campaign to purify the Sakae [entertainment] area.”  Attached to the article was a picture of 
skimpy-dressed “Philippine pub” hostesses being taken to a police station (p. 29; see also Figure 
3.1 on the next page).  These articles—especially the picture and the use of the word “purify”—
evidence that female migrants are still represented as “immoral yet sexually titillating others” in 
the media.  The mainstream media by and large still find little news value in covering the issue 
of female migration from other angles.  In the absence of any countervailing framings of news, 
the terministic screen Japayuki-san continues to do its structuring work even after the term itself 
has receded from view.      
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 Source: YS, 2003, June 20, p. 29.  Reprinted with permission of Yomiuri Shimbun Sha 
Figure 3.1: Filipino Hostesses Being Taken to a Police Station 
 
 
 
Although women’s organizations continue to combat the skewed images of migrant 
women, they basically put forward the same argument that migrant women must be protected as 
innocent victims.  For instance, Kaori Mutō (2004), director of Women’s House Saa-Laa, 
characterizes migrant sex workers as “‘the socially weak’ who deserve protection in Japanese 
society” (p. 44).  Equally illustrative is the “End Violence Against Women” Project’s Domestic 
Violence and Human Trafficking.  As the title attests, the volume by and large depicts migrant 
women as victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.  Out of the 15 articles, only two 
make explicit mention of the labor rights of migrant women, which hints that they are still not 
given due recognition in the discourse of foreign workers.   
Recently, the rhetoric of protection is beginning to gain ground after the U.S. State 
Department issued a report in September 2004, censuring Japan as “the worst industrialized 
country in terms of measures to prevent the trafficking of women” (JT, 2004, April 5, n.p.  For 
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the full text of the report, visit the U.S. State Department’s website at http://www. 
state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/).  The State Department report, coupled with international 
pressure to ratify relevant UN conventions, spawned a series of policy initiatives for coping with 
human trafficking and providing care and protection for trafficking victims.  Concomitant with 
these policy changes, unauthorized female foreign workers are now more likely to be represented 
as trafficking victims in the media.  Carrying pictures of three apparently overseas sex workers, 
the February 2005 issue of progressive Days Japan, for instance, holds that these women should 
not be seen as “criminals,” but as “victims [of human trafficking] who are feeling frightened in 
helpless circumstances” (p. 14).  Similarly, soon after the release of the State Department’s 
report, Asahi Shimbun runs a feature article suggesting that sex workers from abroad should be 
treated as “victims of sexual slavery,” not as “illegal aliens” (Takenobu, 2004, p. 23).  The 
current director of HELP, Keiko Ōtsu (2005) makes a similar point by referring to foreign 
women visiting the shelter as “victims” of “domestic violence,” “human trafficking,” and “sexual 
abuse and exploitation” (pp. 31-32).   
Implicit in these portrayals, however, is a rather patronizing attitude towards migrant 
women.  That is, they all posit that clandestine female workers must be rescued and protected as 
they are powerless to stand up against exploitation and abuse on their own.  What’s more, 
whether “illegal” female migrant workers are portrayed as helpless victims or voluntary sex 
workers, they are still associated almost exclusively with the sex industry.  But this assumption 
does not accurately reflect the reality of undocumented migrant women because their 
occupations, life styles, and demographics have diversified over the years.  As Figures 3.2-3 on 
the next page show, while over 80% of the apprehended women were found working as 
hostesses in 1985, the percentage dropped to about 35% in 2003.   
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Hostess (83.1%)
Stripper (6.8%)
Prostitute (5.8%)
Waitress (0.7%)
Sales Clerk (0.7%)
Chore worker (0.6%)
Factory worker (0.3%)
Cook (0.06%)
Civil engineering &
construction worker
(0.02%)
Others (1.8%)
 
Source: Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku (Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry), 1987, p. 108 
 
Figure 3.2: Occupations of Foreign Women Apprehended for Immigration Law Violations in 1985 
(N = 4,942) 
 
 
Hostess, etc. (34.7%)
Factory worker (14.3%)
Waitress (12.0%)
Other services (10.5%)
Dish Washer (5.9%)
Cook (4.9%)
Others (17.7%)
   
Source: Nyūkoku Kanri Kyōkai (Immigration Association), 2004, p. 79 
 
Figure 3.3: Occupations of Foreign Women Apprehended for Immigration Law Violations in 2003 
(N = 14,051) 
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This trend is even more conspicuous for non-Filipino female migrants.  According to 
Wakabayashi (1997), more than 60% of apprehended Peruvian women were found working in 
factories; hostesses made up only 5% of Malaysian women (p. 102).  The vast majority of 
apprehended women from Myanmar, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka took on jobs in factories and 
restaurants (Wakabayashi, 1997, p. 102). 
The overrepresentation of sex workers in the media coverage of female migrants is partly 
due to the fact that the figures of irregular foreigners are tabulated from apprehension statistics.  
Police and immigration raids tend to target bars and brothels in red-light districts in large cities, 
notably Tokyo’s Kabukichō (Wakabayashi, 1997, pp. 102-103).  Thus apprehension statistics 
turn out to inflate the estimated figures of foreign sex workers.  Still, given that more than half of 
apprehended female migrants are unrelated to the sex industry, the dominant media image of 
undocumented foreign women as sex workers is deeply problematic.  Suzuki (2003a)’s following 
observation regarding the representations of Filipinas holds equally good for migrant women 
from other countries:  
Filipinas have not yet achieved the status of women, but representationally remain as 
goods and (indentured) servants.  The representations imply that the women are 
incapable of self-determination—unless they are described as hyperactive 
opportunities who sell their sexuality and take advantage of naïve men in order to 
satisfy their monetary, material and legal-immigration needs.  (p. 16) 
 
Though many migrant women are no doubt trafficked into Japan for sex work,33 this is 
only part of the whole story.  A 17-month field study conducted by Japan Network Against 
Trafficking in Persons (JNATIP) and Ochanomizu University’s Frontiers of Gender Studies (F-
GENS) (2005) revealed that the majority of Filipinas and Thais who escaped to NGO shelters 
                                                 
33 International Labour Office (ILO) (2004) observes that “[a]lthough it is impossible to estimate the number of 
Philippine nationals who have been trafficked to Japan over the last six years, the numbers appear to have remained 
fairly steady” (p. 20).  Japan’s National Police Agency placed the number of trafficking victims at 83 in 2003 (cited 
in JNATIP and F-GENS, 2005, p. 10).  But this official figure is way too low, given that many trafficking women 
were deported for violations of the immigration laws and many others did not seek help for fear of reprisals. 
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were recruited not by “international crime syndicates” but through informal networks (p. 87).  
Since they were mostly recruited by colleagues, friends, neighbors, and relatives, they hardly 
saw themselves as victims of trafficking crimes despite the fact that they were forced to work 
under extreme duress (JNATIP and F-GENS, 2005, p. 24, p. 87).  Just as important, migrant 
women will continue to come to Japan for work as long as a huge wage gap exists between Japan 
and developing countries.  In fact, the number of Filipina entertainers has been increasing at a 
steady rate despite the enforcement of stricter immigration control measures in recent years (see 
Figure 3.4).  This is understandable, considering that Filipina women, even when “exploited,” 
are able to earn three times the wages they could in their home country (Hata, 2005, p. 8).        
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Sources: Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku (Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry), 2003b, p. 176; 2004, p. 169  
Figure 3.4: Number of Foreigners Newly Entering Japan on Entertainer Visas 
 
Ultimately, the empowerment of female women requires an attack on the construction of 
their images through an identity marked by powerlessness.  Especially when most trafficking 
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victims complain about labor-related violations, it is critically important to treat them as victims 
of both sexual and labor exploitation (International Labour Organization, 2004, p. 16).     
 
3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has traced the “beginning” of Japan’s foreign worker problem to demonstrate that 
the wave of female migration since the late 1970s was understood as a peculiar issue of 
Japayuki-san, not as a foreign worker problem.  All in all, the neglect of female migrants in the 
“foreign worker” debate could be attributed to a number of interlocking factors, including the 
past migratory patterns in Western Europe, Japan’s economic structure, ubiquitous gender bias, 
the state’s inaction, public indifference, and thriving sex businesses.  Admittedly, many of them 
are non-linguistic factors.  For example, the massive influx of male migrant workers was 
perceived as the “beginning” of Japan’s foreign worker problem in part because they were 
absorbed into integral part of Japan’s mainstream economy.  Put differently, the concentration of 
overseas women workers in the informal service sectors partly explained why female migration 
was not give due recognition in the “foreign worker” debate.  In consequence, the circumstances 
of female migrant workers have been little known (Sellek, 2001, p, 158), and their labor rights 
have been hardly protected (Machimura, 1998, p. 191; Yamagishi, 2004, p. 42).   
But this does not mean that language mattered little in marginalizing the status of migrant 
women in the 1980s.  On the contrary, it was responsible for drawing public attention away from 
female migrants in the wake of the foreign worker problem.  Specifically, the terms Japayuki-san 
and gaikokujin rōdōsha functioned as terministic screens to induce the general public to see the 
migratory waves of female and male workers in different ways.  Partly because different sets of 
vocabulary were employed to account for the female and male migration patterns, they were 
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addressed as separate issues and grabbed attention from different writers in different genres and 
professions.   
Even though Japayuki-san has now become an obsolete term, the association of migrant 
women with sex work still dictates the media portrayals of migrant women and thus weighs 
heavily on the public’s minds.  Unfortunately, the media have long treated female migrants as if 
they had no news values except as sex workers.  As Suzuki (2000) lucidly shows, “[t]he 
continuing domination of . . . a pervasive ‘prostitute’ image of Filipinas symbolically places all 
Filipinas in the time-space confinement of ‘the sex industry’ in the night, and outside of the 
home” (p. 433).     
The chapter has also illustrated that the images of migrant women have been 
oversimplified and polarized from one extreme of being docile, submissive, and innocent to the 
other extreme of being cheerful, calculating, and cunning.  Either way, they are not seen as active 
social agents capable of speaking up against structural violence inflicted upon them.  While 
women’s organizations made serious attempts to contest the stereotyped images and give voices 
to migrant women, they by and large framed the issue of female migration as a trafficking 
problem rather than a labor issue.  Accordingly, the voices of migrant women were selected and 
filtered through the groups’ interpretive framework.  Their counter discourse, though morally 
appealing, was necessarily reductive as it spotlighted the victim status of female migrants.   
   In the last analysis, female migrants deserve more recognition in the context of the 
foreign worker problem.  Since many problems faced by migrant women workers are gender-
specific, research on labor migration has much to gain by examining the ways gender affects 
public attitudes and social policies about foreign workers.  At the discursive level, it is 
imperative to enrich public discourse so that the sexualized image of migrant women ceases to 
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be the dominant form of representation.  Admittedly, this is easier said than done, and a full 
discussion of alternative rhetoric is beyond the scope of this chapter.  But one possibility is to 
portray female migrants as both trafficking victims and legitimate laborers.  Inaba (2004) 
underscores this possibility by citing the programme of action adopted at the 2001 World 
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance in 
Durban, South Africa.  Recognizing the labor rights of even trafficked persons, Article 105 of the 
programme:  
Urges States to give special attention, when devising and implementing legislation and 
policies designed to enhance the protection of workers’ rights, to the serious situation 
of lack of protection, and in some cases exploitation, as in the case of trafficked persons 
and smuggled migrants, which makes them more vulnerable to ill-treatment such as 
confinement in the case of domestic workers and also being employed in dangerous and 
poorly paid jobs. (p. 40) 
 
Equally important, we should listen more closely to the voices of migrant women and their 
families living and working in Japan as many of them feel dissatisfied with being represented as 
“pitiful victims of poverty and passive pawns of male power” (Suzuki, 2003b, p. 406; see also 
Hata, 2005, p. 8).  Recently, various attempts have been made from academics and Filipino 
groups to counter the “passive victim” stereotype of migrant women (for example, see the 
Filipina Circle for Advancement and Progress, n.d.; Fujieda, 2001; Suzuki, 2003a, 2003b; 
Watanabe, 2000).  To cite one example, Fujieda (2001) found through her field research that 
many Filipina migrant women were in reality “reflexive actors” who negotiated the meanings of 
migration and struggled for better living and working conditions: 
The subject japayuki was articulated in a national movement against IST [International 
sex traffic] [in the Philippines], particularly in relation to Japan.  Filipino women bound 
for Japan as entertainers partook in the flow to Japan, not in subjection but rather in 
resistance, to the discourse of japayuki.  From the marginal position, they actively 
rejected the identity of japayuki, and struggled to construct alternative meanings of 
their own experiences of labor migration to Japan. (p. 114) 
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Continued efforts like this should be made in public arenas and academia alike to diversify the 
images of migrant women. 
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4.0  CRIMINALIZING “ILLEGAL ALIENS”: THE MEDIA HYPE OF ORGANIZED 
AND VICIOUS CRIMES BY “ILLEGAL” CHINESE MIGRANTS 
 
Imperial Ordinance No. 352 is concerned primarily with the maintenance of discipline 
over Chinese workers since they are not only likely to vitiate public morality, but are 
also apt to enter into conflict with Japanese workers through competition; thereby 
causing disorder in industry and society, and ultimately disturbing public peace and 
order.  
Ordinance No. 782 issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in July 1899 
(cited in Weiner, 1994, p. 53). 
 
 
There is fear—and not without cause—that it -will not be long before . . . the entire 
nature of Japanese society itself will be altered by the spread of this type of [vicious] 
crime that is indicative of the ethnic DNA [of the Chinese].   
Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara in Sankei Shimbun on May 8, 200134  
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Through his fieldwork in the early 1990s Wayne Cornelius (1993) observes that “in Japan, local 
police know the whereabouts of virtually all foreigners within their jurisdictions; but unless a 
specific complaint is made against a foreigner, or he [sic] is caught in the act of committing some 
sort of crime, he [sic] is left alone” (p. 446).  His observation, though probably true at the time of 
his writing, no longer holds good.  For as the Japanese economy has plunged into a decade-long 
recession, the foreign worker problem has been increasingly framed as a security issue (Friman, 
2001, p. 294).  Indeed, the relentless round-ups of “illegal aliens” in recent years attest to 
Cornelius’s (1993) own thesis that “it makes a tremendous difference whether a major wave of 
Third World immigration is being experienced in the context of economic expansion or 
                                                 
34 The English translation was taken from the ISSHO website (http://www.issho.org). 
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 recession” (pp. 442-443).  During the so-called bubble economy “illegal” foreign workers were 
tacitly admitted into Japan as “economic units” that would sustain its economic growth.  It is 
therefore hardly surprising that as the Japanese economy slumped down, they came to be seen as 
mere illegal aliens who don’t deserve continued living in Japan.    
The two opening quotations, when placed in tandem, illustrate that the threat of 
foreigners, especially Chinese immigrants, is not a recent construct, but a recurring narrative in 
modern Japan.  For instance, the recent news coverage of foreigners’ crimes (gaikokujin hanzai) 
bears a striking resemblance to that in the 1950s.  Under the headline “Foreigners’ Crimes are 
Left Unchecked,” Asahi Shimbun of December 27, 1958, alarmed the reader that foreign 
criminals had turned Japan’s large cities into “Devil’s Town Shanghai” (Mato Shanhai) (p. 11).  
It then presented the data that Chinese nationals made up the majority of “the most vicious, 
largest-scale brokers” masterminding drug-related offenses (p. 11).  Also highlighted in the 
article was a swelling number of “organized crimes” (soshiki hanzai) by foreigners.  In a similar 
vein, Asahi Shimbun on March 28, 1958 pointed to a steep rise in “transnational organized 
crimes” (soshiki teki na kokusai hanzai) perpetrated by criminal groups of diverse nationals (p. 
5).  The article also cited the low clearance rates for foreigners’ crimes and stated that since “bad 
foreigners” who ought to be deported were living a comfortable life in Japan, some called Japan 
“a paradise for foreign criminals” (gaijin hanzai no tengoku) (p. 5).  
These press reports, when compared with the following headlines of more recent articles, 
unveil the remarkably persistent patterns of reporting on foreign crime:   
The background of crimes by the Chinese.  Devil’s Town Kabukichō—a report on the 
underground society. (AERA, 2003, September 1, p. 26) 
 
“Japan is a paradise for pickpockets.” 420 offenses with earnings of 9.7 million yen    
[$88,000], three apprehended Koreans confessed. (AS, 1990, November 22, p. 31)35
                                                 
35 While I came across this article in Herbert’s book (1996), I retrieved it and translated the heading by myself. 
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 Like the press coverage in the 1950s, these articles expressed concern about the threat of 
“organized crime” by Asians in “international cities” (kokusai toshi).  They also pointed to the 
low clearance rates for foreigners’ crimes and suggested that control authorities let bad foreign 
criminals run free.  Although any easy comparison of media texts at different times could be 
misleading, the juxtaposition of the articles indicates that foreign crimes have long been 
represented as grave threats to Japan’s public safety.   
This chapter seeks to identify general patterns in the recent media coverage of crimes by 
“illegal aliens.”  To this end, I investigate relevant official documents and popular texts 
published from January 1997 through February 2005.  As samples of “illegal aliens,” I chose 
“illegal” Chinese newcomers, as they figure prominently in crime reporting.  As Shipper (2001) 
points out: 
From articles in Japanese newspapers, the Chinese appear to be the number one 
violator of major crimes such as rape, violent acts, and murders.  For example of the 64 
articles on rapes committed by foreigners, 26 (41%) were on the Chinese, 160 of 417 
(38%) on violent acts, and 841 out of 1,794 (47%) on murders. (p. 163) 
 
Similarly, Zha (2003) notes that [i]n the Japanese media, migrant laborers from China have 
become synonymous with a sudden increase in crime rates” (p. 1).   
The time period was chosen because crimes by Chinese “illegals” became the subject of 
intense media coverage and serious policy discussion around 1997.  Although some people 
registered their concern about a foreign crime wave as early as the mid-1980s, they were mostly 
worried about crimes by “illegal” Pakistanis, Iranians, and Filipinos (see, for example, YS, 1987, 
October 30, p. 31; YS, 1991, November 14, p 3).  At least, Chinese criminals were not construed 
as particularly violent and vicious at that time (for example, see Yamatani, 1992).  The 
government and the media began to heed crimes by Chinese “illegals” in the mid-1990s 
(Aikawa, 1995, p. 210; Friman, 2001, p. 294); they became particularly wary of a Chinese crime 
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 spree around 1997 when an upsurge in smuggling cases of Chinese was reported.  According to 
Friman (2001), Tateshi Higuchi, then chief of the National Police Agency (NPA)’s Investigation 
Bureau, declared in early 1997 that Japanese society was completely unprepared for Chinese 
criminals and smugglers (p. 299).  It was also around this time that the major publishing 
companies started putting out books on crimes by “illegal” Chinese migrants    
 For analysis of official crime reports, I refer mainly to the NPA’s annual White Paper on 
Police (Keisatsu Hakusho).  Two annual crime reports are published in Japan: The Justice 
Ministry’s White Paper on Crime (Hanzai Hakusho) and the NPA’s White Paper on Police.  
According to Finch (2000), White Paper on Police was first published in 1974 to provide “the 
general population with an insight into police activities, and . . . to help formulate future 
policies” (p. 238).  Thus it “is useful in understanding the phenomenon of reported crime in 
Japan” (Finch, 2000, p. 239).  Besides, White Paper on Police has great influence on crime 
reporting in the media.  When the latest white paper comes out in the fall, it usually leads “to a 
wave of media stories on the crime challenges facing Japan” (Friman, 2004, n.p.). 
 By popular texts, I mean general-interest magazine articles, bunkobon, and mook 
featuring crimes by “illegal aliens.”  Foreign crime has been a favorite topic in many general-
interest magazines ranging from Weekly Bunshun, Yomiuri Weekly, Sunday Mainichi, and AERA 
to more sensational ones such as Weekly Post, Weekly Gendai, and SAPIO.  This is to say that 
overblown media reports on foreign crime are not restricted to tabloids and rightist magazines, 
but can be found in many general-interest magazines as well.  Particular bunkobon and mook 
titles are to be specified in a later section. For now, it suffices to say that most bunkobon and 
mook authors regularly contribute articles on foreign crime to general interest magazines.   
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  To supplement my analysis of popular texts, the chapter occasionally references major 
Japanese and English newspapers and TV programs on foreign crime.  Admittedly, my research 
on these two types of media texts is not exhaustive.  Especially, I watched relevant TV shows in 
a rather ad-hoc way while living in Tokyo from July 2003 through February 2005.  But time and 
again, I came across and, in many cases, taped TV shows featuring foreign crime.  I believe that 
the reference to TV programs and newspaper articles provides additional insights into my 
analysis of written texts and shows persistent, stereotyped images in popular media.  
 In examining official documents and popular texts, I am particularly interested in the 
latter, or to be more exact, the interplay between the two.  Although scholarship on an alleged 
foreign crime wave tends to focus its analysis on official documents, the mass media are more 
critical in shaping public perceptions of the phenomenon as they “know best how to ‘get things 
across to the public,’” to use Hall, et al.’s (1978) words (p. 62).  In fact, a survey conducted by 
the Public Safety Research Foundation discloses that the respondents’ fears of crimes are 
influenced principally by news reports (cited in Hamai, 2004, p. 25).  As Koichi Hamai (2003), a 
professor at Ryūkoku University and a former Justice Ministry official, states, even prison 
officials’ perception of public safety is shaped by news rather than their daily first-hand 
experiences with inmates (in Tajima, Hamai, Shirafuji, and Endo, p. 15).  If the growing 
xenophobic sentiment among the general public “probably reflected rampant media reports in 
recent years of crimes allegedly committed by foreigners” (Matsubara, 2004, n.p.), media 
portrayals of foreign crimes deserve close scrutiny. 
My argument is that the print and broadcast media do more than just relaying the NPA’s 
accounts of foreigners’ crimes to their readers and viewers.  Rather, they perform a more distinct 
function of extending, illustrating, and amplifying official crime reports.  More specifically, the 
 123
 media both draw on and transform official accounts to construct the illusio that “illegal” Chinese 
migrants are posing an “unprecedented” threat to public safety and social order in Japan. 
My textual analysis in this chapter is situated within Stuart Hall, et al.’s model of crime 
reporting in Policing the Crisis.  I find their model highly useful in unraveling the process in 
which the media draw on and transform official crime reports to play up the threat of a foreign 
crime wave in Japan.  Also, Hall, et al. introduce many heuristic concepts such as primary and 
secondary definers that help to explain general trends in the media representation of foreign 
crime in Japan.    
 The chapter consists of three main parts.  It first sets forth a framework for analyzing 
reports on a foreign crime wave in Japan.  The chapter then reviews the current immigration 
control measures and crime statistics involving “illegal aliens.”  The remainder of the chapter 
scrutinizes how “illegal” Chinese migrants’ crimes are portrayed in official crime reports and the 
popular media.      
 
 
4.2 ANALYZING CRIME REPORTS—STUART HALL, ET AL.’S POLICING THE 
CRISIS 
 
Public anxieties over crime are not simply generated by official bodies via the mass media.  As 
Hall, et al. (1978) lucidly show in Policing the Crisis, there exists “an exceedingly limited circle 
of mutual reciprocities and re-enforcements” among policy makers, control agencies, the 
judiciary, the media, and the public (p. 76).  The national hysteria over Japan’s foreign crime 
wave, for instance, serves to deflect public attention from the government’s failures to protect the 
rights of irregular migrant workers and their families.  Law enforcement agencies are able to cite 
an alleged foreign crime spree as a rationale for demanding more budgetary outlays and staff 
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 resources.  Since crime stories pay lucratively for news organizations, they are tempted to play 
up the threats of “illegal aliens” to enhance their readership or boost ratings.  Lastly, the general 
public can rest assured that declining public safety would return to normal once “bad foreigners” 
were driven out.  Their interests and motives certainly overlap, but do not always coincide.  Even 
if the media appear to report in concert with the state, they are not deliberately complicit in 
propagating a foreign crime wave.  In some cases, the aims of the media even collide with those 
of the state.  As Hall, et al. (1978) illustrate, “the competitive drive to be ‘first with the news’ 
may not be immediately in the interest or to the advantage of the state.  The media often want to 
find out things which the primary definers would rather keep quiet” (p. 65).      
 Nevertheless, the media are strongly predisposed to cover crime stories in the 
government’s favor.  As Hall, et al. (1978) concisely put it, “the prevailing tendency in the media 
is towards the reproduction, amidst all their contradictions, of the definitions of the powerful, of 
the dominant ideology” (pp. 65-66).  They argue that the incessant pressures of news production 
and the professional demands of impartiality and objectivity lead the media to draw on state 
authorities as regular and reliable sources.  The end result is that state authorities become “the 
primary definers of topics,” able to set the terms and contexts for faming social events.  The 
media, on the other hand, usually play a secondary role in covering the events in basic line with 
the primary interpretation.  Hall, et al. (1978) spells out the relationship between the media and 
the state in news making: 
The media . . . do not simply ‘create’ the news; nor do they simply transmit the 
ideology of the ‘ruling class’ in a conspirational fashion.  Indeed . . . the media are 
frequently not the ‘primary definers’ of news events at all; but their structured 
relationship to power has the effect of making them play a crucial but secondary role in 
reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access, as of right, to the 
media as ‘accredited sources’.  From this point of view, in the moment of news 
production, the media stand in a position of structured subordination to the primary 
definers. (p. 59)  
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  The media’s structural dependence on official sources holds particularly true for crime 
news because state authorities “form a near-monopoly as sources of crime news in the media” 
(Hall, et al., 1978, p. 68).  Specifically, media crime reporting is normally based on three 
sources: 1) police statements about investigations of a particular case, 2) official crime statistics  
with an interpretation of what the raw figures mean, and 3) a court case (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 69).  
Although criminals, victims of crimes, and citizens’ groups are all potential sources of 
information, only the police “claim a professional expertise in the ‘war against crime,’ based on 
daily, personal experience” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 68).  This “double expertise,” they continue, 
“seems to give police spokesmen especially authoritative credence” (p. 68).  As a result, 
journalists become almost exclusively dependent on law enforcement agencies for crime 
reporting.  Hall, et al. (1978) write: 
What is most striking about crime news is that it very rarely involves a first-hand 
account of the crime itself, unlike the ‘eye-witness’ report from the battlefront of the 
war correspondent.  Crime stories are almost wholly produced from the definitions and 
perspectives of the institutional primary definers. (p. 68)  
 
 Although the media are inclined to reproduce official viewpoints, this does not mean that  
they are passive and submissive puppets of the state.  It simply means that they have only 
relative autonomy.  The media do have a lot of leeway in selecting and interpreting news events, 
and their selection and interpretation are usually driven by journalists’ sense of news values and 
target audiences, the structure of news organizations, and available space and airtime (Hall, et 
al., 1978, pp. 52-55).   
 More importantly, the media don’t passively reproduce official accounts, but play a more 
active role in transforming them “within certain distinct ideological limits” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 
61).  There are two major variations in this active work of transformation.  For one thing, the 
media translate official viewpoints into a public idiom to “inves[t] them with popular force and 
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 resonance, naturalizing them within the horizon of understandings of the various publics” (Hall, 
et al., 1978, p. 61).  For example, the media employ “newsworthy rhetoric,” “popular imagery,” 
and “everyday language” to tailor news events to their target audiences (Hall, et al., 1978, pp. 
61-62).  They also “tend to play up the extraordinary, dramatic, tragic, etc. elements in a story in 
order to enhance its newsworthiness” (Hall, et al., 1978, pp. 53-54).  Hall, et al. (1978) suggest 
that each news organization has its own “version of the rhetoric, imagery and underlying 
common stock of knowledge which it assumes its audience shares and which thus forms the 
basis of the reciprocity of producer/reader” (p. 61).  But these different languages of different 
news organizations usually fall within dominant interpretative paradigms (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 
61).   
 It is critically important to make a distinction between (simple) reproduction and 
translation because the latter enables the media to perform a unique function of agenda setting.36  
Hall, et al. (1978) argue: 
[T]he publicising of an issue in the media can give it more ‘objective’ status as a real 
(valid) issue of public concern than would have been the case had it remained as merely 
a report made by experts and specialists.  Concentrated media attention confers the 
status of high public concern on issues which are highlighted; these generally become 
understood by everyone as the ‘pressing issues of the day’.  This is part of the media’s 
agenda-setting function. (p. 62) 
 
This agenda-setting function, they continue, also has a “reality-confirming effect” (p. 62).  That 
is, by translating official accounts in a public idiom, the media serve to transform them into “part 
of the taken-for-granted-reality of the public” (p. 62).  
 Not only do the media use a public idiom, but they sometimes “tak[e] the public voice” 
through editorials (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 63).  According to Hall, et al., the function of editorial is 
not limited to the expression of a journalist’s opinion about topics of major concern.  Oftentimes, 
                                                 
36 Though Hall, et al. did not credit any source for the concept of agenda setting, they most likely borrowed it from 
McCombs and Shaw’s 1972 article in Public Opinion Quarterly. 
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 the media use editorials to speak for the public and thereby mobilize public opinion (Hall, et al., 
1978, p. 63). This is another, more active work of transformation on the part of the media 
because they “actively and openly shape and structure public opinion” by claiming to express the 
public’s views (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 63).  Although the media often summon up (perceived) 
public opinion to bring pressure on the state, this “campaigning role” should not be taken too far 
(Hall, et al., 1978, p. 63).  For as long as the media frame news events within dominant 
interpretive frameworks, their opinions expressed in editorials tend to favor state authorities.  As 
Hall, et al. (1978) maintain, “these representations of public opinion are . . . often enlisted by the 
controllers as ‘impartial evidence’ of what the public, in fact, believes and wants” (p. 63).     
 To summarize the main points, although the media are predisposed to echo official 
viewpoints, the practices of news production are relatively autonomous.  Besides, the media 
neither simply nor directly reproduce official accounts, but play a more active role in 
transforming them to enhance their newsworthiness.  Yet since state authorities act as the 
primary definers of news topics, the range of their creative work are severely constrained within 
dominant interpretive frameworks.  The media’s autonomy is especially limited in crime 
reporting because the state virtually “monopolizes” legitimate sources of information.  Worse, 
the public’s voices expressed in editorials are often invoked by law enforcement agencies as 
rationales to justify more draconian control measures.   
 
 
4.3 INTENSIFYING CONTROL MEASURES 
 
In an effort to curb illegal labor migration, the Japanese government has recently stepped up its 
control measures.  To begin with, the government strengthened punitive measures against 
immigrant smugglers and those who assisted them in 1998 (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004, p. 461).  
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 In April 1999, an amendment to the Immigration Control Act was passed in a regular Diet 
session, making illegal stay a separate offense (fuhō zairyū zai, literally “illegal stay offense”) 
from illegal entry.  Although illegal stay was an immigration offense prior to that, the statute of 
limitations ran out in 3 years.  The revision has -allowed immigration officials to apprehend 
“illegal aliens” regardless of their length of stay.  In February 2000, the government introduced 
new penalties against visa overstayers (fines of up to 300,000 yen [$2,700] and three-year 
punishment) (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004, p. 461).  Around the same time, the NPA created the 
Committee on Internationalization to tackle foreigners’ crimes (Keisatsuchō, 2000, p. 252).    
Although Tsuda and Cornelius (2004) suggest that these measures are largely cosmetic, a 
host of evidence indicates that the government has set their heart on reducing the number of 
unauthorized foreigners.  In his Diet speech—the Japanese equivalent of the U.S. president’s 
State of the Union address—on January 31, 2003, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged to 
restore Japan’s public safety in part by beefing up control measures against “illegal aliens.”  
What follows is an excerpt from his Diet address: 
We aim to regain Japan’s status as “the safest country in the world” by improving the 
worsening situation in which a large number of heinous incidents occur and a number 
of people are having concern about the deterioration of public safety.  Measures 
against organized crimes committed by foreigners living illegally in Japan and hi-tech 
crimes will be strengthened. (cited in JT, 2003, February 1, n.p.) 
 
The newly appointed Public Safety Chair, Kiyoko Ono appeared on NHK, Japan’s largest public 
broadcasting network,37 in October 2003 and remarked that “foreign crime and youth crime were 
among her policy priorities” (JT, 2003, October 7, n.p.).  That same month, Justice Minister 
Daizō Nozawa also stated in a news conference that “[s]olving the problem of illegal residents is 
a pending task for regaining public safety in Japan” because “[a]n increasing number of visaless 
                                                 
37 Indeed, NHK is the world’s second largest public broadcasting network behind the BBC (Pharr, 1996, p. 5).  
According to Pharr (1996), public surveys indicate that NHK is the most trusted broadcasting organization in Japan 
(p. 5). 
 129
 foreigners engage in serious crimes, and it is pointed out that the problem is closely linked to 
organized crime by foreigners” (Matsubara, 2003, October 18, n.p.).  In December, the 
government unveiled five priority measures to “turn [Japan] back into the safest country in the 
world” (JT, 2003, December 14, n.p.).  Included in the measures was an effort to halve by 2005 
the number of unauthorized foreigners from the current estimate of 250,000.  Under the headline 
“Crime Crackdown Includes Plan to Cut Illegal Foreign Residents,” the Japan Times of 
December 14 reports: 
Among other measures, the action plan calls for a revision of the immigration law so 
that foreigners who have illegally obtained resident status, such as through bogus  
marriages, can be deported immediately.  Given the increased prominence of crime 
involving Chinese nationals, Japan will also aim for the early signing of a consular 
pact with China stipulating an obligation to notify each other when people are arrested 
by investigative authorities. (n.p.) 
 
To facilitate the roundups of unauthorized foreigners, the Ministry of Justice announced that it 
was drawing up guidelines for tracking down “suspicious foreigners” to be distributed to 
immigration officials at airports and other ports of entry (MDN, 2004, January 1, n.p.).  The 
guidelines elicited sharp criticism primarily because they specified “people of which nationality, 
birthplace and age should be viewed with suspicion” (MDN, 2004, January 1, n.p.).  Around the 
same time, the Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry created a “snitch” website designed to 
solicit information about the names, addresses, and workplaces of “suspicious foreigners.”  
Dismissing calls for the removal of the site from citizens’ groups, the Immigration Bureau 
launched the program on February 16 with a few modifications. According to an immigration 
official, about 780 tip-offs had been submitted from February 16 to March 11 (Kyōdō News, 
March 18, 2004, n.p.). 
Local authorities have followed suit with similar regulations.  According to Khan (2003), 
“[i]n the month from September 19 to October 17 [2003], immigration forces and the Tokyo 
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 police caught 1,643 illegal foreign workers, the largest number recorded so far for a single 
month” (n.p.).  On October 17, 2003, the Immigration Bureau, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police 
Department, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government issued a joint statement proclaiming to cut 
the number of “illegal aliens” in Tokyo in half within the next five years.  Whether this is 
feasible or not, the announcement has proven to be more than a symbolic gesture.  According to 
APFS, the number of apprehensions doubled after the joint statement was issued.  Six foreign 
members of APFS were apprehended in February 2005 alone (APFS, 2005, n.p.).   
As part of the PR campaign, Governor Ishihara and Justice Minister Nozawa “inspected” 
Tokyo’s Kabukichō entertainment district in December 2003.  The two political figures 
accompanied scores of immigration officials and journalists (see Figure 4.1 on the next page).  
As a result, their visit to the alleged “hotbed of foreigners’ crimes” (gaijin hanzai no onshō) 
made news headlines the following day.  After the inspection, Ishihara expressed grave concerns 
about organized crimes by Chinese migrants.  Referring to a murder case by three former 
Chinese students in Fukuoka City, he told the reporters: “While foreigners are not the only factor 
behind the deterioration in Tokyo’s security, they have introduced new kinds of crimes (to 
Japan)” (Matsubara, 2003, December 31, p. 3). 
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Source: YS, 2003, December 9, p. 33.  Reprinted with permission of Yomiuri Shimbun Sha 
 
Figure 4.1: Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara (left) and Justice Minister Daizō Nozawa (right) 
Strolling around Tokyo’s Kabukichō Area 
 
 
 Concomitant with the implementation of these stringent security measures, a handful of 
influential politicians have urged law enforcement agencies to step up vigilance on foreigners.  
Although there is nothing new with conservative politicians making anti-immigrant public 
statements,38 they have become far more outspoken in the wake of a foreign crime wave in 
recent years.  For example, Takami Etō, a leading member of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party asserted during a local party convention in Fukui Prefecture: 
Just look at the Kabukichō district in Shinjuku [Tokyo]. It’s a lawless zone ruled by 
sangokujin [peoples from third countries]. . . .  Nowadays illegal immigrants from 
South Korea, China, and other countries are roaming the streets, robbing people. . . .  
Tens of thousands of refugees will flood this country if a war breaks out in the Korean 
                                                 
38 One notable example is a blatant anti-Korean slur made by former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in 1992.  
Following on the heels of “racial riots” in Los Angeles in June 1992, he hinted at the possibility of similar upheaval 
(in his word, “military campaign”) by Korean migrant workers in Yokohama’s Kotobuki area (Ajiajin Rōdōsha 
Mondai Kondankai, 1992, iii).  He reasoned: “[W]e have about 1500 workers from South Korea within the 
jurisdiction of the Kotobuki police station in Yokohama.  They aren’t inexperienced in shooting a gun since they 
participated in the Vietnam War.  It is feared that if about 1000 [of them] banded together under one leader, they 
could launch a tremendous military campaign” (Ajiajin Rōdōsha Mondai Kondankai, 1992, iii). 
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 Peninsula.  They will team up with the 1 million foreign robbers and murderers 
illegally staying here and start riots.  (cited in MDN, July 13, 2003, n.p.)  
 
Even more incendiary was Governor Ishihara’s address at a Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) 
garrison in Tokyo’s Nerima Ward on April 9, 2000.  During a ceremony marking its 49th 
anniversary, he urged GSDF members to be on alert for possible insurgency by overstayers, 
should a major natural disaster hit Tokyo: 
Atrocious crimes have been committed again and again by ‘sangokujin’ (people from 
Taiwan or Korea or their descendants) and other foreigners. We can expect them to riot 
in the event of a disastrous earthquake. . . .  Police have their limits. I hope you will not 
only fight against disasters but also maintain public security on such occasions. (JT, 
April 11, 2000, n.p.) 
 
Ishihara insinuated that rioting by illegal foreigners could be so immense that even the police 
might not be capable of quelling it alone.  Not surprisingly, his instigating remarks created a 
ruckus especially because the scurrilous rumor of rioting resulted in the massacre of thousands of 
Korean immigrants in the aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923.  Faced with growing 
criticisms from both at home and abroad, Ishihara expressed his regret for offending resident 
Koreans and Chinese with his unfortunate word choice, but he did not retract the statement itself.  
In fact, he chastised media outlets for quoting his address out of context, insisting that by 
sangokujin he meant “illegal aliens.”  Within a week following the Ishihara’s address, the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government received over 7,000 calls; about 70% of them reportedly favored the 
governor’s address, while 26% were critical (Todd and Murakami, 2000, n.p.).  Ishihara’s anti-
foreigner speech and the attendant favorable public reaction further emboldened conservative 
politicians and journalists to speak and write self-righteously on the danger of “illegal aliens” in 
right-wing journals such as Shokun and Seiron (Morris-Suzuki, 2001, n.p.).  To mention one 
example, Kanagawa Governor Shigefumi Matsuzawa identified “all” Chinese students in Japan 
as “sneaky thieves” during a Lower House election rally on November 2, 2003 (AS, 2003, 
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 November 3, p. 38).  When reached for comment later that night, he clarified his intent by saying 
that by “all” he didn’t literally mean “all,” but “some” (JT, 2003, November 4, n.p.).   
When taken in isolation, each anti-immigrant slur might well be dismissed as slip of the 
tongue by jingoistic political figures. Yet the spate of gaffes, when read together, illuminate 
persistent political motives for imputing the soaring crime rates to “illegal aliens.”  Outlandish as 
their xenophobic remarks may be, they have successfully played on and fueled the national 
hysteria over a foreign crime spree.  
 
 
4.4 TAKING A CRITICAL LOOK AT OFFICIAL CRIME STATISTICS 
 
4.4.1 Statistics on Foreign Visitors’ Crimes 
 
 
Although there is little doubt that crimes by foreign nationals are increasing, they must be 
understood in proper contexts.  Among others, it is necessary to keep in mind the following three 
points: 1) crimes by Japanese nationals are also rising; 2) the number of foreigners visiting and 
living in Japan is increasing; and 3) the majority of crimes committed by foreign nationals are 
immigration law violations.  With that said, this section looks into official crime statistics 
involving “illegal aliens.” 
Foreign visitors (rainichi gaikokujin) is a category used in official crime reports.  It 
encompasses all foreign-born nationals coming to Japan on temporary visas, including tourists, 
long-term residents, and visa overstayers.  Conversely, they exclude permanent residents and 
American military personnel as well as unidentified foreigners (such as illegal entrants). 39   
Oddly, foreign nationals with permanent residency fall into the category of “Japanese.”      
                                                 
39 According to Komai (1999/2001), American military personnel and their families “under the Status of Forces 
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 Although deterioration in public safety is often attributed to foreign visitors, especially 
“illegal aliens,” close scrutiny of actual crime data reveals a more nuanced picture of foreign 
crime.  To take recent crime statistics for example, the 2003 White Paper on Police recorded 
34,746 cases of arrest or prosecution involving foreign visitors in 2002, up 25.2% from the 
previous year (p. 2; JT, 2003, September 27, n.p.).  The figures were, however, grossly inflated 
since they included immigration law violations, the type of offense applicable only to foreign 
nationals.40  Alleged cases of penal code offenses (keihōhan) by foreign visitors totaled 24,258 
in 2002, involving 7,690 individuals (JT, 2003, September 27, n.p.).  Foreign visitors made up 
2.2% of all the criminal suspects (Gaikokujin Sabetsu Wotchi Nettowāku, 2004, p. 11).  The 
figure was not remarkably high, considering that registered foreigners alone make up nearly 
1.5% of the total population.  Although Police White Paper (2003) noted that the number of 
foreign visitors apprehended for criminal offenses had risen by 11% in the past decade, the total 
number of foreigners newly entering Japan had increased at an even sharper rate (p. 2; see also 
Tables 4.1-2). 
 
Table 4.1: Number of Foreigners Newly Entering Japan (in thousands) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total 3504 3856 3926 3747 3831 3732 4245 4670 4557 4901 5272 5286 5772 
% *  n/a 10.0% 1.8%  - 4.6% 
 
2.2% -2.6% 13.7% 10.0% -2.4% 7.6% 7.6% 0.3% 9.2% 
 
* denotes an increase over the previous year 
 
Sources: Keisatsuchō, 1995, p. 285, 2003, p. 2 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Agreement which accompanies the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, are exempted from alien registration, and thus are 
not subject to immigration control” (p. 126).  
40 Immigration law violations are classed under Special Law offenses that comprise offenses concerning elections, 
traffic laws, preservation of public order, finance and economy, illicit drugs, public morals, and alien registration 
and immigration, among others (Finch, 2000, p. 240) 
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 Table 4.2: Foreign Visitors Arrested for Criminal Offenses (1990-2002) 
 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
Total 2978 4813 5961 7276 6989 6527 6026 5435 5382 5963 6329 7168 7690
Percent  n/a 61.6 23.8 22.0 -0.4 -6.7 -7.7 -10.0 -0.1 10.70 4.40 13.26 7.28 
Felonious 
offense 
111 126 185 246 230 201 212 213 251 347 318 403 353
Violent 
offense 
157 174 213 277 246 255 279 313 305 338 568 578 628
Larceny 1656 2493 2944 3995 3937 3900 3399 3155 3098 3404 3803  4135 4395
White-collar 
offense 
139 94 443 260 218 302 497 305 319 264 277 267 339 
Others 915 1926 2176 2498 2358 1869 1639 1449 1409 1610 1363 1785 1975 
 
Note: The figures exclude traffic offenses. 
   Sources: National Police Agency, 2000, p. 90; Keisatsuchō, 2002b, p. 27, 2003a, p. 3, 2003b, p. 37 
 
 
 
Of all the foreign visitors apprehended for criminal offenses, 17%, or 1,403, were found 
to be “illegal aliens”; they accounted for 0.4% of the total criminal suspects in 2002 (Nakashima, 
2004b, pp. 11-12; see also Table 4.3). 
 
 
Table 4.3: Number of Individuals and “Illegal Aliens” Apprehended for Criminal Offenses (1993-
2003) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
a. Total 297.7 307.9 293.2 295.5 313.5 324.2 315.3 309.6 325.2 347.5
b. Illegal aliens 1015 1215 1315 1632 1317 1302 1529 1603 1379 1403
Percentage* 0.34 0.39 0.45 0.55 0.42 0.4 0.48 0.52 0.42 0.4
 
Notes:  The figures for “a” are in thousands.   
* denotes the percentage of ‘illegal aliens” in the total criminal suspects.  
 
Source: Nakashima, 2004b, p. 11. 
 
 
 
In 2003, 84% of the crimes committed by penal code offenders in the foreign visitor 
population were larcenies (Gaikokujin Sabetsu Wotchi Nettowāku, 2004, p. 13).  The high 
incidence of larcenies indicates that foreign visitors resorted to crime predominantly for financial 
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 reasons.  Felonious crimes—which comprised homicide, robbery, arson, and rape—involved 477 
foreign visitors in 2003 (Keisatsuchō, 2004b, p. 2).  The homicide cases by foreign visitors had 
even dropped from 69 cases in 1998 to 34 in 2002 (Nakashima, 2004b, p. 14).        
Felonious crimes occupied a meager 1.2% of the total criminal offenses by the foreign 
visitor population in 2003 (Keisatsuchō, 2004b, pp. 2-3).  Among the foreign visitors arrested for 
felonious crimes, 175 were “illegal aliens,” including 16 persons charged with homicide.  
“Illegal aliens” constituted 2.1% of all the individuals charged with felonious crimes (see Table 
4.4).  Most of them (145 out of 175) were arrested on robbery charge.  It is clear from Table 4.4 
that felonious offenses by “illegal aliens” remained fairly stable over the past decade.     
 
 
Table 4.4: Number of Japanese Nationals, Foreign Visitors, and Illegal Aliens Arrested on Charge 
of Felonious Crimes (1993-2003) 
 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Japanese 4,944 5,296 5,108 5,247 6,420 6,698 6,870 7,170 7,087 7,373 7,885
% 95.3% 95.8% 96.2% 96.1% 96.8% 96.4% 95.2% 95.8% 94.6% 95.4% 94.3%
Foreign 
visitors 
246 230 201 212 213 251 347 318 403 353 477
% 4.7% 4.2% 3.8% 3.9% 3.2% 3.6% 4.8% 4.2% 5.4% 4.6% 5.7%
Illegal 
aliens 
130 133 106 142 131 137 186 159 180 141 175
% 2.5% 2.4% 2.0% 2.6% 2.0% 2.0% 2.6% 2.1% 2.4% 1.8% 2.1%
 
Sources: Gaikokujin Sabetsu Wotchi Nettowāku, 2003, p. 14; Keisatsuchō, 2004b, p. 8; Nakashima, 2004b, p. 12 
 
 
 
It is apparent that an increasing number of foreign visitors have committed felonious crimes in 
recent years.  But so have Japanese nationals (see Figure 4.2 on the next page).  Unfortunately, 
the upsurge in felonious crimes by foreign visitors alone has been highlighted in official 
documents.  
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Source: Gaikokujin Sabetsu Wotchi Nettowāku, 2004, p. 14 
Figure 4.2: Number of Foreign Visitors and the Japanese Apprehended for Felonious Crimes 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Statistics on Crimes by Chinese nationals 
 
 
Of the total foreign visitors apprehended for penal code offenses in the first half of 2004, the 
Chinese occupied 50.9%, followed by Brazilians at 12.0%, Koreans at 7.1%, Vietnamese at 
5.9%, Peruvians at 4.1%, and Filipinos at 4.0% (Keisatsuchō, 2004b, p. 33).  Chinese nationals 
committed 77 felonious crimes (47.8%); 42 cases of felonious crimes involved Brazilians 
(26.1%) (Keisatsuchō, 2004b, p. 33).  76 Chinese nationals (46.6%) and 49 Brazilians (30.1%) 
were arrested for robbery in this period (Keisatsuchō, 2004b, p. 33).        
It is incontrovertible that the Chinese make up about half of the crimes by the foreign 
visitor population.  Also, as Table 4.5 shows, the number of Chinese criminal offenders has 
almost doubled in the past decade.  But these crime figures for the Chinese must be understood 
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 in relation to those for other nationals.  It is especially important to bear in mind that crimes by 
Brazilians—97% of whom are Nikkeijin and their families—have increased by more than 
fourfold during the same period (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000, p. 41). 
 
 
Table 4.5: Number of Foreign Visitors Apprehended for Criminal Law Offenses by Nationality 
(1993-2003) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
China 2,668 2,942 2,725 2,504 2,320 2,281 2,721 3,038 3,232 3,503 4,444
S/N Korea 987 775 752 732 522 548 593 603 581 473 496
Brazil 223 301 318 304 347 536 658 682 958 952 1,005
Peru 470 470 386 310 264 255 263 261 326 327 364
Vietnam 200 198 252 274 329 340 347 377 469 583 549
Iran 544 294 167 150 103 72 66 64 68 69 47
Philippines 366 396 301 326 315 269 237 241 243 294 329
 
Sources: Keisatsuchō, 1998a, p. 261; 2000a, p.241; 2001a, p. 218; 2003b, p. 39; 2004a, p. 11 
 
 
 
Particularly notable in this regard is Masahide Maeda’s study of official crime statistics.  From 
the official crime data in 2001 he tabulated the number of criminal suspects per 1,000 registered 
foreigners by nationality.  The study found that Vietnamese by far topped the list, followed by 
Iranians and Brazilians (see Table 4.6).    
 
Table 4.6: Number of Criminal Suspects per 1,000 Registered Nationals in 2001 
            
  Vietnamese  28.64  Filipinos  1.3 
  Iranians  12.83  Thais   0.92 
  Brazilians  11.71  Malaysians  0.82 
Russians   3.33  Koreans  0.45 
  Chinese  2.46  Americans  0.15  
    
     Source: Maeda, 2003, p. 64 
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 Despite the fact that most Vietnamese and Brazilians in Japan are legal long-term residents, the 
rates of criminal offences by these nationals are disproportionately high.  What can be inferred 
from Tables 4.5-6 is that crimes by foreign visitors are spurred not so much by their legal status 
as by their living and working conditions.  At least it is grossly unfair to impute the soaring 
crime rates by foreigners to “illegal aliens” alone.   
 
4.4.3 Observation 
 
 
To recapitulate the main points, “illegal aliens” commit only a small number of felonious crimes.  
Nevertheless, the public’s fear lingers that “illegal aliens” are endangering Japan’s public safety.  
A recent poll conducted by the Cabinet Office (Naikakufu) (2004b), for example, discloses that 
the general public perceives the rise in the number of “illegal aliens” as the biggest cause of 
deteriorating public safety and social order in Japan (p. 12).  While people’s fear of crime is 
usually disproportionate to the actual risks they are subject to (Fairclough, 1995, p. 153), a gap 
between the reality of illegal aliens’ crimes and the public perception thereof is stunning.   
There are both quantitative and qualitative approaches for explaining this gap.  Sociology 
Professor Ryōgo Mabuchi of Nara University (2003) takes the first approach.  He surveyed the 
frequency of Asahi Shimbun reports on apprehensions of the Japanese and foreign nationals, 
respectively, during the first six months of 1998.  His survey found that the arrests of foreign 
visitors were nearly 5 times more likely to be reported than those of Japanese nationals (see 
Table 4.7 on the next page for the survey results).   
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 Table 4.7: Frequency of Press Reports on the Arrests of Suspects by Nationality 
 
    Japanese Foreign 
Visitors 
Chinese Korean Brazilians Filipinos  Americans Thais 
1 Media 
reports   
4,826 390 168 88 8 20 6 4
2 Actual 
arrests 
324,263 5,382 2,401 548 536 269 89 84
3 1 divided  
by 2 
1.49% 7.25% 7.00% 16.06% 1.49% 7.43% 6.74% 4.76%
4 Ratio 1 4.87 4.7 10.79 1 5 4.53 3.2
 
Source: Mabuchi, 2003, n.p. 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 also indicates that the apprehensions of foreigners were over-reported with the only 
exception of Brazilians.  Although Brazilians constituted the third largest group for actual 
arrests, they were not frequently covered in the newspaper.  Instead, Asahi Shimbun shed more 
light on Filipinos whose arrest cases were much smaller than Brazilians’.  This tendency remains 
the same to date.  As Sekiguchi (2002) suggests, even when the mass media take up the issue of 
Brazilians’ crimes, they tend to be depicted more favorably in the media relative to other 
nationals (p. 201).  Granted that the absolute number of Nikkeijin’s crimes is still relatively 
small.  But it is conceivable that their crimes are played down because their legal status and 
ethnic origin run counter to the prevailing belief that “illegal aliens” from “third countries” are 
responsible for decline in public safety.   
Disproportionate media attention to foreigners’ crimes can also be observed in Nihon 
Television (NTV)’s two-hour prime-time police show aired on September 16, 2003 (comparable 
to Fox’s COPS except that the former is broadcast on an irregular basis).  Although foreign 
visitors’ crimes made up only 2.1% of all the reported crimes, the show devoted more than 25% 
of the airtime to foreign crime (JT, 2003, October 7, n.p.).  According to the Japan Times on 
October 7, 2003, “Rightwing Tokyo Gov. Shintarō Ishihara came on after every foreign-specific 
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 segment to remark on, inter alia, the cruelty of Chinese crooks and the need for more police” 
(n.p.).  The overrepresentation of foreign crime in the show is evidenced in Asahi Shimbun’s TV 
listing (terebi ran) as well.  A short description of the show read: “We’ve filmed it! A little kid 
bleeding from being punched by a foreign theft gang” (AS, 2003, September 16, p. 20).    
Insightful and perceptive as Manabe’s quantitative study is, this chapter conducts a 
textual analysis to explain a gap between the reality of illegal aliens’ crimes and the media 
coverage thereof.  This qualitative approach is useful because the threat of foreigners’ crimes is 
framed not only as a quantitative increase, but also as a trend toward greater deviousness and 
atrocity (see, for example, Herbert, 1996, especially Chapter 7).  In other words, “illegal aliens” 
are believed to pose unprecedented threats to Japanese society not only because their crimes are 
allegedly on a steep rise, but also because they are perceived as committing far more violent, 
vicious, and organized crimes than the Japanese.  For instance, journalist Takashi Orikawa 
(2004) argues: 
Crimes by Chinese have not only rapidly increased in the past few years, but their 
quality has also drastically changed.  Such felonious crimes as murders and robberies 
have been on the rise, and lock-picking crimes have now become common.  Not only 
their compatriots but also innocent, ordinary Japanese have become victims of their 
crimes. (p. 10)   
 
Even when crimes by foreigners decrease, control authorities and the media often alarm the 
public to an increase in their serious offenses (for example, see JT, 2001, September 14, n.p.).  
For instance, by drawing on a ranking police official, journalist Tateo Tamura (1998) takes a 
drop in reported cases of foreign visitors’ crimes as proof that their criminal activities have 
become more insidious, organized, and armed (p. 38).   
Having summarized the recent crime statistics concerning “illegal aliens,” the next two 
sections explore how “illegal” Chinese migrants are portrayed as grave threats to Japan’s public 
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 safety and social order in official crime reports and popular media texts.  I first argue that official 
accounts are partly to blame for the unduly inflated risks of crimes by Chinese “illegals.”  Then I 
demonstrate that the mass media both rely on and transform official accounts to amplify the 
danger of “illegal” Chinese migrants.     
 
 
4.5 OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS OF CRIMES BY “ILLEGAL ALIENS” 
 
Since the NPA began to use the term “foreign visitors” in 1980, its White Paper has constantly 
noted a growing trend of their criminal activities.  Still, the NPA held a rather optimistic view on 
Japan’s public safety throughout the 1980s.  For example, the 1987 edition of White Paper on 
Police, though recognizing an increase in foreign visitors’ crimes, maintained that Japan enjoyed 
a higher level of public safety than the UK, France, West Germany, and the U.S. partly due to its 
“linguistic and cultural homogeneity” (p. 6). 41   This epitomizes the workings of cultural 
nationalism in official accounts of public safety.  Seen in this light, it came as little surprise that 
control agencies would later interpret the influx of “illegal” foreign workers as an ominous threat 
to public safety.    
The upsurge of male foreign workers in the late 1980s prodded the NPA into featuring 
foreign visitors’ crimes in a special report for the first time in 1990.42  The special report “Rapid 
Increase of Foreign Workers and the Police’s Response” offered an elaborate analysis of rapidly 
increasing crimes by foreign visitors.  Notably, it pointed to a noticeable increase in such 
felonious crimes as murders by foreign visitors (p. 36).  Along similar lines, the 1992 edition of 
                                                 
41 Identified as other factors were 1) high levels of education and morality, 2) low unemployment rates and a small 
gap between the rich and the poor, 3) strict regulations against firearms and drugs, and 4) the people’s deep trust in 
and cooperative attitudes toward the police. 
42 As Hebert (1996) notes, the White Paper on Police “always focuses on one issue in a ‘special report’” (p. 196). 
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 White Paper on Police highlighted cross-border crimes in the special report “the Transformation 
of Crime in a Borderless Age.”  A substantial portion of the report was devoted to foreign 
visitors’ crimes.  The 1993 edition for the first time addressed the problem of “felonious crimes 
by illegal aliens” in a separate section (p. 111).  The 1994 edition argued that “the presence of a 
large number of illegal aliens is a serious problem in terms of public security” (p. 97).  The 1995 
White Paper on Police began to take particular note of the criminal activities of Chinese 
nationals, especially the smuggling cases engineered by the Snakehead, a Chinese smuggling 
network (p. 288, p. 291).   
The current official discourse of a foreign crime wave became prominent around 1999.  
Although the general tone of argument on foreign visitors’ crimes became more alarmed year by 
year, it was not until 1997 that White Paper on Police offered a detailed account of foreign 
criminal groups (gaikokujin hanzai soshiki).  The terms “transnational crime” (kokusai hanzai), 
“transnational criminal organization” (kokusai hanzai soshiki), and “transnational organized 
crime” (kokusai hanzai soshiki) were foregrounded for the first time in the 1999 White Paper on 
Police.  It also began to make explicit mention of the criminal propensity of “illegal aliens.”  The 
remainder of this section, therefore, takes a close look at Police White Paper since 1999 to 
identify recurrent themes, common arguments, and popular idioms the NPA employ in 
characterizing foreign visitors’ crimes.  Particular emphasis is placed on the 1999 and 2003 
editions as they carry special reports on a foreign crime wave.   
 In a nutshell, White Paper on Police since 1999 suggests that foreign visitors’ crimes 
have become more organized (soshikika), sophisticated (kōmyōka), atrocious (kyōakuka), vicious 
(akushitsu), and armed (busōka).  Also stressed are the allegations that their crimes tend to be 
carefully planned (keikakuteki) and perpetrated in a heavy-handed (teara) manner.  The 2003 
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 edition of the White Paper documents this “changing nature of foreign visitors’ crimes” with 
statistics, actual cases, and testimonies from foreign suspects and investigators.  According to the 
2003 edition, criminal offenses by foreign visitors recorded “the largest ever” (kako saita) in 
2002 (p. 2).  Of the crimes committed by foreign visitors, felonious offenses, especially 
robberies, soared exponentially in the last five years (p. 3).   
According to the 2003 White Paper, foreign visitors are more likely to commit break-in 
robberies than the Japanese (p. 4; see Figure 4.3).  
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Source: Keisatsuchō, 2003a, p. 4  
Figure 4.3: Percentages of Break-in Robberies and Other Types of Robberies by the Japanese and 
Foreign Visitors 
 
 
In the NPA’s (2004a) view, the high incidence of break-in robbery is a matter of serious concern 
for ordinary people because that could put their lives in great danger (p. 189).  More worryingly, 
foreign visitors’ break-in robberies are characterized by “their heavy-handed mode of operation 
[tearai teguchi]” (2003 White Paper, p. 4).  By way of illustration, the English translation of the 
2000 White Paper describes a typical case of break-in robbery by foreign visitors as follows: 
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 “Perpetrators in general turned to more ferocious acts than before as they trussed victims with 
adhesive tapes or handcuffed them, and used handguns and knives” (p. 90).  White Paper on 
Police (2003) goes further to suggest that foreign visitors’ break-in robberies could easily 
escalate into brutal attacks on or murders of victims (p. 78).  Also cited is the high occurrence of 
organized robberies with picking devices (p. 5).   
Among others, “illegal aliens” are singled out as a menace to public order on the grounds 
that they commit nearly half of the felonious crimes by the foreign visitor population.  The 2004 
edition of White Paper points out that while “illegal aliens” made up only 17.4% (1,520) of the 
foreign visitors apprehended for criminal law offenses in 2003, they committed 42.1% of the 
white-collar crimes (209 out of 497), 36.7% of the felonious crimes (175 out of 477), and half of 
the break-in robberies (p. 189).  Along the same line, White Paper on Police in 1999 stresses the 
criminal propensity of “illegal aliens” by stating that many illegal aliens who initially came to 
Japan for work now engage in criminal activities because they can make quick, easy money that 
way (p. 17).  The growing presence of “illegal aliens” therefore portends that Japan is becoming 
“a hotbed of crimes” (p. 17).   
 Perhaps the most salient and contentious feature of the recent white papers on police is 
their emphasis on the dangers of organized crimes by “transnational criminal organizations.”  
The 2003 edition, for instance, devotes the first 31 pages of the special report (“Combating 
Organized Crime”) to “transnational organized crimes” by foreign criminal groups.  Yet a few 
notes on terminology are in order.  By “transnational crime,” “transnational organized crime,” 
and “transnational criminal organization,” White Paper on Police (2003) means, respectively, 
“crime by foreigners, crimes committed overseas by the Japanese, or crime related to foreign 
countries,” “crime that is organized across borders,” and “a group of individuals that commits a 
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 transnational crime” (p. 2).  If we follow the definitions, however, any crime committed by 
foreigners in an organized manner will count as transnational organized crime, and any foreigner 
who commits crimes in a group will be classified as a member of transnational criminal 
organization.  But as Finckenauer (2001) concisely put it, “[t]rue organized crime is much more 
than just crime committed by organized groups” (p. 168).  It is marked, for example, by “the 
structure and continuity of criminal networks engaging in crime” (p. 168).  Given that the 2003 
White Paper on Police acknowledges that foreign criminal groups are typically amorphous, 
opportunistic groups (p. 13), “transnational criminal organization” is obviously a misnomer.  For 
the term may well conjure up the image of cross-border criminal syndicates engaging in illicit 
activities of firearms trafficking, drug peddling, money laundering, prostitution, and even 
terrorism.  In more general terms, Finckenauer (2001) spells out the problem with the 
promiscuous label of organized crime: 
[F]rom a research perspective (simply trying to describe, understand, and explain the 
phenomenon of interest), if organized crime is so loosely or ambiguously defined as to 
encompass particularly any crimes committed by, say, three or more persons, then it is 
a meaningless concept.  Without a clear and focused definition of what the 
phenomenon is, description, explanation, and understanding are impossible.  It then 
follows that mapping trends and measuring the impact of countermeasures will also be 
impossible. (pp. 169-170) 
 
Nevertheless, White Paper on Police uses the extremely vague and elastic definitions to 
document a noticeable increase in organized crimes by foreign visitors.  The 2003 edition, for 
instance, showed that foreign visitors were 3.3 times more likely to commit crimes in groups 
than Japanese nationals in 2002 (p. 6).  Specifically, 61.5% of robberies, 68.6% of thefts, and 
49.9% of white-collar crimes by the foreign visitor population were reportedly committed in 
groups (p. 7); some groups were found to perpetrate offenses in a highly organized and 
premeditated manner (p. 8).  But a closer look at the actual crime data reveals that almost 70% of 
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 the crimes committed by “foreign groups” involved three persons or less (p. 8).  Of course, two 
or three persons could pre-meditate and organize a brutal crime; but that is not the same as 
organized crime.  Finckenauer (2001) argues:     
The committing of a single crime can sometimes involve considerable planning and 
implementation of the resulting plan by a number of individuals fulfilling very 
specially defined roles and carrying out specific functions relative to that crime.  Such 
would be an example of a crime that is organized.  The sense of organized crime, 
however, goes beyond this. (p. 169)   
 
In short, by invoking the terms “transnational organized crime” and “transnational criminal 
organization,” White Paper on Police exaggerates the threat of organized crime by foreign 
visitors.   
Specifically, the NPA’s White Paper divides “transnational criminal organization” into 
two types: foreign-based criminal syndicates and foreign criminal groups formed in Japan.  The 
former include the Snakehead, Korean pickpocket groups, Hong Kong Triads, Taiwanese 
criminal syndicates, and Russian criminal organizations; Chinese criminal groups, Iranian drug 
trafficking groups, and Columbian theft groups represent the latter.  Of particular concern are 
growing links among foreign criminal groups, foreign-based criminal syndicates, and Japanese 
gangs.  The 2003 edition of White Paper illustrates that “[d]uring robberies, the Japanese do such 
work as casing and selecting the target and driving the getaway car, while it will be the Chinese 
who actually force their way into a home and steal the valuables” (p. 77, cited in Foreign Press 
Center, 2003, n.p.).  To corroborate this point further, the 2003 White Paper conducts a 
questionnaire survey for about 1,000 police officers who “work on the frontlines of crimes by 
foreign visitors” (pp. 12-14).  Over 90% of the police officers are under the impression that 
foreign visitors’ crimes have been more organized than before.  When asked to name a country, 
85.1% of the respondents answer “China” (p. 12).  Moreover, 61.9% of those surveyed speculate 
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 that foreign criminal groups are tied to foreign-based criminal syndicates (p. 13).  66.0% of them 
also suspect that some Japanese nationals aid and abet foreign criminal groups (p. 12).  In the 
NPA’s account, these survey results evidence that “transnational criminal organizations are 
penetrating deeply into Japanese society and perpetrating crimes along with Japanese fellows” 
(p. 12).   
Chinese criminal groups are a particular focus of the special report in the 2003 White 
Paper.  According to the special report, more Chinese are coming to Japan to make money 
legally or illegally as the rumors spread among “bad Chinese” (furyō chūgokujin) that it is easy 
to commit crimes in Japan and that criminals will receive only light punishment there (p. 17).  
Particularly alarming are the high rates of organized crimes by Chinese groups.  From the above 
survey results, White Paper (2003) surmises that there may exist a larger number of Chinese 
criminal groups in Japan than the statistics capture.  The special report also suggests that many 
Chinese criminal groups are forging closer ties with Japanese gangs, which sometimes results in 
conflicts between them (pp. 75-88).  Worse, even minor skirmishes could easily escalate into 
explosive, bloody fights as some Chinese criminal groups are not afraid of Yakuza gangs.  The 
2003 White Paper recounts a scuffle between a Yakuza gang and a Chinese criminal group:     
When a member of a yakuza syndicate was injured through the actions of a Chinese 
group, the leadership of the Japanese group met with the Chinese group to demand 
compensation for his medical bills. The Chinese group, however, responded by 
opening fire in the coffee shop where the meeting was being held, killing one person 
and seriously wounding another. (cited in Foreign Press Center, 2003, n.p.) 
 
Incidents like this are cited in White Paper on Police to illustrate the intractably violent nature of 
Chinese criminal groups.  
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 The 2003 White Paper carries “the voices of Chinese suspects” as well.  When asked why 
they decided to target Japan as a venue for making money, Chinese suspects answer the 
following: 
a. You can make a fortune in a short period.  The one with money is a success   
whether you earned it by committing a crime or not.   
 
b. I wanted to go to the United States, but you could be shot by the police there.  
Plus, the punishment [in the U.S.] is more severe. 
 
c. The Japanese police will never beat [suspects].  Even if you are arrested without 
luck, the worst thing you will get is deportation if you keep denying the charge.  
I’m afraid of being arrested, but I don’t fear the police themselves. 
 
d. The punishment in Japan is light.  The most you will get for theft is a few-year 
prison term.  I can bear it. 
 
e. Prisons in Japan are clean.  [Prisoners] can watch TV.  It is said that [prison life in 
Japan] is more comfortable than life in China. (p. 17) 
 
Their confessions, however, don’t represent the majority of Chinese inmates’ feelings and even 
reflect a racist bias on the part of the editors and the investigators (Hamai, 2004, p. 29).  From 
his experience as a prison official, Professor Hamai (2004) observed that most Chinese inmates 
he met were confused and frightened in jail abroad.  Their defiant attitudes recorded in the 2003 
White Paper on Police even contradict findings in the Justice Ministry’s White Paper on Crime, 
another major official source of information on crime trends in Japan.  The 2001 White Paper on 
Crime, for example, disclosed that 90.9%, or 1,123, of F (foreigner)-class inmates regretted their 
crimes; 65.3% were found to have difficulties adjusting to prison life (Hōmushō Hōmu Sōgō 
Kenkyūjo, 2001, pp. 307-308).  However, these majority opinions rarely made their way into the 
popular media.  Instead, the media far more often printed the voices of foreign suspects in the 
2003 White Paper on Police (for example, see NS, 2003, September 26, p. 18; NS, 2003, 
September 30, p. 18).  To my knowledge, Kyōdō Tsushin reporter Hiroaki Nakajima was the 
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 only journalist who questioned the credibility of the confessions (for details, see his essay in the 
October 10, 2003 issue of the progressive Shūkan Kinyōbi [Weekly Friday], p. 21).   
Furthermore, White Paper on Police expresses serious concern that foreign criminals 
have been shifting their target to the Japanese.  According to the 2003 edition, about 70% of 
foreign visitors’ felonious crimes involved Japanese victims in 2002 (p. 5).  The NPA also 
maintains that as foreign crimes are spreading all over the country, they are a national problem 
(zenkokuteki na mondai) (Keisatsuchō, 1999a, pp. 12-13).  By implication, no one is immune to 
the threats posed by foreign criminals.    
Last but not least, the 2003 White Paper on Police releases the results of a questionnaire 
survey for about 600 external interpreters.  The survey was designed to solicit input from 
interpreters working in criminal investigations involving foreign visitors.  They were first asked 
if they were ever threatened by foreign suspects.  1.3% answered “yes” and 3.0% responded that 
they felt threatened by their remarks (p. 15).  Also, in response to the question “why did 
foreigners who came to Japan for the purpose of work or sightseeing end up engaging in criminal 
activities?,” 30.8% answered “because they can earn more money by committing crimes than 
working diligently,” followed by “they were lured by their compatriots to join criminal groups” 
(28.7%) and “they were lured by the Japanese gangs such as Bōryokudan [Yakuza]” (10.9%) (p. 
16).  The underlying assumption of all the answers is that foreign visitors are susceptible to the 
lure of easy money.  Missing are the economic and living conditions that drive them to commit 
crimes.  In reality, the vast majority of foreign visitors resort to crime “as a result of financial 
difficulties relating to every day living or in order to gain redress for damages which they have 
suffered” (Sellek, 2001, p. 214).   
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 The neglect of economic reasons in White Paper suggests that the police show different 
attitudes towards crimes committed by the Japanese and foreign visitors.  Admittedly, foreign 
visitors’ crimes are on the rise.  But so are crimes by Japanese nationals.  In general, official 
crime reports are more sympathetic to the latter.  To mention one example, Matsubara (2003, 
November 29) of the Japan Times writes: “Among crimes perpetrated by adults, there was a 
dramatic increase in the number of burglaries.  The [police white] paper says these crimes were 
often motivated by financial hardship or debts, reflecting the protracted economic downturn” 
(n.p.).  Unfortunately, such a sympathetic account is rarely extended to foreign visitors.   
 
 
4.6 MEDIA PORTRAYALS OF CRIMES BY “ILLEGAL” CHINESE MIGRANTS 
 
Such [felonious] crimes as murders and robberies resulting in injuries have been 
committed mostly amongst foreigners so far.  The time may come when Japanese 
people become victims of such felonious crimes and the incidents get widely reported. 
When that happens, I hope that the mass media, among others, will stay calm.  
                                                        (Ryūzō Saki, 1991, p.209) 
 
Unfortunately, sensational media coverage of foreign crime has become a reality.  As McCurray 
(2004) puts it, “[r]eports of heinous acts committed by foreigners from the Asian mainland, who 
take advantage of Japan’s ‘good-nature’, have become a staple of the Japanese press, the 
broadsheets included” (n.p.).  When figures, crime cases, suspects’ confessions, and survey 
results in official documents are filtered through law enforcement agencies’ interpretive 
framework, the media are responsible for questioning the framework and counterbalancing the 
official accounts with others so that the reader could get a better picture of the crime situation in 
Japan.  Yet the media fail, miserably, to act as a check on the official discourse and largely 
accept the idea of “illegal aliens” as serious security threats.  Instead of problematizing a racist 
bias embedded in the portrayals of foreign criminals in the white papers on police, they 
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 frequently present frightening images and lurid stories to reinforce the irredeemably vicious 
nature of foreign criminals.  For example, the July 7, 1996 issue of Weekly Asahi quotes a former 
senior Yakuza gangster as saying: 
It is dangerous to get involved with Chinese groups.  Even if a conflict arises between 
Japanese Yakuza gangs, you can talk it out.  But they [the Chinese] are reckless.  They 
say with a smile: “The life of the Japanese is expensive, but that of the Chinese is 
cheap.”  They are the kind of dudes who don’t mind committing a murder if they get 
paid 500 thousands yen [$4,500] or so. (p. 38) 
 
This article epitomizes the media’s tendency to amplify the danger of a Chinese crime wave 
along official lines.  To begin with, it implies that even Yakuza, Japan’s most feared organized 
crime gangs, pale in comparison to the reckless behavior of Chinese criminals.  Also, the article 
obfuscates the line between professional criminals and other Chinese.  This equivocation might 
lead the reader to view all Chinese migrants as susceptible to criminal behavior.  Lastly, it 
highlights the personal or ethnic traits of Chinese criminals at the neglect of material 
circumstances that drive them to crime.  As Curran (2000) argues, the personalization of the 
crime issue has political implications because whether crime is portrayed as arising from social 
conditions or individual evils impacts on public attitudes toward law and order (p. 139).   
Uncritical crime reporting is due to several structural factors.  First of all, young, 
inexperienced journalists are usually assigned to be police-beat reporters with little training 
(Borderland of the Media, 2004, n.p.).  Not surprisingly, they are inclined to accept official 
accounts and write crime reports accordingly.  Second, the infamous press club system (kisha 
kurabu seido) in Japan fosters collusive relationship between journalists and the police and 
denies independent, critical journalists first-hand access to crime data.  Bryan Shih (2001) 
explains how the press club system operates to shun investigative journalists unaffiliated with 
major news institutions: 
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 In Japan, many press conferences aren’t open to just anybody who wants to attend: 
Instead, every official agency has a press club, and only reporters who are members of 
each press club can attend press conferences held by each agency.  Generally, only 
journalists from one of 20 or so major domestic media outlets are admitted to most of 
Japan’s press clubs.  If you’re foreign or work for a magazine that falls outside the 
mainstream, you can find yourself cut off from official sources because they often 
won’t talk to non-club reporters. (n.p.) 
   
Since journalists are unable to even confirm the names of suspects if shut out of the press club, 
they shy away from writing critical crime reports lest they “offend” the police (Jimbo, 1995, p. 
110; Tsukada, 2001, p. 173).  Worse still, the “elitist” press club system fosters “a kind of 
bureaucratized ‘pack journalism,’” which further exacerbates the news media’s overreliance on 
official sources (Schudson, 2000, p. 188).  As Schudson (2000) points out: 
‘Reporters’ clubs’ are organizations of reporters assigned to a particular ministry, and 
most basic news comes from reporters in these clubs.  Since most clubs are connected 
to government agencies, news takes on an official cast.  The daily association of 
reporters at the clubs contributes to a uniformity in the news pages; reporters are driven 
by what is described as a ‘phobia’ about not writing what all the other reporters write. 
(p. 188) 
 
Besides, control authorities would often leak information to trusted journalists outside of routine 
press conferences.  It is extremely difficult to build a trusting relationship with the police if a 
journalist does not belong to the press club.  As Hall, et al. (1978) put it in more general terms, 
“both the formal and informal social relations of news-making from which the journalist derive 
his [sic] ‘crime’ material are dependent on a notion of ‘trust’, e.g. between the police and the 
crime correspondent” (p. 68).  If a journalist lacks or breaches this trust, he or she will be barred 
from access to privileged information (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 68).  Third, police-beat journalists are 
too busy to reflect on their daily reporting as they typically wake up at 6:30 in the morning and 
work until 1 a.m. at night (Borderland of the Media, 2004, n.p.).  Lastly, reporters on the police 
beat are usually transferred in a few years, which makes it difficult for them to write an in-depth, 
critical report on foreign crime (Tsukada, 2001, p. 173).   
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 Although journalists are predisposed to cover crime stories in favor of law enforcement 
agencies, official crime reports are not to blame entirely for the growing public antipathy 
towards foreign visitors, especially “illegal aliens.”  For the media not only fail to keep a critical 
check on the misleading public presentation of official crime data, but they also play an active 
role in exacerbating the national hysteria over a foreign crime wave.  Ever since the NPA began 
to release data on foreign visitors’ crimes, the popular media have fueled, rather than quelled, the 
public anxiety over them.  For example, the November 1987 issue of the monthly Sentaku 
warned the reader of the “explosive increase” in crimes by foreign visitors (p. 116).  Although 
White Paper on Police still affirmed Japan’s high level of public safety during this period, the 
article contended that “an upsurge in illegal foreign workers and the infiltration of criminal 
groups [were] shaking [the] very foundation of [Japan’s high] public safety” (p. 117).  More 
recently, following on the heels of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in January 1995, 
scurrilous rumors erupted of looting by foreigners.  Despite the local police’s persistent denial of 
organized crime by foreigners (AS, 1995, January 26, p. 33), Weekly Shinchō (Shūkan Shinchō) 
(1995, February 2) stated that the rumors were not totally unfounded (p. 55).  The article even 
gave credit to those vigilance groups insisting that Southeast Asians and peoples from the Middle 
East with dark complexion were looting stores and vandalizing vending machines (p. 54).  To 
mention yet another example, a deadly fire and explosion in Kabukichō’s Meisei 56 building in 
September 2001 resulted in 44 deaths.  According to the police, an arson attack was the most 
likely cause of this catastrophic fire (MDN, 2002, December 12, n.p.).  Although the cause of the 
fire has yet to be confirmed, the media made frequent mention of the rumor that Chinese groups 
set a fire to the building.  Freelance journalist Atsushi Mizoguchi (2001), for example, cited 
several individuals who claimed to have seen or know someone who saw “an apparently Chinese 
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 illegal entrant” running away from the scene (p. 102).  The rumor was also taken up in the 
November 15, 2002 issue of Weekly Asahi wherein a senior Yakuza member and a Chinese 
broker attested to the credibility of the rumor.   
Building on the premise that the popular media both draw on and transform official crime 
reports, this section fashions a critical analysis of how they covered crimes by Chinese “illegals” 
from January 1997 to February 2005.  Subject to my analysis are general-interest magazine 
articles and bunkobon and mook titles on a Chinese crime wave.  I also look into two hardcover 
books on this topic at least part of which were originally printed as article series in general-
interest magazines (for the book titles, see Table 4.8 on the next page).  To add to my analysis of 
these written texts, I occasionally reference newspaper articles and TV programs pertaining to 
crimes by Chinese “illegals.”  The reference is intended to illustrate that the general tone of 
foreign crime reporting is not radically different across the media.      
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Table 4.8: Bunkobon and Mook Titles on Crimes by the Chinese (in alphabetical order) 
 
 
Azuma, H. (1998). Shinjuku Kabukichō Mafia No Sumu Machi (Shinjuku’s Kabukichō: The  
Town Where the Mafia Lives). Bunshun Bunko. 
 
Azuma, H., Suzuki, T., Natsuhara, T., Hinago, A., Lee, X. et al. (2004). Tokyo Autorō Sensō  
(Outlaws’ Wars in Tokyo). Bessatsu Takarajima Real, 58.  
 
Hinago, A., Natsuhara, T., Yamaoka, S., Etō, K., and Watanabe, K. (2001). Shinjuku Kabukichō  
Andā Wārudo (The Underworld in Shinjuku’s Kabukichō). Takarajimasha Bunko.  
 
Lee, X. (2004). Kabukichō Annainin (Kabukichō Guide). Kadokawa Bunko. 
 
Mizoguchi, A. (1998). Chaina Mafia (Chinese Mafia). Shōgakukan Bunko. 
 
Mizoguchi, A., Morita, Y., Azuma, H., & Tomisaka, S. (2000). Yakuza To Iu Ikikata Chūgokujin  
Mafia Raishū (The Life of Yakuza: The Invasion of the Chinese Mafia). Takarajimasha 
Bunko. 
 
Mo, B. (1999). Jatō (The Snakehead). Shinchō Bunko. 
 
Morita, Y. (1998). Tokyo Chainīzu (The Chinese in Tokyo). Kōdansha Bunko.   
 
Morita, Y. (1999). Shinjuku Ban (Gangs in Shinjuku). Kōdansha Bunko.  
 
Morita, Y. (2002). Tokyo Hanzai Konsu (Crime Companies in Tokyo). Kōdansha Bunko. 
 
Natsuhara, T. (Ed.). (2003). Kabukichō Autorō Sensō (Outlaws’ Wars in Kabukichō). Bessatsu  
Takarajima Real, 52. 
 
Orikawa, T. (2004). Chūgokujin Renzoku Gōtōdan (Chinese Serial Robbery Groups). Kōdan  
Sha.  
 
Tamura, T. (2004). Documento Gaikokujin Hanzai Kane No Tame Nara Inochi Wa Iranai  
 (Documentary on Foreigners’ Crimes: We Are Willing to Die for Money). Rim Shuppan  
Shin Sha. 
 
Tomisaka, S. (2003). Sennyū Zainichi Chūgokujin No Hanzai Shinjikēto (Sneaking-in: Criminal  
            Syndicates of Resident Chinese). Bunshun Bunko.  
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 It might be useful to start out with the profiles of major writers on a Chinese crime wave.  
Most works on the topic are produced by so-called “free writers (furī raitā),” or freelance writers 
who are reputedly well versed in Chinese society (chūgoku tsū).43   These freelance writers 
include Akira Hinago, Satoshi Tomisaka, Atsushi Mizoguchi, Yasuro Morita, Hirokatsu Azuma, 
Tateo Tamura, and Takashi Orikawa.  Contrary to their name, “free writers” are not “free” at all.  
Since they are not employed by publishers or news organizations, they occupy a very weak 
position in the media.  According to Yasuoka (2004), many freelance writers manage to get their 
pieces published by catering to the demands of editors and publishers (pp. 203-204).  In fact, 
many of the above freelance writers did not choose to write on the theme of foreign crime;  
rather, they were originally assigned by magazine editors to do the report (for example, Azuma, 
1998; Tomisaka, 2001). 
In addition to writing bunkobon and mook titles, these freelance writers regularly 
contribute articles to such general-interest magazines as Weekly Bunshun, Weekly Asahi, and 
SAPIO.  In fact, many bunkobon titles were originally published in general-interest magazines.  
For example, Hirokatsu Azuma penned articles on foreign crime in Weekly Bunshun from 1993 
to 1994.  A collection of articles was later published with revisions as a bunkobon in 1998 from 
Bungei Shunjū Sha, the publisher of Weekly Bunshun.  Likewise, Satoshi Tomisaka’s 2003 
Sneaking-in: Criminal Syndicates of Resident Chinese was originally published as series articles 
in Weekly Bunshun from September to November 2000.  Besides, they are often asked for 
comments when crimes by Chinese “illegals” are featured in print or broadcast media.  Among 
others, Tomisaka frequently appears on TV when relevant stories come up in news programs.   
                                                 
43 The notable exception is Dr. Zhang Jing’s (2003) Rainichi Gaikokujin Hanzai (Foreign Visitors’ Crimes).  But his 
book is academic by nature and published by Akashi Shoten, a small, independent publisher.  Thus it does not fall 
into the category of popular texts.  
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 Oddly, the bunkobon and mook authors rarely cross-reference each other’s works, but 
they share a wealth of information.  They typically draw on official crime reports and various 
anonymous—often, dubious—sources for unmasking the “reality” of Chinese crime.  Moreover, 
the bunkobon and mook writers recycle a lot of materials across the media, which enables them 
to write prolifically on the topic.  This may partly explain why the popular media employ 
remarkably similar rhetoric, frames of reference, and lines of arguments in covering an alleged 
Chinese crime spree.  This “symbolic drip-feed” in turn serves to lend credibility to otherwise 
incredulous stories about crimes by Chinese “illegals.”  
 
4.6.1 Media Hype of Chinese Organized Crime 
 
In the remainder of this section, I identify idioms, imageries, stories, and arguments the popular 
media commonly invoke for playing up the danger of a Chinese crime wave.  To begin with, 
they are inclined to sensationalize the threat of organized crime by “illegal” Chinese migrants by 
depicting them as if they were members of international crime syndicates.  This is a 
quintessential example of how the popular media both draw on and transform official accounts.  
What can be extrapolated from White Paper on Police are 1) “illegal aliens” are more likely to 
commit crimes in groups than the Japanese and 2) some groups perpetrate offences in a very 
organized manner.  But just because groups of “illegal aliens” tend to commit crimes in an 
organized manner, this does not mean that they are professional criminal organizations.  As a 
matter of fact, “while much is made of links to criminal organizations, statistics cited to 
demonstrate this fact reveal that, in 1995, only 1 per cent of those persons arrested for violating 
the Immigration Control Act of Japan were identified as having links to criminal organizations 
(Caouette and Saito, 1999: 26)” (Skeldon, 2000, p. 19).   
 159
 The NPA’s ambiguous and misleading definition of “transnational criminal organization” 
is partially responsible for the media’s excessive emphasis on organized crime by Chinese 
“illegals” because it encompasses a wide range of groups from foreign-based criminal syndicates 
to two foreigners committing a minor offense.  But the NPA at least makes a conceptual 
distinction between organized crime syndicates and foreign criminal groups.  Besides, although 
White Paper on Police states that outposts of transnational crime organizations are getting more 
active in Japan, it also acknowledges that they are typically loosely arranged, opportunistic 
groups.  The 2003 edition, for example, documents that approximately 70% of crimes committed 
by groups of foreign visitors involved three persons or less (pp. 7-8).  Some law enforcement 
officials even admit that whether such ad-hoc groups should be called “organizations” is 
debatable (see, for example, Uchida, 1997, p. 45).   
Yet the line between the two types of “transnational criminal organization” often gets 
blurred in the popular media.  In effect, Chinese nationals who commit crimes in groups get 
almost automatically associated with professional crime syndicates.  For example, Tomisaka 
(2000) recounts an alleged crime scene where Chinese groups were dealing in stolen goods.  One 
day, he came across “several apparently Chinese people talking busily by cellular phone near a 
ticket gate in a JR [Japan Railways] station in Tokyo” (p. 51).  Tomisaka then happened to see 
them selling stolen goods.  He claimed to have witnessed such “crime scenes” over and over 
again.  His narrative is problematic inasmuch as it induces the reader to suspect any Chinese 
walking in a group and talking by cell-phone as a potential criminal.   In another article 
Tomisaka (2001b) suggests that the bosses of Chinese underground organizations are dressed so 
casually that it is all but impossible to tell them from ordinary people (p. 91).  By implication, all 
Chinese-looking people need to be seen with suspicion.  Worse, the popular media tend to pick 
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 up the most vicious and ruthless of Chinese criminal groups.  Takeyuki Tanaka (2001), for 
instance, charges Chinese smugglers for “ransacking” Japan as much as they want (p. 114).  He 
deplores that since Japan’s judicial system is not capable of tracking down and eliminating those 
smugglers, “[the country] is defenseless against 250 thousands illegal aliens” (p. 114).  Notice 
that Tanaka exaggerates the threats of undocumented migrants by describing Chinese smugglers 
“ransacking Japan” as representative of “250 thousands illegal aliens.”   
Similar hyperbole is prevalent in newspapers as well.  For instance, Sankei Shimbun of 
May 1, 2000 runs a rather alarming article on organized crime by foreign visitors.  In particular, 
the article underscores the threat of Chinese criminal groups by saying: “Recurring among 
crimes by foreign visitors last year were organized crimes such as smuggling of an enormous 
amount of stimulant drugs and robberies by the Hong Kong-based criminal organization ‘the 
Hong-Kong Triads’ or murders and kidnapping by the Snake Head for nonpayment of smuggling 
fees” (p. 1).  Like Tanaka, the article depicts the illicit activities of professional crime syndicates 
as illustrative of organized crimes by foreign visitors.  Yomiuri Shimbun of September 29, 2003 
also opines that the government must tackle organized crimes by Yakuza gangs and foreigners as 
if foreign criminal groups were as professionally organized as Yakuza (p. 3).  Even the Japan 
Times which is relatively critical of the NPA’s crime reports interprets foreign visitors’ tendency 
to commit crimes in groups as a sign of “an increase in illegal activities by foreign organized 
crime syndicates” (2000, September 15, n.p.).   
 Yomiuri Shimbun Public Safety Research Team (henceforth, the Research Team)’s 2004 
Organized Crimes (Soshiki Hanzai) is perhaps most indicative of the media’s inclination to 
conflate organized crime with crime that is organized by foreigners.  The book consists of a 
collection of article series originally printed in Yomiuri Shimbun from 2001 through 2003.  
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 Although the book purports to unravel the reality of organized crimes in general, it is almost 
entirely devoted to the growing presence of foreign criminal groups and their connections with 
Yakuza gangs.  For example, the first chapter entitled “Escalating Foreign Crimes” begins with a 
minute report on the grisly murder of a housewife in Yamagata Prefecture by three Chinese and 
one Japanese.  The three Chinese originally came to Japan to attend language schools, but they 
eventually dropped out and joined a criminal group (p. 20).  In the Research Team’s account, this 
and other Chinese robbery gangs (gōtōdan) or theft gangs (settōdan) commit crimes all over 
Japan because they mock the Japanese police and have confidence that they won’t be arrested.  
In fact, the police were able to arrest the offenders in the Yamagata murder case only because 
they discovered by chance the kitchen knives they used to kill the housewife.  As the Research 
Team (2004) put it, “the discovery of the kitchen knives was nothing but a miracle” (p. 13).   
 According to the Research Team, this gruesome murder incident is only a tip of the 
iceberg, and Chinese groups have been repeatedly committing atrocious crimes throughout 
Japan.  As the Research Team sees it, Chinese criminals pose particularly serious threats to 
public order because “they are not the kind of people who commit one crime and live quietly 
afterwards” (p. 34).  On the contrary, “they have no compunction.  They don’t hesitate to 
perpetrate any atrocious acts for money” (p. 35).  In fact, the three Chinese who murdered the 
housewife in Yamagata Prefecture allegedly expressed no remorse.  Having attended several 
trials of the case, her bereaved husband told the reporters in great disappointment: “The 
criminals have no sense of guilt.  Sometimes, they even smirked in a courtroom.  It is painful to 
sit behind the bar and hear the criminals denying the charges” (p. 18).   
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 4.6.2 “Illegal” Chinese migrants are forging close links with crime syndicates. 
 
While White Paper on Police offers a relatively modest assessment of links between Chinese 
criminal groups and professional crime syndicates at home and abroad, the popular media rely on 
anonymous police officers, Yakuza mobsters, and foreign gang members (as well as official 
crime reports) for stressing their close ties.  For example, the June 18, 2001 issue of AERA draws 
on several freelance writers, including Mizoguchi and Mo, to show that Chinese “illegals” in 
Japan now align themselves with transnational criminal organizations for the systematic 
perpetration of criminal acts.  According to the lead article, former Japanese-language students 
are typically assigned to lay groundwork for a criminal act, illegally staying and working 
Chinese perpetrate the act itself, and professional criminal groups aid and abet them (p. 9).  
Journalist Hiroshi Kubo (2004) also points to growing nexus between Chinese criminal groups 
and Yakuza gangs.  Even more worrisome is the fact that Chinese criminal groups now recruit 
unemployed Japanese nationals to perpetrate crimes for them.  According to Kubo (2004):   
It is well known that the Chinese hire jobless Japanese to commit larcenies.  Once the 
Japanese who waited on them hand and foot got arrested, Chinese who spearheaded the 
crimes would quickly flee to their home country.  If you take that into consideration, 
more Chinese must be involved in crimes than the statistics show and exacerbate 
Japan’s crime situation. (p. 204)  
      
Along a similar line, Tomisaka (2000) contends that “bad Chinese groups” no longer work for 
the Japanese but lure “ordinary Japanese” to abet and assist them by offering handsome rewards.  
He is gravely concerned about this alignment because “if the boldness of Chinese criminals is to 
be combined with the ‘eyes’ of the Japanese who have home ground advantages, it will no doubt 
endanger the safety of the island country” (p. 51). 
Amplifying the public fear of organized crime by Chinese “illegals,” the popular media 
often invoke the image of “Chinese Mafia.”  Although literature on the Chinese Mafia abounds 
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 in the media, very few, if any, writers seem to grasp how much of it is a reality.  Indeed, as Mo 
(1999) holds, it is all but impossible for Japanese journalists to even contact Snakehead members 
as they keep a very low profile (p. 350).  He even accuses self-proclaimed experts on China of 
cooking up stories about the Snakehead and the Chinese Mafia (p. 350).  Even though the actual 
activities of the Chinese Mafia are unknown, the popular media still feed on its ominous image 
to hype up the reality of organized crime by the Chinese.  Worse, as the growing presence of the 
Chinese Mafia has been reported over and over again, many people have begun to assume it as a 
reality.  In consequence, a looming threat of atrocious crimes by Chinese criminal syndicates has 
become fixed in the minds of many people.   
Overblown media reports are largely responsible for fueling the public anxiety over the 
Chinese Mafia because the term is nowhere used in White Paper on Police.  The only reference 
to mafia in the NPA’s White Paper is the Russian Mafia (for example, Keisatsuchō, 2003a, p. 
26).  The ambiguous definition of transnational criminal organization in Police White Paper is 
already problematic.  By invoking the evocative and equivocal term “mafia,” the popular media 
play an integral part in creating the illusio that “illegal” Chinese migrants are (potential) 
members of professional crime rings active in Japan’s underground world.  Azuma (1997), for 
instance, estimates without hard data that at least 2,000 Chinese have joined mafias after they 
came to Japan (p. 36).  In Outlaws’ Wars in Kabukichō Natsuhara (2003a) argues that a 
staggering number of illegal entrants are getting “mafia-ized” (p. 83).  Under the provocative 
title “Japan as a Target of ‘Transnational Organized Crime,’” journalist Katsuro Kawabe (2000) 
proclaims that the smuggling of humans has now become the biggest external threat in postwar 
Japan (p. 187).  In particular, he takes the growing presence of the Chinese Mafia seriously.  
Even though his fear of the Chinese Mafia is hardly substantiated, Kawabe insists that the 
 164
 Chinese Mafia is shaking the very foundation of social order in postwar Japan (p. 191).  Along 
the same line, the Weekly Post of April 28, 2000 reads: “‘The presence of illegal aliens is posing 
a threat to public safety,’ declares the National Police Agency.  [The NPA] also warns against 
the shadowy activities of foreign mafias such as the Chinese Snakehead” (p. 35).  In this article, 
the Snakehead is assumed to be a mafia despite the fact that the NPA’s White Paper has never 
identified the organization as such.  As a matter of fact, the Snakehead is not a transnational 
crime syndicate but a smuggling network (Mo, 1999, p. 74).  Yet the popular media usually label 
the Snakehead as a global crime ring jeopardizing Japan’s public safety. 
Some writers even deliberately collapse the distinction between “illegal” Chinese 
migrants and mafia members.  For example, Lee (2003) equates foreign mafias with “‘crime 
teams’ by bad foreigners” (p. 65).  A more blunt assertion comes from Atsushi Mizoguchi’s 
article in The Way Yakuza Lives—The Invasion of the Chinese Mafia.  He (2000b) finds little 
value in separating “bad Chinese groups” (those who began to engage in criminal activities in 
Japan) from “the Chinese Mafia” (meaning “professionally organized crime syndicates”) because 
the important point is not their criminal records, but whether they make a living on crimes (p. 
11).  Since all undocumented migrants are “criminals” in the sense that they violated 
immigration laws, Mizoguchi maintains that they should be all viewed as “foreign mafias” (p. 
10).   
 In some cases, Chinese criminal groups are characterized as even more cruel than the 
Mafia.  Self-appointed Kabukichō expert Xia Mu Lee (2003a) quotes a ranking Chinese mafia 
member as testifying: “It is getting common for foreign students who are short of money to 
commit burglaries in groups. . . .  Indeed, the most violent and horrifying people may well be 
reckless young foreign students rather than a group called the Mafia” (p. 78).  Likewise, 
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 Tomisaka (2003) points out that while the Chinese Mafia used to dominate the underground 
world in Kabukichō, most Chinese criminals active in the area are now former students (p. 88).  
In his view, these student-turned-criminals pose an even greater security threat because they, 
unlike mafia members, are undisciplined beasts (p. 88).  In like manner Yoshitaka Kakei (1997) 
suggests that even professional criminals’ acts of violence pale in comparison with “illegal” 
Chinese migrants’ atrocities: “Those Chinese who have become delinquent [furyōka] in Japan 
are even more radical than members of formal [criminal] organizations.  Surprisingly, they 
undertake to commit murders for as little as 100 thousand yen [$900]” (p. 62).   
In addition to the horrid image of the Chinese Mafia, the popular media often deploy 
“company” metaphors to illuminate the organized nature of criminal activities by “illegal” 
Chinese migrants.  The September 16, 2003 issue of Weekly SPA! (Shūkan SPA!), for example, 
runs a feature article on a Chinese crime wave under the title “Evolving ‘Crimes by the Chinese’: 
Their Networks and Latest Methods.”  Drawing on anonymous police officials, journalists, 
security firm employees, and Yakuza gangsters, the report purportedly unveils the reality of 
Chinese criminal groups (p. 20).  The graphic description of Chinese criminal groups alludes to 
the presence of a large Chinese crime network targeting Japan (p. 20).  The report portrays the 
network as “a large crime trading firm” (hanzai no sōgō shōsha) profiteering from various illicit 
businesses including lock-picking crimes, prostitution, credit card skimming, money 
counterfeiting, and drug peddling (p. 20).  Similarly, Morita (2003) likens Chinese criminal 
syndicates to “crime companies” in that they provide housing benefits and organize leisure trips 
for their members as many Japanese enterprises do for their employees (p. 200).  As the title of 
his 2002 book Crime Companies in Tokyo suggests, the analogy of “company” is ubiquitous in 
Morita’s works on Chinese criminal groups.  “Company” metaphors are used in national dailies 
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 as well.  To mention one example, Asahi Shimbun of March 8, 1998 reports a police raid on a 
Chinese theft gang under the headline “Foreign Company Inc. of Crime; The Police Analyze a 
Chinese Group.”  The article compares the group to a company because confiscated membership 
manuals stipulate that each member become a “stock owner” by ‘investing” 300,000 yen 
($2,700) for mutual support (p. 35). 
Last but not least, the popular media are eager to spotlight conflict between Chinese 
criminal groups and Yakuza gangs.  Whereas White Paper on Police cites several cases of 
scuffles between Chinese criminal groups and Yakuza gangs, the popular media deploy “war” 
metaphors to exaggerate the magnitude of their conflict.  Most suggestive in this respect is 
Outlaws’ War in Kabukichō.  As the title indicates, this mook title is a collection of articles 
featuring fierce underground battles among Yakuza gangs, the Chinese Mafia, and the police.  
Several authors recount the so-called Paris-Jenne incident in September 2002 in which a 
Chinese group shot two Bōryokudan gangsters (e.g. Natsuhara, 2003b; Lee, 2003).  According to 
Lee (2003), the police took the incident as “a historic crime in Shinjuku” because it might trigger 
an all-out battle between bad Chinese groups and Bōryokudan gangs (p. 63).  In a similar vein, 
the Weekly Asahi of November 15, 2002 declares that an all-out war between the Chinese Mafia 
and the Japanese Yakuza has broken out underground.  The article ascribes the cause of the war 
to the money trouble that cropped up between a Shanghai mafia and a Yakuza gang.  The furious 
Shanghai mafia dispatched a “negotiator” and a “hit man” from China’s Tōhoku area to issue an 
ultimatum to the Yakuza gang.  Both of them were said to have received a 5 million-yen 
($45,000) reward.  Referring to this episode, one Yakuza gangster told the reporter: “You might 
think it [the 5 million-yen reward] is low, but prices are different [between China and Japan].  So 
is the price of life” (p. 152).  Implied in this quote is that even Yakuza gangs are fearful of 
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 reckless Chinese criminal groups.  To mention yet another example, the Weekly Post of February 
25, 2005, carries an article on the Chinese Mafia under the sensational title “Shintarō versus the 
Chinese Mafia—‘A Final War in Kabukichō.’”  Belying the shocking title, the article is little 
more than a description of recently beefed up crackdown measures against “illegal aliens” in 
Kabukichō and the Chinese Mafia’s response to them.  Still, the article postulates that the 
Chinese Mafia has gained a strong foothold in the area; it also draws on Morita, Lee, and other 
anonymous informants for documenting its escalating criminal activities.  
 
4.6.3 “Illegal” Chinese migrants have triggered an unprecedented crime wave in Japan. 
 
 
On the whole, White Paper on Police maintains that Chinese criminal groups tend to perpetrate 
criminal acts in an organized, sophisticated, and heavy-handed manner.  The popular media 
basically subscribe to this idea but stretch it to the limit.  First and foremost, many popular texts 
hold that crimes by the Chinese can be easily identified because their modus operandi is 
distinctively flagrant.  Whereas the NPA’s White Paper provides a fairly detailed description of 
felonious crimes by “illegal” Chinese migrants, the popular media supply even more gory details 
and flashy visuals for playing up the brutality of Chinese criminals and making their images felt 
clear to the popular imagination.  For example, the September 1, 2003 issue of AERA recounts a 
murder case by a group of three Chinese in which a victim was stabbed all over and chopped up 
into pieces (p. 27).  Investigators in the murder case told the reporter that they had rarely seen 
such a grisly crime scene (p. 27).  The weekly pictorial magazine Flash (2002, July 2) echoes the 
same point in covering the killing of a construction company president in June 2002.  The 
president was reportedly badly stabbed to death; from the wounds marked on his body, the 
Chinese Mafia was suspected of perpetrating the murder.  A local resident in the construction 
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 business is quoted as saying: “Even [Japanese] gangsters would not commit a cruel murder like 
this.  Rumor has it around us that a foreigner was hired to commit this act.  Otherwise, I can only 
think of girl troubles” (p. 93).  Similarly, Tamura (2004) offers a two-page account of how 
brutally the housewife in Yamagata Prefecture was killed by the Chinese group.  As he put it, the 
Chinese group’s method of killing was “nauseating” (hakike ga suru) even to investigators (p. 
202).  
A similar pattern of reporting can be found in daily newspapers as well.  Extreme as it 
may be, Governor Ishihara’s following essay in Sankei Shimbun (2001, May 8) is still worth 
quoting at length:  
Several wealthy families within my circle of acquaintances have been assaulted by 
Chinese who broke into their homes and robbed them of large sums of money.  In one 
instance, the criminals ripped the clothes that the women were wearing into two strips 
lengthwise and used these materials to tie up the victims.  This type of cunning . . . 
method has never been seen before in Japan.  In another bold . . . method, 
characterized by a complete lack of regard for alarms and other safeguards, criminals 
break into places such as jewelry stores using construction equipment to instantly 
break a hole in the walls and help themselves to the jewelry at hand.  When the 
security company staff responds to the alarm, rather than run away [these brazen 
criminals] instead threaten the staff with weapons and chase them off. Then, by the 
time the police arrive, these criminals have made a leisurely escape.44
 
 Not only do the popular media stress the flagrant nature of Chinese crime, but they 
sometimes spuriously link flagrant crimes to the Chinese even when the police make no formal 
statement about suspects.  On February 12, 2002, a dead body was found in a dumping ground in 
Tokyo’s Koto Ward.  Journalist Kensaku Tokitō (2002) contributed a report on this incident to 
the March 15 issue of Shūkan Posuto, a sensationalist weekly.  He surmised from the “horrible 
condition” (mugoi jōtai) of the body that the crime was perpetrated by a Chinese group despite 
the fact that even the victim had yet to be identified at that time (p. 210).  In like manner, a 
                                                 
44 The English translation was taken from the Issho website.  A full-text translation and line-by-line analysis of 
Ishihara’s essay is available at the website. 
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 reporter for the weekly pictorial tabloid Flash (1999, September 14) alarmed the reader to the 
danger of break-in larcenies by Chinese gangs under the title “Watch out! ‘Chinese Theft Gangs’ 
are Active behind the Scenes in Tokyo.”  The reporter who went by the name of Jajamaru 
claimed that his apartment was robbed by a Chinese gang.  In reality, no suspects had yet to be 
arrested at the time of writing; he was only told by an investigator that as the apartment was 
thoroughly ransacked and almost every valuable was stolen, the act was supposedly committed 
by a Chinese theft gang (p. 34).  Nevertheless, the reporter emphasized the dangers of robberies 
by Chinese groups throughout the article.  Kakei (1997) went as far as to blame “bad foreigner 
groups” for most violent thefts in Japan (p. 63).  However, his conjecture was nowhere 
substantiated in the article.   
 To highlight the unprecedented nature of organized crime by Chinese “illegals,” the 
popular media invoke several neologisms.  Pikkingu gōtōdan (lock-picking robbery gang) is a 
prime example of this.  Although White Paper on Police documents that Chinese groups often 
commit robberies with “lock-picking devices,” it does not label the groups themselves as “lock-
picking robbery groups.”  As the popular media began to use the term “lock-picking robbery 
gangs” mostly in reference to a Chinese crime wave, lock-picking robbery has become largely a 
problem of Chinese criminal groups.  In other words, just like the terms “Japayuki-san” and 
“foreign worker problem,” the label “lock-picking robbery” functioned as a terministic screen 
through which the public understood and discussed crimes by “illegal” Chinese migrants.  In 
consequence, the public has been (mis)led to think that Chinese groups have introduced a new 
type of crime.  In reality, robberies with lock-picking tools are not new at all (Yanagihara, 2001, 
n.p.).  What is new is the name “lock-picking robbery.”  Yet a new name for crime often 
translates into a new type of crime in the public’s mind.  This is what Stuart Hall calls the 
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 generative and associative power of a label (Hall, 1974, p. 288; Hall, et al., 1978, p. 72).  For 
example, Hall, et al. (1978) lucidly showed that mugging broke as a big news story in the United 
Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s because of the novelty of the label, not of the crime itself (p. 
71).  Since mugging was initially seen as an American phenomenon, the media depicted 
mugging on British streets as a sign of incipient breakdown in law and order besetting American 
society.  Hall, et al. (1978) observed:  
The ‘mugging’ label played a key role in the development of the moral panic about 
‘mugging’ and the United States effectively provided both the label itself and its field 
of associations and references, which lent meaning and substance to the term.  The 
mass media here was the key apparatus which formed the link and framed the passage 
of the term from one context to the other. (p. 27)  
 
The label “lock-picking robbery” may not be nearly as evocative as “mugging”; still, the media’s 
repeated use of the term has fueled the public anxiety that Japan is unprepared for this new type 
of offenses imported by Chinese criminal groups.  For instance, Tomisaka (2003) cites a Chinese 
journalist as testifying that many Chinese nationals with high lock-picking skills are ex-inmates 
for repeat offenses (p. 208).  This partly explains why Chinese lock-picking gangs are so violent 
as to kill even their cousins and brothers-in-law without any remorse (p. 207).  Although 
Tomisaka concedes that a few Japanese people also commit lock-picking crimes, their crimes, he 
contends, rarely escalate into robberies because they will just run away if caught in the act.  
Tomisaka insists that Chinese lock-picking gangs are uniquely dangerous as many of them used 
to commit far more heinous crimes such as robberies or abductions (p. 207).     
The popular media sometimes employ “school” metaphors to illuminate the skills of 
Chinese lock-picking criminals.  Most illustrative of this point is an article in the Weekly Asahi 
of February 25, 2000.  According to a criminal investigator quoted in the article, members of 
Chinese theft gangs often take “lessons” from “instructors” with prodigious lock-picking skills 
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 before coming to Japan.  Thanks to intense training sessions, they are able to unlock most doors 
within five seconds.  When the police raided the hideout of a Chinese theft gang, they 
confiscated tens of different lock-picking devices and doorknobs upon which its members 
supposedly honed their picking skills.  The article speculates that the hideout served as a 
“thieves’ academy” (p. 143).  In the October 11, 2000 issue of Takarajima, Hinago employs 
remarkably similar arguments, metaphors, and figures.  He (2000) asserts that Chinese theft 
groups could pick most locks within five seconds (p. 36).  Hinago also refers to the seemingly 
same hideout where Chinese thieves reportedly practiced their lock-picking skills with tens of 
different metal sticks and doorknobs (p. 36).     
Tomisaka (2001a) goes further to suggest that trends in Chinese crime have shifted from 
lock-picking crimes to more violent robberies.  Although little is known about this shift, he 
maintains that Chinese lock-picking criminals are no longer “sneak thieves” but violent criminals 
who don’t mind killing people (p. 224).  Along a similar line, the Weekly Post of September 29, 
2000 points out that some Chinese theft gangs now use a crowbar to force open a door (p. 233).  
According to a Chinese theft gang member, this so-called “crowbar theft” (bāru tō) is much 
easier and more efficient than lock-picking theft because no skills are necessary to open a door 
with a crowbar (p. 233).   Although the police have not confirmed any increase in crowbar theft, 
the gang member mockingly states that crowbar thefts are beginning to replace lock-picking 
thefts (p. 233).  This is to say that Chinese theft gangs keep outwitting law enforcement agencies 
that have just set out to take counter measures against lock-picking crimes (p. 233). 
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 4.6.4 Chinese criminals are more cruel and ruthless than any other nationals. 
 
 
Related to the previous point, the popular media tend to characterize Chinese criminals as cold-
blooded, cunning, and ferocious offenders who have no compunction about committing any 
heinous crimes.  Tamura (2001), for example, offers a catalogue of “atrocious crimes by illegally 
staying Chinese” to illustrate their uncanny nature.  An investigator in a murder case at a 
nightclub told him that after stabbing the manager, Chinese criminals remained in the club for an 
hour “as if they deliberately gave it time to enjoy watching frightened hostesses and customers’ 
reaction” (p. 101).  Tamura (2001) brings up another case in which two former Chinese students 
were charged with an attempted murder of a station employee.  In his account, the ex-students 
approached the station employee “with a smirk” and suddenly beat him in the face with a club 
and stabbed him with a knife (p. 101).   
 Similarly, the August 2002 issue of Bungei Shunjū prints a talk on a Chinese crime spree 
between House member Tomoko Sasaki and Atsuyuki Sassa, former head of Japan’s National 
Security Council.  During the talk, Sasaki provides gory details of the aforementioned murder 
incident in Yamagata Prefecture.  Her description of the incident bears a striking resemblance to 
that in Yomiuri Shimbun Public Safety Research Team’s Organized Crimes.  As she recounts it, 
the Chinese group was taken to the scene by Japanese gangsters, broke into the house, and 
stabbed the housewife badly to death without any hesitation when caught in the act (p. 271).  
Sasaki takes this murder incident as a symptom that crimes by malignant Chinese groups are 
spreading throughout Japan.  Sassa echoes her view on the ruthless nature of Chinese criminals:  
 They [Chinese] think nothing of killing people.  [Robbers] normally don’t break in [a 
house] when someone is present, but [the Chinese] don’t care and break in anyway. 
Should they be caught by the elderly, children, or women, they would immediately tie 
them up and truss them with adhesive tapes.  Sometimes, they would even choke 
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 [victims].  They have no compunction about killing any witness, including women and 
children. (p. 271) 
   
 As an outspoken Diet member on Japan’s public safety, Sasaki frequently appears in 
magazine articles about foreign crime.  For example, in the September 24, 2002 issue of the 
women’s weekly Josei Jishin, Sasaki supplies basic data on foreign visitors’ crimes.  After 
noting that “jails [in Japan] are happy places [for foreigners] because clothes, food, and 
accommodation are guaranteed” (p. 184), she (2002) gives her usual spiel: It is necessary, first 
and foremost, to reduce the number of illegally working foreigners in order to curb the number 
of crimes (p. 184; see also her tripartite talk in the July 2001 issue of Chūō Kōron).   
In a little different vein, the September 1, 2003 issue of AERA asks three Chinese 
journalists, including Xia Mu Lee and Bangfu Mo, to analyze the cause of a Chinese crime wave.  
Lee attributes it to China’s one-child policy.  “Because of the one-child policy introduced in the 
1980s (March 1980), [Chinese youths] have grown selfish as ‘little emperor,’” says Lee (p. 29).  
Mo holds that many Chinese students justify their criminal acts as a revenge for having been 
harshly treated by Japanese society (p. 29).  He reiterates this point in many other works (for 
example, see Mo, 1999).   
To play up the violent nature of Chinese criminals, the popular media make frequent 
references to the weapons (knives, guns, swords, razor blades, etc.) they carry.  Worse, Chinese 
“illegals” are often represented as ruthless criminals who don’t hesitate to use weapons if victims 
show any sign of resistance.  For example, Tamura (2003) asserts that most Chinese criminals 
from the Tohoku area are armed with Russian guns when they perpetrate atrocious crimes (p. 
27).  He finds the “armament” of Chinese criminals particularly sinister because they don’t 
hesitate to commit a murder when caught stealing even a tiny amount of money (p. 28).  
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 Similarly, the March 2001 issue of Themis cautions the reader against the danger of armed 
Chinese criminals:  
A recent trend [in crimes by the Chinese] is that they no longer confine themselves to 
threatening [victims] with knives; but they also carry model guns, trafficked firearms, 
or stolen hunting guns and badly assault victims after trussing them with adhesive tapes 
and handcuffs.  They sometimes don’t hesitate to kill them. (p. 119) 
 
In some cases, even Yakuza is referred to as a “foil” for the cruelty of “illegal” Chinese.  
Natsuhara (2003a), for example, argues that even Yakuza gangsters are wary of the presence of 
Chinese criminal groups because they, unlike the Japanese, don’t hesitate to assault others (p. 
83).  In similar fashion, a senior Yakuza gangster testifies to the violent nature of Chinese 
criminals in the September 16, 2003 issue of Weekly SPA!.  According to the gangster, Chinese 
criminals are intractably dangerous because, unlike Yakuza, they are not bound by such 
unwritten moral codes as “don’t hurt ordinary people” or “don’t degrade yourself when you take 
on your enemies” (p. 23).  Similarly, Akihiko Misawa (2001) interviews a leader of the Shanghai 
Snakehead who proudly declares: “We have taken over Kabukichō.  We are not afraid of 
Bōryokudan gangs. Indeed, they will run away when they see us” (p. 113).  
Related to this, several authors claim that numerous Yakuza gangsters have been mugged, 
abducted, threatened, and even killed by Chinese criminals (for example, Azuma, 1997, p. 39; 
Tomisaka, 2001a, p. 225).  Yet few incidents have been brought to public attention because the 
gangsters feel too embarrassed to report to the police.  In Tomisaka (2001a)’s estimation, the 
frequent abductions of Yakuza bosses by Chinese criminals attest to their “recklessness” and 
“ruthlessness” (p. 225).  Natsuhara (2003a) also holds that the Chinese Mafia is by nature more 
atrocious than Yakuza gangs because the Mafia was founded for the sole purpose of engaging in 
criminal activities. (p. 85).  Although most mafias have been kicked out of Shinjuku due to the 
police’s sweeping crackdown measures, Natsuhara is convinced that they are building up more 
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 power and waiting for the day to come back.  He is terrified that the return of the Chinese Mafia 
would trigger an even more disastrous battle in the area as its “fighting potential” (sentōryoku) 
far surpasses that of the Yakuza gangs (p. 88).   
 
4.6.5 “Illegal” Chinese migrants are willing to do anything for money 
 
The 2003 edition of White Paper on Police alludes to the criminal propensity of Chinese 
nationals by carrying a series of confessions by Chinese suspects.  The popular media not only 
feed on these confessions, but also add even more shocking ones.  This tendency is particularly 
true for sensationalist media and journalists.  Specifically, they are inclined to portray Chinese as 
greedy people willing to do anything for money.  For instance, Hinago (2003) makes a bold 
claim that Chinese migrants, legal or illegal, don’t mind risking their lives for earning money (p. 
99).  Under the horrifying title “Rapid Increase in Japanese Victims by Foreigners’ Crimes: The 
Tragedy of Burglary 71%, Rape 100%,” Mizoguchi (1999) also contends: “The overwhelming 
majority [of foreign criminals] are Chinese nationals. They would do anything for money.  
Gouging a victim’s cheek and chopping off her neck—their acts are too flagrant for the Japanese 
to imagine” (p. 29).  In another article entitled “‘Bad’ Chinese’s Philosophy of Management,” 
Mizoguchi (2000a) echoes the same point: “Everyone in mainland China believes that money is 
everything.  Since they come to Japan for the sole purpose of making money, they are willing to 
commit any crime for money.  Their approach is thoroughly businesslike” (p. 245).  Likewise, 
Weekly Shinchō (2003, September 18) cites a police officer as saying: “[Chinese criminals] don’t 
hesitate to kill frail women, the elderly, and children for money.  They are willing to do any ugly 
things that are inconceivable to the Japanese” (p. 145). 
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 The popular media often suggest that Chinese criminals don’t hesitate to perpetrate 
heinous crimes even for a small amount of money.  For example, they are portrayed as willing to 
commit a murder only if they get paid “one million yen [$9,000]” (Flash, 1997, September 9, p. 
66), “200 to 700 thousand yen [$1,800 to $6,300]” (Shūkan SPA!, 1997, p. 25), “300 thousand 
yen [$2,700]”  (Azuma, 1998, p. 208), “50 to 100 thousand yen [$450 to $900]” (Tamura, 2004, 
p. 152), and “100 thousand yen [$900]” (Kakei, 1997, p. 62).  Azuma (1997) goes as far as to 
suggest that Chinese “punks” (chimpira) would beat and kill others in trouble over a thousand 
yen or two ($9 to $18) (p. 39).    
 A common idiom used for illuminating Chinese migrants’ mammonism is 要銭不要命 
(roughly meaning “we sacrifice our lives for money”).  As with the term “Mafia,” this allegedly 
popular Chinese saying is nowhere mentioned in White Paper on Police.  Yet it is among the 
most common idioms used in popular texts about a Chinese crime wave.  Yoshiro Morita (2003), 
for example, juxtaposes this Chinese saying with the Japanese psyche that “we give up money 
for life.”  In his view, this value gap is spawning crimes by Chinese migrants (p. 198).  Yomiuri 
Weekly on November 16, 2003 quotes the same proverb to show that the Japanese police are 
combating completely new types of criminals (p. 18).   
Another common metaphor used to underline the criminal propensity of Chinese 
“illegals” is “reserve army of crime” (hanzai yobigun).  The February 21, 2002 issue of Weekly 
Shinchō, for instance, reads: “About 70 thousand Chinese students, including those attending 
vocational schools, are now living in Japan.  Reserve armies of crimes are everywhere” (p. 139).   
Invoking the same metaphor, Lee (2004) emphasizes the growing threats of “illegal” Chinese 
migrants: “Not only smugglers but also overstayers and foreign students who have come to Japan 
for earning money—there are countless numbers of reserve army of crimes” (p.117).  Notice that 
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 undocumented migrants are all lumped together as potential criminals in both articles.  The 
November 12, 2003 issue of the weekly SAPIO even hints that 30 million jobless people in the 
urban areas of China and a 150 million redundant population in its rural parts are potential 
reserve armies of crimes (p. 75).  A similar metaphor can be found in national dailies as well.  
For instance, Nihon Keizai Shimbun of January 27, 1998 quotes a Justice Ministry official as 
saying that “jobless illegal aliens are turning into the ‘reserve army of crimes’” (p. 38). 
Weekly SPA! (2003, September 16) attributes the Chinese’s obsession with money to a 
decline in Confucian ethics under the socialist regime.  An anonymous writer is quoted as 
explaining that since Confucian teaching no longer undergirds the society, a rapid economic 
growth is changing China into “a society where money is everything” (p. 23).  “As a result,” he 
continues, “[the Chinese] are feeling less hesitant to commit crimes” (p. 23).  To mention another 
example, Orikawa (2003) carries an extensive interview with an “internationally wanted 
fugitive.”  He told Orikawa that the Chinese have a fundamentally different kind of morality than 
the Japanese insofar as they envy others with luxurious houses and tombstones no matter what 
evil deeds they do to own them (p. 45).  Along the same line, the weekly pictorial Flash (1997, 
September 9) contacts “Mr. A” who allegedly worked for the Chinese Mafia.  He asserts that the 
Chinese are malicious by nature because “they hardly tell what belongs to them from what 
doesn’t.  That’s why they steal others’ possessions as they want” (p. 66).  Novelist Fan Cheng 
(2003) even insinuates that every Chinese in Japan is a potential criminal: “Any Chinese will 
want to make money quickly and easily if he sees the ‘peace senility’ [heiwa boke] of Japan.  
This is not limited to those who have sneaked into Japan with the intention of committing 
crimes” (p. 144).    
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 It follows that these moral-less Chinese migrants are threatening not only Japan’s public 
safety but also the moral fabric of the society.  Attorney Katsuhiko Takaike (2004), for instance, 
blames “bad Chinese” for eroding morality in Japanese society (p. 289).  Although he concedes 
that an increase in felonious crimes cannot be imputed to foreigners alone, Takaike insists that 
atrocious crimes by foreigners, especially the Chinese, are uniquely pernicious as they are 
jeopardizing the nation’s social stability and morality as well (p. 289).  By the same token, the 
November 2001 issue of Themis calls for tougher laws that would protect the life and property of 
the Japanese against Chinese criminals who are “taking advantage of Japanese society’s ‘virtue’” 
(p. 90).  
In extremes cases, the differences between Chinese and Japanese criminals are ascribed 
to racial and even genetic factors.  Governor Ishihara contends in Sankei Shimbun’s front-page 
column on May 8, 2001 that the spread of atrocious crimes by Chinese migrants “is indicative of 
the ethnic DNA [of the Chinese]” (p. 1, cited in the Issho Website, 2002, n.p.)  Extreme as 
Ishihara’s views may be, he is not alone in propagating such a blatantly racist idea.  Akira 
Hinago (2000), a co-author of Kabukichō Underworld, quotes a police-beat reporter as saying 
that since Chinese people are shrewd businessmen by nature, they would not miss out on a 
treasure house like Japan (p. 36).  According to Hinago, the Chinese were astounded to see so 
many vending machines and bicycles on the streets without any anti-theft measures.  In their 
view, that is “tantamount to saying ‘we don’t mind you stealing them’” (p. 37).  Consequently, 
many Chinese migrants have now grown into “awful ‘monsters,’” deplores Hinago (p. 37).  
Masayuki Takayama (2003), a professor at Teikyo University, also asserts that brutal crimes by 
Chinese “illegals” in Japan reveal “the real face of the Chinese” (Chūgokujin no sugao) (p. 79).      
 179
 This type of a poorly documented claim can be observed in newspapers as well.  Notably, 
the Ibaraki edition of Yomiuri Shimbun carried a 6-part series to probe “the changing nature of 
crime” (henshitsu suru hanzai) in 2003.  The second half of the series was devoted to foreign 
crime.  Part 5 began with an unabashed confession from a Chinese thief: “I smuggled myself into 
Japan and made one million yen [$9,000] per month.  I remitted money to my family members 
and they built a three-story house” (n.p.).  According to the article, “the man from Fujian 
province, who was a member [of a Chinese criminal group], thought nothing [of committing 
thefts] and boasted of ‘the smuggler’s palace.’  The investigators were left dumbfounded” (n.p.).  
The article also hinted that Chinese suspects would take advantage of Japan’s lax criminal laws 
to get away with their crimes.  Another member of the criminal group stood mute most of the 
time but told an investigator at one point: “Japan’s laws are lax.  Even if you get arrested for 
larceny, you will just end up getting deported” (n.p.).  His mocking remark was congruent with 
the “confessions” from Chinese suspects in the 2003 White Paper on Police.  Quoted near the 
end of the article was “要銭不要命,” the popular idiom in literature on crimes by Chinese 
“illegals” indicating their willingness to sacrifice lives for money.  An investigator allegedly 
heard Chinese suspects saying this over and over again (n.p.).          
 
4.6.6 Japan is unprepared for a Chinese crime wave 
 
 
The popular media repeatedly denounce law enforcement agencies as too lenient with these 
irredeemably vicious Chinese criminals.  This is quintessentially the second type of 
transformative work in Hall, et al.’s model of crime reporting.  That is, rather than translating 
official viewpoints into a public idiom, the media call on control authorities to enforce more 
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 stringent measures by taking the public voice.  In this way, they “provide a crucial mediating link 
between the apparatus of social control and the public” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 63).   
For instance, Kubo (2004) claims in the rightist monthly magazine Shokun: “[I]t has 
become ‘a common sense’ among Chinese criminals that they will get only deported if they 
insist on their right to silence” (p. 207).   In fact, they contemptuously call Japanese police 
officers “pediatricians” because they treat criminals so nicely.  In consequence, a large sum of 
the taxpayer’s hard-earned money (ketsuzei)45 is wasted to investigate them, to no avail (p. 208).  
To “put a stop to waste of money and time,” Kubo proposes four prescriptions one of which 
authorizes court judges to pronounce foreign suspects guilty based on circumstantial evidence 
alone (p. 211).  His reform proposals are far more radical than the current control measures 
stipulating that law enforcement agencies make every effort to protect the rights of foreign 
suspects (for example, see Keisatsuchō, 2002a, p. 80).   
In a dialogue with Sassa, House member Sasaki (2002) maintains that the punishment in 
Japan is too light to curb crimes by the Chinese.  To bolster her claim, she recounts her visit to 
Tokyo’s Fuchu prison with a Chinese judge.  Impressed by the quality of the prison, the Chinese 
judge allegedly told her: “If [a prison in China] were a good facility like this, everyone in our 
country would want to get in” (p. 273).  Sasaki also suggests that the money prisoners make in 
jail encourages the Chinese to commit crimes: “[Prisoners] receive about 4,000 yen [$36] per 
month for their labor.  If they serve three years in jail, their savings will add up to 150,000 yen 
[$1,360].  That is a lot of money in China because its average monthly salary is 10,000 yen 
[$90]” (p. 273).  Sassa (2002) concurs with Sasaki and adds: “This is tantamount to giving 
[Chinese] criminals a break in jail and asking them to leave with allowances” (pp. 273-274).  
                                                 
45 Ketsuzei literally means “blood tax” and is imbued with strong nationalistic sentiment. 
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 Then he argues that when 80% of the victims of foreign crimes are Japanese, we must prioritize 
the human rights of the Japanese over those of foreigners (p. 275).   
The popular media often deploy the metaphor “a paradise (or haven) for criminals” 
(hanzai tengoku) to emphasize that Japan is vulnerable to Chinese crimes.  For example, Lee 
(2004) claims to have overheard many Chinese in Kabukichō saying “Japan is a paradise for 
criminals,” “a thief’s job is half done when s/he enters Japan,” or “it is easier to deceive Japanese 
adults than Chinese babies” (p.121).  In a similar vein, Tomisaka (2001b) warns that Japan is “a 
haven for [Chinese] criminals” because punishments are less severe, prisons are comfortable to 
live in, and they get paid for their labor in jail (p. 88).  According to Tomisaka, Chinese ex-
inmates often tell their acquaintances back home that “Japanese prisons are like hotels” (p. 90).  
He is concerned that such remarks perpetuate the vicious circle of crimes by “illegal” Chinese 
migrants (p. 90).   
Elsewhere during the entertainment-news show TV Tackle on TV Asahi (broadcast on 
March 10, 2003), Tomisaka (2003) was asked for comments as an expert on a Chinese crime 
wave.  What follows is his “expert opinion”:  
The Chinese could be sentenced to death for theft in their home country.  Punishment 
in Japan is light.  Thus it is better for them to earn money in Japan.  When you claim to 
have a toothache in jail, you can get it treated by tax in Japan.  It has spread by word of 
mouth that if thrown in jail, you’d better get dental treatment as well.46   
 
Along a similar line, Kubo (2004) asserts that compared with jails in their home country, 
Japanese prisons are like “oases” for Chinese criminals because they guarantee three meals and 
nap time every day (p. 207).  In another article, Kubo (2003) talks to a senior investigation 
official who states that “they [Chinese suspects] are making light of the Japanese police because 
they know that the police, unlike Chinese authorities, will not treat them harshly” (p. 213).  
                                                 
46  The transcribed text of the program is available at http://www.geocities.co.jp/Bookend-Ryunosuke/6112/ 
TVtackle030310.html.   
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 Similarly, the Weekly Shinchō of February 3, 2005 furiously reacted to China’s demand for 
providing short-term visa exemptions for its nationals during the 2005 World Expo in Aichi 
Prefecture.  Most indicative is the article’s title “‘Visa Exemptions for the Chinese’ during the 
Expo Will Turn Japan into ‘a Paradise for Criminals’” (p. 153).  Lee’s piece in the November 26, 
2003 issue of SAPIO is even more sensational.  He argues that jails in Japan have become 
“hotbeds of crimes” inasmuch as they provide Chinese criminals with perfect opportunities to 
seek advice on future crimes (p. 91). 
 These demonizing portrayals of Chinese “illegals” serve to fuel the public anxiety that 
Japan is defenseless against their crimes.  Orikawa (2003), for example, holds that the police 
have been outwitted by Chinese criminals as they are fundamentally different from their 
Japanese counterparts (p. 42).  Similarly, Kubo (2003) argues that Japan’s law enforcement 
agencies are only prepared for the traditional crimes by the Japanese, but not for crimes by the 
Chinese (p. 218).  Since “illegal” Chinese migrants are seen as posing an unprecedented threat to 
Japan’s law and order, any attempt to criticize skewed crime data and overblown media reports 
may well be taken as an unpatriotic act to impair Japan’s public safety.  Tomisaka (2001b), for 
instance, writes that the Japanese have “very odd minds” in the eyes of Chinese criminals 
because they willingly jeopardize the national interests by being “nice” to foreigners (p. 229).   
 
4.6.7 Everyone is at risk from Chinese criminal groups  
 
 
White Paper on Police maintains that foreign visitors are committing crimes all over the country; 
it also documents increasing cases of break-in robberies that could do harm to ordinary people.  
The popular media goes further to suggest that everyone is at risk of being assaulted by “illegal” 
Chinese.  Kubo (2003), for example, urges the reader to be cautious against Chinese criminals 
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 because “they do not live quietly in an isolated hideout, but live in your neighborhood as if they 
were ordinary citizens” (p. 213).  A young man doing dishes in an off-street Chinese restaurant, 
he continues, might be a theft gang member (p. 213).  In a similar vein, Orikawa (2003) argues 
that “[o]nce the profiles [of rich people] were leaked, they would be targeted by bloodless and 
tearless Chinese” (p. 39).  Likewise, Yan (2003) alarms the reader to the growing threats of 
criminal groups from Fujian: “Their crime network has been taking deep root in underground 
society and keeping a vigilant eye on us every day so that they could readily attack us whenever 
we were caught off guard” (p. 266-267).  Tamura (2004) ends the book with an even more 
ominous remark by a Chinese Mafia member: “The Japanese families possess a lot of money.  
We are targeting every and each of the 47.08 million households in Japan.  [Household larceny] 
is easier than shop or bank robbery” (p. 301).  
This type of foreign crime reporting runs rampant in broadcast media as well.  For 
instance, Daitokai Keisatsu Gekiroku 24 Ji (Filming the Metropolitan Police at Midnight), a 
180-minute feature program on TV Asahi (aired on December 28, 2004), devoted over 45 
minutes of the airtime to covering a foreign crime wave.  It was narrated that we were now living 
in the constant fear of being attacked by foreigners at any time.  
 
 
4.7 A CASE STUDY: THE NEWS COVERAGE OF THE MATSUMOTO FAMILY 
MURDER INCIDENT 
 
This is a truly terrible crime.  I feel so sad for the little children, but why are the 
newspapers and TV just concentrating on the nationality of the killers?  Japanese 
people have committed crimes like this in the past.  Chinese people are just as shocked 
by what happened, but the media [seem] to be blaming us for it. 
            (a Chinese student cited in Curtin, 2004, n.p.)  
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 This section provides a case study to demonstrate that the sensational portrayals of crimes by 
“illegal” Chinese migrants can be observed in most media outlets regardless of their political 
leanings, reporting styles, and readership/viewership.  While I don’t mean to fudge the 
distinction between highbrow and lowbrow media, they all use remarkably similar interpretative 
frameworks, information sources, public idioms, and lines of argument in reporting a Chinese 
crime wave.  For example, the Sunday edition of Tōkyō Shimbun47 (2001, September 16) carries 
a special report on foreign crime.  The reference list indicates that the special report heavily 
relies on the NPA and the Immigration Bureau as well as Satoshi Tomisaka’s Sneaking-In.  
Atsushi Mizoguchi also contributes a column to the report.  Also worthy of mention are the 
images of foreign-looking criminals disguised with sunglasses and knit caps (see Figure 4.4).  
Notice that the guy in front is armed with knives, whereas the other is trying to open a door with 
a lock-picking device. 
 
 
Source: Tōkyō Shimbun, 2001, September 16, p. 1.  Reprinted with permission of Tōkyō Shimbun Sha 
Figure 4.4: Dēta De Miru Gaikokujin Hanzai (Data-based Look at Foreigners’ Crimes) 
                                                 
47 Tōkyō Shimbun is a daily newspaper pubslihed by the Tokyo branch office of Nagya-based Chūnichi Shimbun.  
Althoguh Tōkyō Shimbun is not among the five national newspapers, it still has a circlation of about one million.   
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 Specifically, this section analyzes the news coverage of the killing of a Japanese family 
by three former Chinese students in June 2003.  On June 19, 2003, the three Chinese in Fukuoka 
City killed Shinjiro Matsumoto, his wife Chika, and their two children aged 11 and 8.  They 
reportedly broke into the Matsumoto residence and killed all of them for 37,000 yen ($330) in 
cash (Curtin, 2004, n.p.).  The bodies were dumped in the nearby Hakata bay after being 
handcuffed and weighted down with dumbbells so that they would not float.  Shinichiro 
Matsumoto allegedly engaged in “underground business” and got into trouble with several 
Yakuza gangsters (Yūkan Fuji, 2003, August 2, p. 3).  In August, Chinese authorities arrested two 
former students who fled to China; the Japanese police apprehended the other one.  The 
Intermediate People’s Court in Liaoyang Province sentenced one suspect to death and the other 
to life imprisonment on January 24, 2005 (JT, 2005, January 25, n.p.).  The Fukuoka District 
Court handed down the death sentence to their accomplice in the May 19 ruling (JT, 2005, June 
2, n.p.).  The gruesome murder by the three former Chinese students “shook the entire nation” 
(Shūkan Shinchō, 2005, February 3, p. 153); it also took serious tolls on Chinese residents in 
Japan.  According to Curtin (2004), “[a]s a result of the killings in June 2003, the number of 
Chinese students allowed into Japan has been drastically restricted.  Many in the Chinese 
community feel that the press is stereotyping them as criminal, fueling a rising tide of anti-
Chinese sentiment” (n.p.).       
This so-called “Fukuoka family murder incident” (fukuoka ikka satsugai jiken) spawned a 
spate of media stories partly because the incident was deemed to be one of the successive murder 
cases perpetrated by Chinese students-turned-criminals, following the Yamagata incident in 
April 2000 and the Ōita incident in January 2002.  Put differently, the media understood the 
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 murder as symptomatic of the growing tide of organized and vicious crimes by Chinese 
“illegals.”       
Overall, the news coverage of the Fukuoka family murder incident conformed to the 
general patterns of foreign crime reporting described in the earlier sections.  To begin with, the 
media stressed that the crime was committed in a group and perpetrated in a heavy-handed 
manner.  Drawing on the 2004 Police White Paper, Nihon Keizai Shimbun editorialized on 
October 1:  
A characteristic feature of crimes by foreigners is that they tend to commit crimes in 
groups and in a heavy-handed manner.  This is typified by the murder of the family of 
four in Fukuoka City.  The Fukuoka Prefectural Police and China’s Security Authority 
are currently interrogating three Chinese college and pre-college students under 
custody, but what figures prominently is the flagrant method they used to kill the 
family, including the children, and to sink their bodies in the sea.  (p.2)  
 
Besides, the three former Chinese students were initially suspected of being allied with 
underground crime syndicates.  This suspected link, however, turned out to be false, and the 
students were found to have followed nobody’s order.  Yet the media spuriously pointed to 
connections between the Chinese suspects and underground crime rings.  The Japan Times of 
September 21, 2003, for example, mentioned the possibility that “underworld figures” hired the 
students to kill the Matsumoto family:  
The police believe that an individual, or a group, bore a grudge against the Matsumotos 
and hired the three Chinese as there are no links between the suspects and the family.  
Earlier this month, police said a former Chinese manager of an Internet cafe in 
Fukuoka, who allegedly has links to underworld figures, was in frequent contact with 
the suspects immediately before and after the killings.  They have already questioned 
several local gang members with records of involvement in illegal smuggling of 
Chinese nationals into Japan to determine whether they have any information about the 
case.  (n.p.) 
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 It is clear from these two quotes that even such reputable newspapers as Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
and the Japan Times tend to carry crime stories within the interpretive framework of the primary 
definers. 
In a similar vein, the Weekly Asahi of August 29 insinuated that the Chinese Mafia and 
Yakuza gangs got involved in the murder case:  
A lot of sex-related shops are concentrated in Nakasu, or Kyushu’s largest 
entertainment area.  Many groups such as Bōryokudan and the Chinese Mafia are said 
to be active behind the scenes.  We wonder if the former students had contact with the 
underground society linked to the incident here.  (p. 149)   
 
Likewise, AERA (2003, September 1) reported that the police were going after an “underground 
figure” who masterminded the killing (p. 26).  To mention another example, the weekly pictorial 
Friday (2003, October 10) printed a so-called “murder chart” (satsujin chāto), or an internal 
police document tracing the relationship among those who were suspectedly involved in the 
incident, including Yakuza gangs (p. 94).  Reportage writer Kazumitsu Ono who penned the 
article quoted an investigator as saying: “Since none of the suspects knew well the Kurume city 
where they abandoned [Matsumoto’s] car, a Japanese must have been involved [in this incident]” 
(pp. 94-95).  Ono then ended the article by suggesting: “Investigative authorities have already 
specified ‘masterminds.’  The time is drawing near that they will be taken into custody” (p. 97).  
Alluding to the same murder chart, the October 2, 2003 issue of Weekly Bunshun (Shūkan 
Bunshun) asserted: “The investigation headquarters is believed to have set its mind on issuing a 
warrant for senior Bōryokudan members as soon as their relationship with the Chinese group is 
confirmed” (p. 42).  Soon after the two articles got printed, Matsumoto’s brother filed libel suits 
against the publishers of both magazines for listing the initials of his name in the chart and 
spuriously linking him to the murder incident.  On July 27, 2005, the Tokyo District Court 
sentenced the publisher of Friday to pay some 8.8 million yen ($80,000) in restitution to the 
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 plaintiff.  The presiding judge stated that the article was neither thoroughly researched nor well 
supported (NS, 2005, July 28, p. 17). 
 Moreover, many newspaper and magazine articles played up the cruel nature of the 
Chinese suspects.  For example, the murder of the Matsumoto family was depicted as “an 
unusually atrocious murder in the history of crime” (Shūkan Shinchō, 2003, September 18, p. 
145) or “an unprecedentedly heinous crime” (Yūkan Fuji, 2003, August 15, p. 2).  Similarly, the 
evening daily Yūkan Fuji portrayed the Chinese suspects as “professional murders” (2003, 
August 15, p. 1) and “Chinese hit men” (2003, August 2, p. 3).  To illustrate the brutality of the 
incident, the media frequently supplied gory details of the students’ modus operandi.  Manichi 
Shimbun’s article on August 6 is a good illustration of this point: 
 They choked Matsumoto and his wife until they were unconscious and strangled their 
children aged 11 and 8.  The assailants used handcuffs to attach weights to the 
victims and dumped them into the water off a deserted area of the Hokozaki dock in 
Hakata Port. The Matsumoto couple drowned there. (cited in MDN, 2003, August 6,  
n.p.) 
 
Many articles also printed pictures of the weapons—handcuffs, dumbbells, and weights—
allegedly used by the suspects (for example, see Nishi Nihon Shimbun’s website at 
http://www.nishinippon.co.jp/news/2003/jiken/higashiku/syasin.html).  The October 2 issue of 
Weekly Bunshun even supplied the exact name, size, and weight of the dumbbells: “The weights 
are called ‘strut’ and used for plumbing.  They are 15 centimeters in height, 32 centimeters in 
length, and 15 centimeters in width.  They weigh about 30 kilograms each, and [the suspects] 
were carrying the weights without covering them” (p. 40).  Meticulous attention to the weapons 
plausibly reflected and reinforced the prevailing view that Chinese criminal groups were getting 
more violent and armed.  
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 Also notable is the media’s heavy reliance on the bunkobon and mook authors.  For 
example, the Kyushu edition of Yomiuri Shimbun  (2003, September 17) solicited opinion from  
Mizoguchi in a special report on the Fukuoka family murder incident.  As usual, he underscored 
the danger of a Chinese crime wave by suggesting that “[the Chinese] could resort to murder in 
pure pursuit of money” (n.p.).  Another Yomiuri Shimbun report dated December 8 stressed the 
unprecedentedly violent nature of crimes by the Chinese, stating that even investigators’ 30-year 
experiences with murder and robbery were of no use in combating foreign crime (n.p.).  
The vicious nature and criminal propensity of “illegal” Chinese migrants were emphasized 
in TV news as well.  Soon after the Chinese students were arrested, free-lance journalist 
Shuntaro Trigoe commented on Super Morning, a daily morning show on TV Asahi (a la NBC’s 
Today Show): “From the beginning, I suspected that this incident was executed by foreigners.  
The method of the crime was out of Japanese national character.”  Another female commentator 
registered her concern that a substantial portion of Chinese students might have entered Japan 
with the intention of committing crimes in the first place.  On September 19, Super TV, an 
evening news program on TV Asahi, aired a feature segment on the Fukuoka family murder 
incident.  Interviews with several Chinese students indicated that the suspects murdered the 
Matsumoto family to show loyalty to their “big brother” (aniki-bun) who lured them into the 
underground society.  The involvement of Yakuza gangsters was also insinuated.  Near the end of 
the segment, Tomisaka appeared to comment on the murder case as an expert on Chinese crime: 
“It seems that [the Chinese group] sought to achieve their goal in the simplest manner possible 
and did not let their feelings get in the way.  Killing and sinking the two children are hardly 
conceivable.”  Takashi Kutsuwada, a commentator of the program, wrapped up the segment by 
stating to the effect: The Japanese police are not capable of coping with flagrant crimes 
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 committed by cold-blooded Chinese youths.  Unless strict law enforcement measures are taken to 
grapple with this problem, I am afraid that the Japanese society might turn into a dark, crime-
ridden society.  
 
4.8 GROWING ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT  
 
The general public is increasingly hostile to undocumented migrants due to the prolonged 
recession and the perceived foreign crime spree.  Importantly, the media frenzy over foreign 
crime is also to blame for this anti-immigrant public sentiment. Among others, Chinese migrants 
suffer most from the negative images widely circulated in the media.  As Takano (2004) 
deplores, many Chinese migrants have difficulties finding apartments or part-time jobs due to the 
negative images attached to them (p. 60).  Although it is impossible to measure the effects of the 
sensational media coverage, the results of opinion polls regarding public order and “illegal” 
foreign workers may well be useful indicators.  I mainly cite opinion surveys conducted by the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) (renamed the Cabinet Office since 2001) because they are 
considered most rigorous and reliable.  Plus, as the PMO has conducted opinion surveys on the 
issue of foreign workers four times in the last 15 years, the results of the polls allow for an 
analysis of changing public attitudes toward “illegal” foreign workers in comparable ways.   
The PMO’s 2000 survey found that 49.6% of the respondents upheld the immediate 
deportation of “illegal” foreign workers, up 16% from the 1990 survey.  The percentage rose to 
61.8% in the Cabinet Office’s opinion survey released in September 2004 (see Table 4.9 on the 
next page).  
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Table 4.9: Public Opinions Regarding Measures against the Existing Foreign Simple Laborers 
 
Year All simple laborers should 
be deported  
They should be cracked  
down only in serious cases 
They should be allowed to 
work in sectors suffering a 
labor shortage 
Others Don’t know 
 
1988 37.0% 40.7% 7.3% n/a 15.0% 
1990 33.6% 40.6% 11.4% 1.2% 13.2% 
2000 49.6% 
 
35.0% 5.7% 1.0% 8.7% 
2004 61.8% 28.0% 2.4% 0.8% 7.0% 
Source: Naikakufu (Cabinet Office), 2004a, p. 44 
 
 
The Cabinet Office’s 2004 survey also found that 25.9% of the respondents opposed the 
admission of “simple laborers,” up from 14.1% and 21.2% in the PMO’s 1990 and 2000 opinion 
polls, respectively (Naikakufu, 2004a, pp. 14-15).  Of those who were against the employment of 
foreign simple laborers 74.1% cited a threat to public order and morals (p. 38; see also Table 
4.10). 
 
 
Table 4.10: Top Three Reasons for Opposing the Employment of Foreign Simple Laborers 
(multiple answers permitted) 
 
Year They would threaten public 
order and morals 
Boost the unemployment rates for Japanese workers 
in a time of economic recession 
Increase troubles with local residents 
1990 54.0% 52.7% 38.7% 
2000 62.9% 59.0% 45.1% 
2004 74.1% 40.8% 49.3% 
 
Source: Naikakufu (Cabinet Office), 2004a, pp. 16-17 
 
In addition to the surveys on foreign workers, the Cabinet Office also released the results 
of an opinion poll concerning public order in December 2004.  The poll revealed that nearly 90% 
of the respondents felt that Japanese society was less safe than it was 10 years ago (Naikakufu, 
2004b, p. 10).  Of the perceived causes of deteriorating public order, “a surge in the number of 
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 illegal aliens” ranked the highest with 54.4% (Naikakufu, 2004b, p. 12).  Yomiuri Shimbun’s 
opinion poll conducted in March 2004 yielded a similar result.  It found that 94% of those 
surveyed felt that public safety had worsened in the past few years (YS, 2004, April 8, p. 1).  Out 
of them, 54% attributed deteriorating public safety to an increase in the number of illegal aliens, 
which ranked second only next to a decline in social morals (62%) (YS, 2004, April 8, p. 15).  If 
one compares the Cabinet Office’s 2004 opinion surveys with the Justice Ministry’s similar poll 
in November 1987, the rising public animosity towards unauthorized migrants is evident.  For 
49.5% of the respondents (N=741) in the Justice Ministry’s survey answered that the acceptance 
of foreign workers would not exacerbate public safety in Japan (cited in Tōkyō-to Kikaku Shingi 
Shitsu, 1988, p. 176).   
The results of the PMO’s opinion polls also indicate that the human rights of foreigners 
are at stake.  According to its 1988 opinion survey on the protection of human rights, 61.8% of 
the respondents (N=2,320) answered that the rights of the Japanese and foreigners should be 
equally protected, while 16.7% opposed the protection of equal rights regardless of nationality 
(n.p.).  In the Cabinet Office’s 2002 survey (N=2,059), the percentage of the former dropped to 
54%, down 11.5% from the last survey in 1997; that of the latter rose from 18.5% to 21.8% 
(Naikakufu, 2003, n.p.; see also Matsubara, 2004, March 3).   
 
 
4.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 Is there more to the Chinese crime phenomenon than greed and other personal factors?  
                   (Zha, 2002, p. 129) 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that undocumented migrants are too often represented as potential 
criminals in official documents and the media.  In particular, the popular media, through a 
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 barrage of alarming crime reports interspersed with frightening visual graphics, play a critical 
role in constructing the public knowledge that “illegal aliens” are posing a unprecedented threat 
to Japan which was once hailed as the world’s safest country.   
 To recapitulate the main points, only 0.4% of the crimes in Japan involved “illegal 
aliens” in 2002, and the vast majority of their offenses were larcenies, thefts, and shoplifting.  
Far too frequently, however, “illegal aliens,” especially Chinese “illegals,” are portrayed as 
brutal and ruthless criminals who don’t hesitate to kill anyone for easy and quick money.  Also, 
they tend to be spuriously linked with transnational criminal organizations.  The use of the 
ambiguous term “transnational criminal organization” in official reports is pernicious enough.  
By invoking the image of “mafia,” the popular media fuels, rather than quells, the public anxiety 
over a foreign crime wave.  Unfortunately, such sensational crime reports are not limited to 
general-interest magazines, bunkobon, and mook, but they also abound in national newspapers 
and on primetime TV news. 
 Overall, the findings in this chapter confirm Hall, et al.’s model of crime reporting.  The 
Japanese media by and large act to frame crime stories in line with the interpretation of the 
primary definers.  True, the bunkobon and mook authors add new insights to official crime 
reports by citing various other—mostly anonymous—sources.  But they rarely transgress the 
interpretive framework of the powerful because they need to quote official documents, police 
authorities, and criminal investigators for appearing impartial and credible.  Especially when the 
bunkobon and mook authors rely heavily on such dubious sources as Yakuza gangs and foreign 
criminals, the credibility of their crime stories rests largely on the legitimacy imparted on law 
enforcement agencies.   
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  The Japanese media also actively transform official crime reports in ways that 
“reproduce the definitions of the powerful” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 57).  Their transformative work 
includes the use of such public idioms as “mafia,” “要銭不要命,” and “paradise for criminals.”  
Contrary to Hall, et al.’s thesis, however, the Japanese media use remarkably similar public 
idioms in covering a Chinese crime wave.  While this homogenization of popular idioms across 
the media can be explained in a number of ways, two factors seem to be particularly responsible.  
First, a heavy reliance on official sources, coupled with the system of exclusive press clubs, 
fosters “bureaucratized pack journalism,” which in turn makes reporters oblivious to the fact that 
official reports provide an incomplete and misleading portrait of the crime situation in Japan.  Of 
more importance, the non-stop news cycles and the economic structures of news organizations 
inhibit reporters and editors from doing a real investigative report on Chinese criminal groups 
because it is too arduous, cumbersome, and dangerous.  Plus, the reality of Chinese criminal 
groups may not be so frightening as to appeal to their readers.  In view of this, most reporters 
find it tempting to quote self-proclaimed Chinese experts, invoke popular idioms, and dub well-
known narratives in crime reporting.  This is particularly true of those who are intent on telling 
frightening stories of an alleged Chinese crime spree.   
 In recent years, an increasing number of conservative politicians have tapped into the 
rising xenophobic tide for political gain.  In October 1998, the Human Rights Committee of the 
United Nations (1998/1999) expressed concern that the violations of minorities’ human rights in 
Japan are justified a) by the repeated used of popularity polls and b) on the grounds of “public 
welfare” (p. 316).  Friman (2004) also argues that foreign crime “works as an electoral/power 
base issue” for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (n.p.).  Such politicization of the foreign 
crime issue would be more difficult if the media more critically scrutinized official accounts.  
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 Although there is nothing wrong with tightening border controls to bar foreign criminals from 
entering Japan, they are too often packaged with measures to apprehend undocumented migrants 
many of whom have already established their living bases in Japan.  Such policy packages draw 
little criticism partly because the distinction between foreign criminals and undocumented 
migrants has been blurred in the media under the label of “illegal aliens” or “bad foreigners.”  
In fairness to journalists, the clandestine nature of undocumented migrants hinders 
critical investigative reporting on foreign crime.  Lacking alternative sources of information, 
journalists have little recourse but to rely on official documents and hearsay.  Nevertheless, they 
must recognize that when the overwhelming majority of Japanese people don’t have direct 
contact with unauthorized migrants, their negative images circulated in the media shape public 
perceptions of irregular foreigners.48  As Ippei Torii, secretary general of the Japan Federation 
Workers’ Union, argues in response to Governor Ishihara’s anti-immigrant address in April 
2000, “[t]he governor can lead people into believing that foreigners are committing more crimes 
because people do not know the true situation of overstayers and illegal entrants in Japan” (JT, 
2000, May 1, p. 2).     
 Again, I don’t mean to dispute the fact that crimes by “illegal” Chinese migrants are on 
the increase.  Crimes, exploitation, and human right infringements are all real problems.  My 
point is that undue emphasis on crimes by Chinese “illegals” brings only the first problem to the 
fore, while displacing the others.  In particular, excessive focus on the criminal propensity of 
“illegal” Chinese newcomers serves to divert public attention from the government’s failed 
economic measures and flawed immigration policies that contribute to a foreign crime wave.  
While the popular media occasionally portray undocumented migrants in a positive light, 
                                                 
48 Komai (1999/2001), for instance, observes that those who favor crackdowns on “illegal” foreigners are much 
lower among those who have contact with foreign workers in the workplace (p. 48).  Conversely, “the lack of actual 
contact can lead to increased anxiety among them [Japanese]” (Komai, 1999/2001, p. 133).  
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 ubiquitous crime stories on “illegal aliens” far overshadow such sporadic positive depictions of 
undocumented migrants.  The end result is that “while ‘months of concerted action’ are regularly 
staged to expose ‘illegals’, no similar steps are taken to expose violations of labour regulations or 
to investigate the victimization of ‘illegals’” (Herbert, 1996, p. 101).   
Some people attribute an increase in foreigners’ crimes to the government’s inappropriate 
measures to protect their rights and benefits.  From this vantage point, it is neither effective nor 
responsible for the government to enforce stern crack-down measures against undocumented 
migrants.  On the contrary, “[t]he only solution to foreign crime . . . is to extend visas so they can 
work” (Yoshinari, cited in Kakuchi, 2003, n.p.).  Yet the extension of rights and social services 
to undocumented migrants are unlikely as long as the rhetoric to criminalize visa overstayers 
prevails.  For it is out of the question to endow these “potential criminals” with health insurance, 
paid holidays, injury compensation, and other benefits.  In fact, attorney Genichi Yamaguchi and 
Professor Hiroshi Komai charge that the media hype of foreign crime is a great hindrance to 
normalizing the status of overstayers (participant observation of a symposium on special 
residence permission, October 3, 2004).   
Seen in this light, it is imperative to challenge the prevailing rhetoric that criminalizes 
undocumented migrants and to present a more favorable image of them.  This is obviously a 
daunting task given that citizens’ groups and overstayers have had little say in altering Japan’s 
restrictive immigration policies.  The next chapter takes up a rare case where citizens and 
overstayers united to force immigration authorities to respond to their demands.  While they did 
not succeed in subverting the dominant discourse, they managed to get their voices heard in 
public in the face of the rising anti-immigrant public sentiment.   
 
 197
  
 
 
 
5.0  SOCIAL ACTIVISM ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: A CASE OF THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR SPECIAL RESIDENCE PERMISSION FROM SEPTEMBER 1999 
THROUGH FEBRUARY 2000 
 
There is a need to invent new forms of communication between researchers and activists.      
                                                                     (Pierre Bourdieu, 1998, p. 57) 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As early as July 1988, the Study Group on the Issue of Internationalization proposed: “Whether 
the influx of simple laborers is to be accepted or not, appropriate measures must be taken to 
redress the inhumane treatments often inflicted on the simple laborers who have already flown 
in” (Tōkyō-to Kikaku Shingi Shitsu, 1988, p. 59).  Unfortunately, 15 years after this proposal, 
policymakers, businesses, and the mainstream media remain largely indifferent to the living and 
working conditions of unauthorized migrants, while tirelessly debating whether, when, and under 
what conditions unskilled or semi-skilled foreign workers should be introduced into the domestic 
labor market.     
However, a more pressing issue is, or at least should be, what to do with the existing 
unauthorized foreign workers and their families.  The government’s exclusionary immigration 
policies notwithstanding, so-called “simple laborers” have long undertaken labor-intensive work 
to sustain Japan’s critical economic sectors.  Contrary to popular beliefs, many “illegal” foreign 
workers are no longer temporary sojourners but long-term residents who have established their 
living bases in Japan.  A sizable number of them have brought in their families and virtually 
settled in Japan; some of their children were even born in Japan.  Yet their basic rights continue 
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 to be denied due to their illegal status.  Thousands of undocumented school-age children, for 
example, don’t go to school primarily because their parents hesitate to register at local municipal 
offices for fear of detention and deportation (Takahashi, 2004, p. 47).49  Many others have severe 
difficulties keeping up with their classmates (Villalba, 2000, n.p.).50  
Although there exists a growing gap between the official immigration policies and the 
everyday experiences of undocumented migrants, the state remains adamantly reluctant to bridge 
it.  As Komai (1999/2001) succinctly puts it, “[i]n spite of the increasing trend toward settlement 
among irregular foreigners in Japan, the policy stance taken toward them has been one of 
complete exclusion” (p. 110).  Hirano, Castles, and Brownlee (2000) concur: “The Japanese 
government does not expect or want settlement to occur, and therefore tends to ignore the 
phenomenon” (p. 249).  Besides, the general public rarely views visa overstayers as deserving 
residents.  Rather, as Chapter 4 has shown, they have been increasingly seen as potential 
criminals posing a serious threat to Japanese society.   
Against this backdrop, a special residence permission campaign launched by 21 
aggrieved visa overstayers and their supporters in 1999 can be understood as a challenge to the 
state’s negligence as well as lack of public interest in the plight of undocumented migrants.  
While organizing efforts by and for undocumented migrants have been made since the late 
1980s, the special residence permission campaign was unprecedented social activism in terms of 
its vocality and visibility.  It was also among the few social movements ever in Japan that 
successfully mobilized a wide range of social actors including religious groups, civil rights 
activists, union members, and academics.  While these diverse actors had built a collaborative 
                                                 
49 All children must register with authorities to attend public schools. 
50 According to Yamanaka (2003), a substantial proportion of children of Nikkeijin workers don’t go to school 
despite the fact that they are eligible, though not obligated, to receive public education (p. 178).  It can be surmised 
from this data that the percentage of unschooled children of undocumented foreign workers is even higher. 
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 relationship at various levels over the years, they had never joined forces for a common and 
concrete political cause prior to the campaign. 
The principal aims in this chapter are three-fold.  First of all, the chapter explores the 
roles the 21 overstaying foreigners played in the special residence permission campaign.  
Throughout the campaign they took to the street, staged rallies, and appeared on the media to 
demand special residency; their support groups also pictured them as courageous people who 
were determined to fight for the rights of all troubled overstaying foreigners in Japan.  Since a 
line between acting as social agents and being represented as such was often murky in the 
campaign, it is intriguing to probe what the overstayers actually did and how they were 
represented to bring the campaign to success.  Secondly, the chapter delves into the symbolic 
battles the overstayers and their supporters waged in the campaign.  More specifically, it first 
looks into their rhetorical strategies for projecting an alternative image of undocumented 
migrants so that the media and the public would see them as deserving residents.  The chapter 
then scrutinizes the media strategies they adopted to gain and sustain favorable media attention 
over the course of the campaign.  Lastly, the chapter reviews the academic group’s activities in 
support of the special residence permission campaign.  As briefly noted in Chapter 1, this 
campaign was arguably the first social movement in which immigration researchers in Japan got 
collectively involved.  My particular interest lies in assessing the academic group’s engagement 
in light of Bourdieu’s views of intellectuals.  Bourdieu offers particularly useful insights in 
considering the roles the academic group played in the campaign.  For unlike Said (1996) who 
stresses the autonomy, individuality, and amateurism of intellectuals, Bourdieu envisions them as 
collective agents who venture to work in close liaison with grassroots activists, especially labor 
unions, against the forces of oppression and domination.  
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 For a data collection and analysis, I perused the support groups’ newsletters, websites, 
and books as well as national newspaper and magazine articles reporting the campaign.  I believe 
that I was able to retrieve most relevant written texts as APFS kindly gave me access to its 
collection of newspaper clippings concerning the special residence permission campaign.  I also 
made every effort to collect articles not included in APFS’s newspaper clippings by using the on-
line database services for Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, and Sankei Shimbun.  I searched related magazine articles through Nichigai: Magazine 
Plus and Web Ōya-bunko.  It was fairly easy to obtain books on the special residence permission 
campaign as only two titles have been published as of February 2005.  To supplement the 
archival research, I also interviewed several activists and researchers who played key roles in the 
campaign.51  The interviews were conducted in order to gain insights into the struggles and 
dilemmas members of the support groups faced over the course of the campaign. 
  
 
5.2 THE FOREIGN WORKER PROBLEM SINCE THE 1990s 
 
The media’s preoccupation with the foreign worker problem peaked around the 1988-1992 
period.  Since then, the issue of foreign workers has been a topic of on-again, off-again debate, 
though its scale and magnitude have not been as intense as in the late 1980s.  According to 
Mainichi Shimbun of February 21, 1995, the public’s interests in “the problems of illegal foreign 
workers” had been waning since the enforcement of the revised Immigration Control Act in 1990 
(p. 15).  A table-of-content search of the back issues of Nihon No Ronten (Issues for Japan) 
                                                 
51 I conducted extensive, semi-structured interviews with the following persons from October 2003 to August 2004: 
Katsuo Yoshinari of APFS (October 27, 2003), Kimie Tsukuba of APFS (May 19, 2004), Ichirō Watado of Meisei 
University (May 19, 2004), Nanako Inaba of Ibaraki University (August 17, 2004), and Hiroshi Komai of Chukyo 
Women’s University (August 26, 2004).  The length of interviewing ranged from 40 minutes to 90 minutes.  No 
interviews were audio-taped and all the quotes in this chapter are based on the author’s notes.  
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 (1993-2005) yielded similar results.  Nihon No Ronten is published annually by Bungei Shunjū 
Sha and contains a collection of articles by prominent writers on controversial issues in Japan.  A 
search of its back issues, therefore, provides a window into major national issues during this 
period.  Table 5.1 indicates that the foreign worker problem attracted scant attention in the latter 
half of the 1990s.   
 
Table 5.1: Table-of-Content Search of Issues for Japan (1993-2005) 
 
93 94 Year 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 
Included? yes yes yes no no no no yes Yes yes no yes* no 
 
Note: * The topic of foreign workers is mentioned in passing and not fully addressed in an independent section. 
 
 
 
 It can also be inferred from Table 5.1 that the foreign worker problem re-emerged as a 
social issue around 1999.52  As the government was slated to set a new immigration policy in 
2000, several official bodies, civil organizations, and employers’ associations released their 
respective views on immigration reform.  These reports rekindled the media’s interest in the 
foreign worker problem.  Particularly influential was the Economic Council’s report in June 
1999.  This key advisory council to the prime minister proposed that the government “promote 
the acceptance of foreign workers in specialized and technical areas” and “give careful 
consideration to this issue [the acceptance of unskilled foreign workers and immigrants], starting 
with a consensus of Japanese citizens” (n.p.).  Following the Economic Council’s report, the 
Labor Ministry drew up a draft of the 9th Basic Plan on Employment Measures to be approved 
by the Cabinet on August 13, 1999.  With regards to the acceptance of foreign workers, the basic 
plan generally confirmed the Economic Council’s proposal.  Equally important was the second 
Basic Plan for Immigration Control the Justice Ministry unveiled in March 2000.  While 
                                                 
52 The 2000 edition of Issues for Japan was published in the fall of 1999. 
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 foreseeing an acute labor shortage due to the low birth rates, the basic plan remained cautious 
over the admission of unskilled foreign workers.  Yet another influential report was released in 
March 2000 by the Population Division of the United Nations.  The report Replacement 
Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Aging Population? suggested that Japan would need 
33.5 million immigrants from 1995 through 2050 to keep the size of the working-age population 
constant at the 1995 level (United Nations Population Division, 2000, p. 50).  These three 
reports, among others, stimulated many other policy recommendations from a variety of groups 
(for synopses of major policy recommendations, see the report submitted by the Ministry of 
Health, Labor, and Welfare’s Study Group on the Employment of Foreigners [Gaikokujin Koyō 
Mondai Kenkyūkai], 2002, n.p.).   
Since the Japanese government basically upheld the current immigration policies, a 
public debate became essentially a repeat of the one in the late 1980s.  Although a need for 
unskilled foreign labor force was now seen as a structural, rather than cyclical, one being caused 
by the shrinking working-age population, the focus of the debate was still over whether or not 
unskilled foreign workers should be introduced.  Many media pundits continued to invoke the 
metaphor of “open-door versus closed-door” as if foreign workers threatened “invading” Japan.  
Most illustrative in this regard is Nikkei Business’s special report “Pressed for Opening the 
Country [to Foreign Workers]” in November 2000.  Printed side by side on the opening pages 
are the pictures of Commodore Perry-led “black ships” and of “illegal aliens” lining up in front 
of the Immigration Bureau building (pp. 26-27).  Implicit in this analogy is that unskilled foreign 
workers are enormous external threats disrupting otherwise tranquil Japanese society.  
Unfortunately, this seemingly endless “open-door vs. closed-door” debate obscures more urgent 
problems facing the existing unskilled foreign workers and their families, including their 
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 wretched working conditions, gross human rights violations, and the outright denial of access to 
public services.   
The government’s official posture notwithstanding, a sizable proportion of irregular 
foreign workers have turned out to be long-time residents despite their illegal status.  The 
prolonged stay of unauthorized foreign workers is well documented in official apprehension 
statistics.  Table 5.2 shows that almost half of the apprehended foreigners in 1998 stayed in 
Japan for more than three years.  Likewise, Okuda and Tajima’s 1994 field research on 
“newcomer” Asian migrants in Tokyo’s Ikebukuro area found that 32.3% of those surveyed 
wished to stay in Japan as long as possible (cited in Tajima, 1998, p. 112).   
 
Table 5.2: Apprehended Foreigners by Length of Stay in Japan (1991-2003) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
6 months or  less  12,733 14,370 7,850 6,116 5,594 5,224 5,221 5,697   5,863 
1/2 – 1 year 10,495 22,171 11,133 6,820 5,388 5,471 4,568 4,510   6,209 
1-2 years 5,441 15,465 25.072 15,153 8,835 7,549 6,702 5,811   6,764 
2-3 years 2,531 5,949 12,298 17,537 10,259 7,589 5,945 5,244   5,503 
3-5 years 1,389 3,289 6,242 10,116 14,753 15,323 9,552 8,082   8,556 
over 5 years 257 584 1,411 3,172 3,890 6,430    9,548 10,428 12,490 
Unknown 62 333 335       438 715 199 68 763      873 
Total 32,908 62,161 64,341 59,352 49,434 47,785 41,604 40,535 46,258 
          
                                   2000 2001 2002 2003      
6 months or less  4,546 4,734 4,385 4,462      
1 year or less 4,828 3,839 4,300 3,676      
2 year or less 6,990 4,737 4,553    5,133      
3 year or less 5,614 4,241 3,540 3,759      
3-5 years 7,872 5,843 5,738 5,921      
over 5 years 13,672 9,622 9,028 10,498      
Unknown 688 492 820 876      
Total 44,190 33,508 32,364 34,325      
 
Sources: Hōmushō, 2000-2003, n.p.; Nyūkan Kyōkai, 2000, p. 58, 2004, p. 76; Sellek, 2001, p. 105 
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 Even though many undocumented migrants have established their living bases in Japan, 
the government insistently denies that Japan is a country of immigration (Watado, 2002a, p. 31).  
Kondō (2002) suggests that the government deliberately avoids using the terms “immigrants” 
and “immigration policy” (p. 417).  In lieu of an immigration policy, Japan has “entry and 
departure control measures (shutsu nyūkoku kanri seisaku).”53  As Weiner (2000) sums up, one 
of the basic tenets behind Japan’s “immigration policy” is that foreigners should be admitted 
only on a short-term basis “[t]o reduce potential social costs, including education for the children 
of migrant workers, and the emergence of ‘social’ problems associated with immigrant 
settlement” (p. 60).  Indochinese refugees and Nikkeijin may come closest to being called 
immigrants, but they are legally classified as “long-term residents.”  Plus, Nikkeijin tend to be 
depicted as “returning compatriots” in official reports.54  After all, as Pak (1998) puts it, “the 
entire process [of labor migration in Japan] is hidden behind the continued rhetorical 
commitment to preventing immigration” (p. 11).  As explained later in the chapter, foreign 
worker support groups such as APFS have worked hard to contest the rhetoric that masks the 
reality of Japan’s labor migration.  
  
 
5.3 APFS: ITS HISTORY, GOALS, AND ACTIVITITES  
 
According to Shipper (2001), few ethnic associations in Japan—which are comprised 
predominantly of old-comer residents—are willing to extend support to their illegal compatriots 
                                                 
53 “Shutsu nyūkoku kanri,” which is usually translated as “immigration control,” literally means “control of entry 
into and departure from the country.” 
54 It is indicative that a long-term resident visa is issued to Nikkeijin ostensibly for the purposes of “homecoming” 
(sato gaeri) and “visiting relatives” (shinzoku hōmon).  The actual migration pattern of Nikkeijin, however, belies 
these stated goals.  Drawing on a survey conducted by Hamamatsu City (where a large number of Nikkeijin reside 
and work in automobile factories or electronic appliance plants), Komai (1999/2001) argues that “in contrast to the 
strength of . . . ethnic networks, many Nikkeijin have only weak links with their Japanese relatives” (p. 85). 
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 (p. 434).  In the absence of formal support from government bodies and ethnic groups, 
unauthorized newcomer migrants usually turn to Japanese NGOs and other voluntary 
associations for help when a serious problem arises (Shipper, 2001, p. 434).  As an increasing 
number of undocumented migrant workers have come to Japan, numerous groups have been 
founded to support them at the grassroots level.  According to Ogasawara, et al. (2001), the 
number of support groups has skyrocketed from less than 10 in 1985 to over 200 in 2000 (pp. 
171-173). 
 The Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS) is among the oldest foreign worker 
support groups and originally grew out of personal friendship between Liakat Hossain, a 
Bangladeshi student of a Japanese language school, and Akira Kumagaya, a member of the 
citizen’s group Hiroba Itabashi (who was also a friend of Yoshinari) (APFS, 2002a; see also, AS, 
1987, December 20, p. 25).  Soon after they got acquainted at a local bathhouse, they began to 
frequent each other’s place.  Hossain would be advised on life in Japan, whereas Kumagaya, 
Yoshinari, and their friends would learn about the Bangladeshi culture and newcomer migrants’ 
living and working conditions (Morishita and Naitō, 2003, p. 3).  Their friendship, coupled with 
the tragic death of a Bangladeshi migrant by starvation in November 1987, prodded 20 
Bangladeshi and Japanese to found Bangladesh Japan People’s Society in December.  The group 
was renamed the Asian People’s Friendship Society in February 1987 as other Asian nationals 
came to ask for help (APFS, 2002b, p. 3).  
The membership of APFS expanded to more than 500 in the first four years; it now has 
over 2,700 registered members from more than 10 countries.  The members mostly comprise 
Bangladeshis, Burmese, and Filipinos (Yorimitsu, 2001, p. 22).  To my knowledge, some 
Pakistanis and Iranians have also joined APFS.  According to APFS’s pamphlet, the vast 
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 majority of the members are undocumented.  Half of them have already returned to their home 
countries, and about 150-200 members participate in events and meetings on a regular basis 
(Yoshinari, personal communication, October 27, 2003).  APFS is funded mainly through 
membership fees and private donations; municipal authorities occasionally provide funding for 
such events and activities as lecture series, survey research, and medical check-ups.  According 
to Yoshinari, APFS has recently downsized its operations, supposedly because of a drop in its 
membership and consultation cases (personal communication, October 27, 2003; see also 
Tsugawa, 2003, n.d.).  As a result, the staff has been cut down from 10 Japanese and 17 non-
Japanese staff members in the early 1990s to two staffers and five to six volunteers at the time of 
the interview (Yoshinari, 1993, p. 63; APFS, “APFS”, n.p.).   Yoshinari is currently the only paid 
staff member who works on a fixed annual salary of less than three million yen ($27,000) 
(Matsubara, 2000, February 21, p. 3).  Professor Ichiro Watado of Meisei University assumes an 
advisor role to APFS.  About 20 people serve on the steering committee, but not all of them are 
actively involved in APFS.    
APFS distinguishes itself from most other foreign worker support groups on several 
counts.  For one thing, the organization is a citizen’s group affiliated with neither labor unions 
nor Christian groups.  Accordingly, APFS holds a variety of non-labor-related events, including 
a one-day bus tour, a summer camp, and a spring flower viewing party (hanami).  For another, 
APFS purports to be more than a support group.  To use Yoshinari’s (1996) words, it operates on 
the assumption that newcomer migrants are “invaluable neighbors and residents” and “social 
actors” who are leading and changing Japanese society together with Japanese citizens (p. 281).  
The newsletter of the group is named This Land is –after Woody Guthrie’s “This Land is Your 
Land”; the title nicely captures the goal of APFS.  In fact, foreign members have taken active 
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 part in running the group from its inception.  For instance, it has been customary to choose a 
secretary general from non-Japanese members.  According to Yoshinari (1996), Bangladeshi 
members took a leading role in expanding the membership in the early days of APFS.  Some 
foreign staff members have been working for as many as 10 years, which is rarely the case with 
their Japanese counterparts (Yorimitsu, 2001, p. 22).  By engaging foreign members in the group, 
APFS seeks to dispel the stereotypical view that undocumented migrants are helpless foreigners 
dependent on Japanese activists.  Lastly, unlike many other support groups, APFS bills itself as a 
locally-based organization.  APFS’s office is located in Tokyo’s Itabashi Ward where a sizable 
number of unregistered foreigners live and work.  As Mizukami (1998) observes,  
The reasons for foreigners settling in this Ward include the existence of low-rent 
apartments and small business offices or factories which provide job opportunities for 
manual labourers.  According to some members of the Society, compared with other 
areas in Tokyo, the Ward has more housing available and is convenient because of its 
proximity to major stations. (p. 360) 
 
To forge close ties with the local community, APFS has participated in—even organized—a 
variety of local events, notably, the annual “Asia-You-Never-Knew! Fair.”  Happy House, an 
APFS-affiliated group, holds this ethnic festival every fall with the aid of a local shopping street 
promotion union.  Its primary goal is to introduce local residents and the public to the foods, 
cultural performances, costumes, and folk crafts of the members’ home countries.  The shopping 
street promotion union also requests APFS to open ethnic food shops for its annual local festival.  
Masami Sakurai of the union appreciates APFS’s cooperation, noting that the development of a 
network with diverse peoples is necessary to give a boost to the shopping street (APFS, 2002a). 
   In a published interview, Yoshinari isolates three turning points for the group: 1) the 
foundation of the group in 1987, 2) an increase in consultation cases concerning non-labor issues 
around 1992, and 3) the initiation of the special residence permission campaign in 1999 (APFS, 
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 2002b, p. 5).  The initial purpose of APFS was to promote mutual aid and interaction between 
foreign nationals and Japanese citizens (Mizukami, 1996, p. 360).  Accordingly, its activities 
were limited mostly to hosting various informal gatherings and consulting newcomer migrants 
on troubles in the workplace, in school, and in daily lives.   APFS began to take on more political 
edge in 1990 when the revision to the Immigration Control Act provided the impetus for 
undocumented foreigners to get actively involved in the group (Yoshinari, 1996, pp. 270-273).  
For example, foreign staff took initiative in staging a rally in April 1990 to protest the enactment 
of the new Immigration Control Act.  According to Yoshinari (1996), members from Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh worked hard to make flyers in their respective native languages and 
publicize the event to their friends and acquaintances (p. 272).  The rally was reportedly the first 
political gathering organized by and for migrant workers (YS, 1990, April 30, p. 26); it also 
marked the very first May Day Meeting for Migrants Workers.  Since then, APFS has held a 
May Day event every spring a few days before May 1st.55   
As a considerable proportion of “illegal” foreign workers got married or sent for their 
families in the early 1990s, APFS became confronted with a series of new problems.  Chief 
among them were international marriage, childbirth and child-rearing, divorce, and settlement.  
The number of consultation cases on marriage and special residence permission jumped up from 
46 cases in 1992 to almost 600 in 1993 (Yoshinari, 1996, p. 274).  Similar yet distinct problems 
cropped up around the mid-1990s as many children of undocumented migrant workers grew up 
to a school age.  Related to this, the problem of so-called “stateless children” arose during this 
period.  In the absence of governmental support, APFS and other support groups were forced to 
tackle these emerging problems on their own.   
                                                 
55 APFS did not hold a May Day meeting in 2004 for the first time in 14 years. 
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 While APFS is a local-based group, it has built a trusting relationship with many other 
support groups over time.  In principle, foreign worker support groups can be classified into 
several camps ranging from lawyers’ associations, community workers’ unions, and medical 
NGOs to civil rights organizations and women’s associations.  Lawyers’ associations typically 
provide legal consultation and settlement to visa overstayers and push for better treatments of 
foreign suspects in detention centers, prisons, and immigration offices (Shipper, 2002, p. 43).  
Community workers’ unions56 primarily handle cases of unpaid wages, unlawful dismissals, and 
workplace accidents involving unregistered migrant laborers.  Medical NGOs treat uninsured 
immigrants at an affordable rate.  Citizens’ groups operate at the most grassroots level and 
engage in a variety of activities, including individual case advocacy, governmental lobbying, 
social and cultural events, conferences on the issue of foreign workers, and publication of 
newsletters (Shin, 2001, pp. 270-271).  Women’s groups offer consultation services and 
temporary shelters for foreign women fleeing from their abusive husbands or exploitative 
brokers.   
Although these foreign worker support groups differ from each other in their goals and 
activities, they have developed a loosely coordinated network of mutual aid and information 
exchange to administer better services.  To be more precise, since most NGOs for foreign 
workers operate on a tight budget with a small staff (Pak, 1998, p. 202), they have no choice but 
to cross-network with each other to provide adequate information, referrals, and counseling 
services for unregistered migrants with diverse backgrounds and needs (for details on the 
networking, see Shipper, 2001).  
                                                 
56 So-called “enterprise unions” (i.e. one union per company) account for over 90% of all unions in Japan.  Whereas 
enterprise unions are intended for full-time employees (Japan Institute of Labor, 2002, pp. 47-49), community 
workers unions accept members on an individual basis irrespective of their occupation and employment status.  
Hence they are conducive to the needs of irregular foreign workers. 
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 Over time, APFS has collaborated with many other foreign worker support groups at 
various levels.  Although the group itself is not a trade union, Yoshinari had served as a leader of 
the Itabashi Workers Union before he assumed the current position.  His background has 
supposedly helped APFS to cooperate with labor unions and capitalize on their network when 
necessary.57  Besides, many lawyers have recognized and assisted APFS’ activities.  Notably, 
APFS received the Human Rights Award from the Tokyo Bar Association in January 1995 
(APFS, 2002a).  APFS has also cooperated with the SHARE, a medical NGO, to offer free 
medical check-ups to uninsured foreign nationals.  APFS is currently a member organization of 
the Solidarity Network with Migrants in Japan (SMJ), the umbrella organization of foreign 
worker support groups.  Although APFS didn’t join the SMJ at the time of the campaign, it 
nevertheless enlisted the help of the organization.   
Last but not least, APFS has established close connections with several prominent 
immigration researchers over the years.  The involvement of the academic group in the special 
residence permission campaign was partly a product of the decade-long reciprocal relationship 
between APFS and the researchers (Watado, 2000, p. 82).  Yoshinari (2002) values academic 
research inasmuch as it provides theoretical insights, historical perspectives, and empirical data 
useful for justifying, evaluating, and guiding APFS’s activities (p. 5).  This is not a common 
attitude among activists as they often discredit scholarly work as futile in addressing imminent 
(in their view, “real”) issues (Katagiri, 2005, p. 56).  For instance, Ken Suzuki of Kalakasan—
Migrant Women Empowerment Center did not hide his frustration about the selfish attitudes of 
many academics who contacted the group only for their research purposes (participant 
observation of the 10th National Forum for Philippines Study Groups, July 3, 2005).   
                                                 
57 One notable example is the co-foundation of the CALL Network by APFS and 7 other labor unions and civil 
organizations in February 1988 (for details of the CALL Network, see Suwa, 1989). 
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 Notably, APFS commissioned Professor Watado to conduct an interview survey on 
“newcomer” Asian migrants in Itabashi Ward from November 1992 through February 1993.  The 
group submitted the survey reports to the local municipal office as references for better 
administrative services for unregistered foreign residents (YS, 1993, May 13, p. 24).  Watado has 
also served as a keynote speaker, a conference coordinator, and a lecturer on several occasions at 
APFS’s request.  To mention one example, he coordinated the symposium “International Labor 
Migration and Japan in the 21st century” in conjunction with APFS’s 10th anniversary party.  
Hiroshi Komai, then professor of sociology at Tsukuba University, was invited as a keynote 
speaker.  Yoshinari (2003) remarked in retrospect that Komai’s and Watado’s talks on the 
normalization of irregular migrants in the symposium encouraged him to launch the special 
residence permission campaign in 1999 (p. 34).  Other than the symposium, APFS has regularly 
organized a lecture series and invited specialists from various fields.  The past lecturers include 
Junko Tajima of Shukutoku University, Mariko Hirose of Shōwa Women’s University, and 
Keizō Yamawaki of Meiji University.  Sometimes, Yoshinari himself gets invited to speak 
before immigration scholars.  For instance, the Foreign Labor Project Team of Hitotsubashi 
University had Yoshinari give a talk on generational conflict among newcomer migrants.  As 
elaborated in a later section, this networking with immigration scholars and other foreign worker 
support groups greatly helped APFS to fight through the special residence permission campaign.   
 
 
5.4 REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL RESIDENCE PERMISSION 
 
The Japanese government has never enacted an amnesty program for unregistered foreigners 
before; it also rules out the possibility of amnesty in the future on the grounds that the 
implementation of amnesty would fuel further illegal migration (for example, see the First 
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 Immigration Control Basic Plan cited in Ajiajin Rōdōsha Mondai Kondankai, 1993, p. 54).  The 
lack of amnesty sets Japan apart from most other industrialized countries where tougher 
immigration control measures are often packaged with the legalization of undocumented 
migrants who meet certain provisions.  The U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 
for instance, granted amnesty for about 3.1 million “illegal aliens” while enforcing employer 
sanctions.   
In the absence of general amnesty, application for special residence permission is 
currently the only recourse for unregistered foreigners to get their status legalized in Japan.  
Although a similar system exists in other countries, they usually adopt dual regularization 
programs, namely a combination of general amnesty and special residence permission.  Special 
residence permission differs from general amnesty in a couple of important respects.  First of all, 
permission for special residency is granted only in the last stage of deportation procedures.  In 
other words, irregular foreigners must first surrender to the Immigration Bureau before filing a 
petition for special residency.  Second, whereas general amnesty is designed to normalize all 
irregular immigrants who fulfill a certain set of requirements, special residence permission is 
granted on a case-by-case basis.  Furthermore, there are no explicit criteria for the issuance of 
special residence permission.  Instead, Article 50 of the Immigration Control Act gives the 
Justice Minister complete discretion in granting special residence permission.  The absence of 
written criteria greatly discourages unauthorized migrants from applying for special residence 
permission.  As Komai (2003, December 31st) charges in an interview with Hiroshi Matsubara 
of the Japan Times, “[t]he opaque system allows the government to tighten or loosen 
immigration controls subjectively, depending on the economic situation or public sentiment” (p. 
3; see also Figure 5.1 on the next page). 
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Source: Ijū Rōdōsha To Rentai Suru Zenkoku Nettowāku (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan), 2003, p. 25.  
 Reprinted with permission of Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan. 
 
Figure 5.1: Application Procedure for Special Residence Permission 
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 While no written criteria for special residence permission are available, the Justice Minister has 
so far granted special residency almost exclusively to those who have close ties with either 
Japanese citizens or permanent residents.  Until the late 1980s, special residence permission had 
been given mostly to undocumented immigrants from the Korean peninsula (Hōmushō Nyūkoku 
Kanri Kyoku, 1987, p. 113).  In 1985, almost all unregistered Korean immigrants (47 out of 48) 
apprehended for criminal law offenses were granted special residency on humanitarian grounds 
(Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku, 1987, p. 114).  Few Korean immigrants now resort to this 
option because the amendment to the Immigration Control Act in 1990 has accorded residential 
rights to all long-term Korean residents, registered or not.  Since then, the system of special 
residence permission has mainly become a vehicle for “newcomer” foreign workers to get their 
status regularized.  With a dim prospect of general amnesty in the foreseeable future, an 
increasing number of unauthorized migrants report to the Immigration Bureau in hope that they 
would be given special residency.  As a result, the number of foreigners granted special 
residence permission has grown exponentially in recent years (see Table 5.3).   
 
 
Table 5.3: Number of Foreign Nationals Granted Special Residence Permission (1992-2003) 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number 
 
  482 465 612 849 1,468 1,406 2,497 4,318 6,930 6,930 5,306 6,995 10,327 
 
      Sources: Hōmu Daijin Kambō Shihō Hosei Chōsabu, 1993-1997; Yamaguchi, 2004, p. 2 
 
 
When the 21 overstaying foreigners stood up to file for special residence permission in 
1999, the granting of special resident permission for visa overstayers was limited to 1) those 
married to native residents and 2) those who were raising children born with a Japanese partner.  
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 Special residence permission began to be given to the latter in 1996 in accordance with the 
ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.  The only known exception was 
Korean immigrants who illegally entered Japan soon after World War II.  Although many of 
them were not related to Japanese citizens and resident Koreans, they were allowed to stay in 
Japan on the grounds that they had already established their lives as workers and residents (Ko, 
2000, p. 33).  This historical precedent was to give APFS the leverage to demand special 
residence permission for the 21 overstayers who had no blood ties with native residents in Japan. 
 
 
5.5 PATH TOWARD COLLECTIVE CAMPAIGNING FOR SPECIAL RESIDENCE 
PERMISSION 
 
Since the early 1990s, many foreign worker support groups have continuously urged the 
government to grant amnesty for unregistered foreigners.  The highpoint of grassroots activism 
for amnesty was the rally named “Human Rights to Foreigners! December 13 Rally” at Tokyo’s 
Yamanote Church in 1992.  The Forum on Asian Migrant Workers, the precursor of the SMJ, 
staged the rally; and many other support groups, including APFS, joined forces in coordinating 
various events on that day.  The details of the rally were reported in the inaugural issue of 
Immigrant Workers’ Forum (Imin Rōdōsha Fōramu) in April 1993.   
APFS got interested in the system of special residence permission in March 1990 as it 
helped a Pakistani overstayer married to a Japanese woman to obtain regular status of residence.  
Since then, APFS has been actively involved in the issues of special residence permission and 
amnesty.  In March 1992, APFS held a forum on special residence permission, which stimulated 
a flood of phone calls and walk-in visits from interested unregistered foreigners and their spouses 
(APFS, 2000b, p. 14).  Around the same time, the group drafted the Declaration of Foreign 
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 Workers’ Human Rights in time for its annual May Day meeting.  The Declaration called on the 
government to normalize the status of undocumented foreign workers in Japan (Yoshinari, 2002, 
p. 9).  It was formally adopted in 1994 with over 800 signatures by 11 different nationals and 
submitted to the Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry.  In January 1993 several staff 
members were invited to speak on the topic of special residence permission in a lecture held by 
the Forum on Asian Migrant Workers.  This indicates that APFS gained a reputation as a 
grassroots expert of some sort on the subject in the early 1990s.   
The number of consultation cases on special residence permission continued to soar in 
1993.  Of a total of 2,010 consultation cases in 1993, 801 concerned special residence 
permission, followed by life and other matters (493 cases), labor issues (484 cases), and medical 
problems (231 cases) (Mizukami, 1998, p. 361).  To facilitate information exchange, mutual aid, 
and interactions among intermarried couples, several members of APFS volunteered to form the 
Forum on International Marriage (Kokusai Kekkon O Kangaeru Tsudoi) on June 27, 1993.  The 
group was soon renamed Happy House in February 1994.   One activity of the group was to aid 
visa overstayers in obtaining special residence permission (for example, see YS, 1994, April 23, 
p. 24).    
In April 1994, an unregistered Korean woman visited APFS’s office to seek consultation 
on special residence permission.  She and her two sons smuggled themselves into Japan in the 
early 1980s and surrendered to the Immigration Bureau in a plea for special residency in August 
1992.  Unfortunately, they were all denied special residence permission in March 1994.  This 
was the first case in which APFS helped foreigners neither married nor related to native residents 
to fight for special residence permission.  Although APFS filed an administrative suit in 
objection to the deportation of the Korean family, the family was soon deported and APFS 
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 eventually lost the case (Yoshinari, 2004, p. 178).  From this bitter experience Yoshinari learned 
that the only way to pressure the Justice Ministry to normalize the status of irregular migrants 
was to appeal to the general public and to stir a nationwide controversy on the issue. 
 While APFS had long assisted irregular foreigners in obtaining special residence 
permission on an individual basis, several factors prodded the group to launch a collective 
campaign in September 1999.  For one thing, although APFS had regularly negotiated with 
immigration officials to demand amnesty for undocumented migrants since the spring of 1993, 
immigration authorities had dismissed its requests almost out of hand.  Having recognized that 
an amnesty program was unlikely in the near future, APFS changed its strategy and decided to 
utilize the system of special residence permission as an alternative (Kobayashi, 2002, p. 52).  For 
another, the amendment to the Immigration Control Act in 1999 stepped up penalties for 
immigration law violations.  The inclusion of these punitive sanctions meant that the already 
wretched living conditions of unregistered foreigners could get even worse.  Lastly, foreign 
worker support groups began to face a series of “second-generation immigrant problems” in the 
latter half of the 1990s as children of undocumented migrant workers grew up to a school age.  
They found it intolerable to leave undocumented children under “rightless” conditions 
(Yoshinari, 2002, pp. 18-19).   
 
 
5.6 A CHRONOLOGY OF THE SPECIAL RESIDENCE PERMISSION CAMPAIGN 
 
5.6.1 Prior to September 1 
 
 
APFS began to give serious consideration to collective petitioning for special residence 
permission in January 1999 when Asahi Shimbun (1999, January 5) editorialized that the 
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 government should consider normalizing the status of long-term visaless migrant workers (p. 5).  
Soon after the editorial came out, APFS asked its foreign members if they were interested in 
filing collective petitions for special residence permission (Ogaya, et al., 2001, p. 50).  Although 
decisions to report to the Immigration Bureau were ultimately left to overstayers themselves, this 
did not mean that anybody was encouraged to join a group demanding special residency.  Rather, 
prospective applicants were selected in light of their period of stay, their children’s ages, and a 
need for continued medical treatment in Japan (Kobayashi, 2002, pp. 53-54). 
Initially, over 60 overstaying foreigners expressed interest in surrendering to the 
Immigration Bureau (Yoshinari, 2004, p. 182).  Many of them soon backed down for fear of 
being detained and deported.  This was understandable, given that foreigners who were neither 
married nor related to native residents had rarely been granted special residence permission.  By 
the day the 10th May Day Meeting for Migrant Workers was held, only 38 of them remained 
resolved to come forward and demand special residency.  Of them, 21 overstayers were 
determined to report to the Immigration Bureau on September 1 and the remaining 17 on 
December 27 (Yoshinari, 2002, p. 12).   
In June 1999, APFS participated in the Third National Forum in Solidarity with Migrant 
Workers organized by the SMJ.  During this two-day forum, the issue of special residence 
permission became a central theme in many panel discussions.  Notably, two Iranian children 
aged 12 and 15 spoke up for regular resident status in the plenary session.  In this way the forum 
participants got to know APFS’s plan on the special residence permission campaign.  Around the 
same time, APFS began to contact other foreign worker support groups for cooperation.  Nanako 
Inaba of Ibaraki University told me that she was first informed of APFS’s plan through the 
Edogawa Union, a Tokyo-based community workers union, around July (personal 
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 communication, August 17, 2004).  On July 11, a group of attorneys from the Center for 
Protection of Foreigners’ Human Rights held the first meeting in preparation for an impending 
campaign.  Masaki Yamada, a member of the attorneys’ group, had long worked with APFS 
since Yoshinari requested him to represent a Bangladeshi defendant in a criminal case in 1990 
(APFS, 2002b, p. 12).  Several staff members of APFS held a final preparatory meeting with the 
overstayers on August 1st to confirm their will to fight for special residency and to devise 
concrete campaign strategies.  Ichiro Watado and four lawyers also attended the meeting 
(Watado, 2000, p. 83).  On August 29, APFS held a gathering to support the 21 overstayers at a 
local hall near the office.  The overstayers “came out in public” for the first time in the gathering.  
Several journalists were present as APFS notified them in advance of their intention to appear at 
the Tokyo Immigration Bureau on September 1. 
 
5.6.2 A Timeline of the Campaign after September 1 
 
 
On September 1, 1999, the 21 visa overstayers who consisted of five families and two 
unaccompanied men from Bangladesh, Iran, and Myanmar surrendered to the Tokyo 
Immigration Bureau to file for special residence permission.  About 20 supporters accompanied 
them (Yoshinari, 2004, p. 172).  This was the first case where visa overstayers without close ties 
with native residents demanded special residence permission in a group.  Thanks to the advance 
notice, immigration authorities made no arrests and told the overstayers that they would be 
investigated at home (Shipper, 2002, p. 56).  As APFS contacted the press ahead of time, most 
national newspapers covered their action the following day.   
 Of the 21 overstayers aged 2-68, 8 were children; 16 applicants were Iranian nationals.  
This was because the suspension of the mutual visa exemption agreement between Iran and 
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 Japan in 1992 made their re-entry virtually impossible once they left Japan.  Plus, there existed a 
strong personal network for mutual aid among the Iranian overstayers.  According to Watado 
(2002b), the economic distress and the theocratic regime in their home country provided 
additional incentives for them to stay in Japan (p. 90). 
 Second and third groups of overstayers followed suit and reported to the Tokyo 
Immigration Bureau on December 27 and July 12-13, 2000, respectively.  APFS opted for a 
series of collective campaigns in hope that they would exert stronger pressure on the Justice 
Ministry, draw more media attention, and stir up a public controversy (Yoshinari, 2004, p. 182).  
The collective campaigning was also intended to compel the Justice Ministry to lay down 
explicit criteria for issuing special residence permission (Murata, 2002, p. 4). 
 Owing to relentless campaigning efforts by varied social actors, the Justice Minister 
conceded special residence permission to 16 applicants, or 4 Iranian families, in February 2000.  
A Burmese family of three and two unaccompanied men were denied their petitions.  While the 
Justice Ministry gave no reasons for granting (or not granting) special residency, “lawyers 
emphasized the fact that the children were enrolled in Japanese schools and ‘well accustomed 
with Japanese culture and can speak only Japanese’” (Migration News, “Japan: crackdown, 
legalization,” n.p.). 
The success of the campaign can be attributed partly to the development of loosely 
coordinated national networking among and across foreign worker support groups and concerned 
individuals.  Countless groups and individuals got involved in the special residence permission 
campaign and formed a loose alliance of civic engagement for a common political goal.  But the 
development of such a nationwide network did not take place out of thin air; rather, it was a 
product of more than a decade of coalition building efforts among foreign worker support 
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 groups.  Of prime importance to the campaign was the development of networks among 
community workers’ unions, attorneys, and academics as well as the establishment of an 
umbrella organization for foreign worker support groups.  About 70 community workers’ unions 
joined together to establish a national network in September 1993 in an effort to handle 
increasingly complex and diverse problems.  In legal arenas the Tokyo Bar Association set up 
the Center for Protection of Foreigners’ Human Rights in 1989.  To address various issues 
related to the human rights of foreigners in Japan, concerned attorneys also founded the 
Lawyers’ Association for Foreign Laborers’ Rights (LAFLR) in 1990 and the Lawyers’ 
Association for Foreign Criminal Cases in 1992 (Shipper, 2001, p. 302).  According to Shipper 
(2002), there are now 11 lawyers’ association NGOs for foreign workers in the Kantō area alone 
(p. 43).  Last but not least, academics in the fields of ethnic and immigration studies established 
an on-line network called the Ethnic Migration Studies in Japan (EMSJ) in November 1995 
(Ishii, Sadamatsu, and Ikeda, 2000, n.p.).   
Over time, their cross-networking efforts moved toward a higher level of concentration 
and coordination, culminating in the formation of the National Network in Solidarity with 
Migrant Workers in 1997.  According to Shipper (2002), the network was launched at the 
Second Forum in Solidarity with Migrant Workers to replace its precursor, the Forum on Asian 
Migrant Workers (p.54).  It was later renamed the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan 
(SMJ), supposedly because its activities expanded to all unregistered foreigners irrespective of 
their employment status.  The SMJ is now housed in the Japan Council of Churches and consists 
of 88 organizations and 237 individuals (Okamoto, 2004, p. 204).  As the central network 
organization, the SMJ has taken a variety of collective actions from holding a symposium and 
lobbying immigration authorities to forming a global alliance with overseas NGOs and staging a 
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 rally for unregistered foreigners (Shipper, 2001, p. 324).  As Shipper (2002) sums up, the SMJ 
has enabled Japanese activists “to associate more as members of a socially conscious community 
of activists rather than as isolated and marginalized individuals” (p. 66). 
To reach as many audiences as possible, APFS tapped into these existing networks of 
foreign worker support groups.  For instance, the networks of community workers’ unions and 
NGOs for foreign workers enabled APFS to collect signatures from some 100 groups within two 
weeks from September 15 through 30.  30 groups and 15 individuals launched another signature 
campaign in November 1999 to mobilize public support.  About 5,300 signatures were collected 
in three weeks and submitted to the Justice Ministry on December 15; a total of 34,000 
signatures were collected by April 1st (Steering Committee, 2000, n.p.).  The collection of over 
30,000 signatures would have been impossible without the functional national networks.  In 
addition, the lawyers’ associations facilitated the prompt formation of a defense team for the 21 
overstayers.  The EMSJ was also instrumental in forming an academic group in support of the 
special residence permission campaign.   
 
 
5.7 MEDIA STRATEGIES—FIGHTING WITH AND AGAINST THE MEDIA 
 
The success of social activism hinges a great deal on its media strategies.  As Bourdieu (1998) 
concisely puts it, “[i]t is no longer possible nowadays to conduct social struggles without having 
a specific programme for fighting with and against television [italics added]” (p. 57).  One way 
to fight with and against television, more broadly the media, is to work in close liaison with 
progressive journalists (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 73).  This was one of the media strategies APFS 
pursued over the course of the campaign.     
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 While such conventional strategies as petitioning and rallying were effective in 
mobilizing public support at the street level, the special residence permission campaign would 
not have been so successful without continuous and favorable media coverage.  Indeed, the 
media even spurred the campaign in that Asahi Shimbun’s editorial in January 1999 provided the 
impetus for APFS to launch the movement for special residency.  Immediately after the editorial 
was printed, Yoshinari contacted the journalist who penned it.  He agreed with Yoshinari on the 
need for regularizing the status of long-term unauthorized migrants and promised to assign a 
reporter to cover the campaign.   Yoshinari and Komai met with the journalist even during the 
campaign to discuss its prospects and future strategies (Komai, personal communication, August 
26, 2004).  Yoshinari also arranged to meet with a reporter for NHK a week before the 21 
overstayers surrendered to the Immigration Office (personal communication, October 27, 2003).  
According to Yoshinari, the reporter reacted favorably to the overstayers’ impending action, too.  
Through these and other interactions with journalists, Yoshinari got the feeling that the campaign 
was likely to be covered in a positive light.  In view of this, the media were not simply a channel 
in the campaign for activists to send messages to the public.  Rather, a handful of journalists 
functioned as social agents and took active part within the structure of their institutions and 
professional roles in helping the overstayers to obtain special residence permission.  In fact, 
Kimie Tsukuba of APFS told me that the campaign got a big boost thanks to the reporting of the 
NHK director, the Asahi Shimbun writer, and a freelance TV director who produced a 
documentary on the campaign on TV Asahi (personal communication, May 19, 2004).    
Seen in this light, Bourdieu’s (2001/2003) following thesis does not apply to the media 
coverage of the special residence permission campaign: “The spokespersons are interviewed, a 
few emotion-laden reports are broadcast, but the demands of the movements are seldom taken 
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 seriously in public debate, as a consequence of the media’s limited understanding” (p. 41).  On 
the contrary, sustained attention by journalists gave activists the leverage to present the campaign 
as a legitimate social movement.  The support groups, for their part, adeptly used their 
investigative reports to command the attention of policy makers.  This “collaboration” between 
journalists and activists was crucial in making the campaign a success. 
In fairness, Bourdieu’s aim was to elucidate structuring and structured constraints in a 
journalistic field, not to point a finger at individual journalists.  In fact, he was well aware and 
appreciative of serious journalists committed to investigative reporting.  Indeed, the main thrust 
of his critical works on the media was to explore possibilities for concerted action among 
journalists, activists, and researchers.  “Only through such a collaboration,” Bourdieu 
(1996/1998) contends, “will it be possible to work effectively to share the most universal 
achievements of research and to begin, in practical terms, to universalize the conditions of access 
to the universal” (p. 1).  From this vantage point, the finding in this chapter may be rather 
consistent with Bourdieu’s thesis.  For my point is that the support groups managed to sidestep 
structural obstacles in a journalistic field by orchestrating efforts of concerned journalists as a 
collective force to pressure immigration authorities.   
Importantly, the favorable media coverage of the campaign was largely a product of 
APFS’s longstanding efforts to build a trusting relationship with journalists.  While criticizing 
the media for spreading the unsavory images of undocumented migrants, APFS has also served 
as an invaluable source of alternative information for news outlets.  Since a small number of 
foreign worker support groups existed in the late 1980s, APFS has received fairly constant media 
attention from its inception (see Table 5.4 which tabulates the number of newspaper articles 
making references to APFS from 1988 through 2004). 
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 Table 5.4: Database Search for the Keywords “APFS” & “Asian People’s Friendship Society” 
 
Year Asahi Yomiuri Mainichi Total 
1988 1 0 0 1 
1989 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 3 1 4 
1991 1 1 2 4 
1992 0 2 2 4 
1993 6 6 1 13 
1994 2 3 2 7 
1995 2 2 2 6 
1996 1 1 2 4 
Year Asahi Yomiuri Mainichi Total 
1997 2 0 3 5 
1998 2 0 1 3 
1999 8 1 1 10 
2000 8 13 4 25 
2001 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 
2003 3 0 1 4 
2004 0 1 0 1 
Total 36 33 22 91 
 
Sources: Yomidasu Bunshokan, Kikuzō, Mainichi Shimbun Kiji Jōhō 
 
 
 
APFS’s connections with journalists partly explain why the 21 overstayers’ surrender to 
the Immigration Bureau was promptly covered in most national newspapers the following day.  
In particular, Asahi Shimbun devoted half a page to their action.  Given that other national dailies 
printed only a brief report on the news, Asahi Shimbun’s article stood out.  To my knowledge, no 
newspapers were critical of the overstayers’ action.  Asahi Shimbun (1999, September 2) even 
depicted the overstayers as courageous social actors taking big risks to speak up on behalf of all 
aggrieved undocumented migrants (p. 39).  Asahi Shimbun also ran an editorial on the campaign 
on September 3.  The editorial explicitly called on the government to relax the current criteria for 
special residence permission (p. 5).   
Just as important, the overstayers and their supporters were able to sustain favorable 
media attention throughout the campaign.  Table 5.5 offers a fairly comprehensive list of the 
news coverage pertaining to the special residence permission campaign (see pp. 227-228).   
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 Table 5.5: List of the Media Reports about the Special Residence Permission Campaign (from 
September 1999 to March 2000) 
 
Year 1999 
9/2  Asahi Shimbun (p. 39), Japan Times (p. 2) on the overstayers’ surrender  
9/3 Asahi Shimbun (p. 5) ran an editorial on the special residence permission campaign. 
9/22    Japan Times (p. 2) on the formation of a defense team 
10/19 Asahi Shimbun (p. 26), Japan Times (p. 2) on APFS’s submission of a petition to the Justice  
 Ministry 
 
11/4 Asu o Yomu on NHK (a 10-minute news segment) 
 Japan Times (p. 3) on an Iranian family 
11/11 Asahi Shimbun (p. 15, Evening edition) on a joint statement by the academic group 
11/12 Japan Times (p. 2), Daily Yomiuri (p. 2), Manichi Shimbun (p. 26, Tokyo edition) on academics’  
 petitioning 
 
11/22  Asahi Shimbun (p. 34), Mainichi Shimbun (p. 26), Asahi Evening News (p. 4) on a petition drive  
 
12/9 Asahi Shimbun (p. 34) on a symposium 
12/16 Asahi Shimbun (p. 35, Tokyo edition), Asahi Evening News (p. 4) on a national caravan 
12/20 Daily Yomiuri (p. 3) carried an interview with Yoshinari. 
12/21   Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 23) on a national caravan 
12/27 Asahi Shimbun (p. 29, Aichi edition) on a national caravan 
12/28 Asahi Shimbun (p. 23, Shizuoka edition) on a national caravan;  
 Japan Times (p. 2) on five Iranian families’ visits to the Tokyo Immigration Bureau 
 
12/29 Asahi Shimbun (p. 4) Professor Komai contributed an article.  
12/31 Daily Yomiuri (p. 3) on the special residence permission campaign in general 
 
Year 2000 
1/13 Asahi Shimbun (p. 5) printed “a letter to the editor” by Yoshinari. 
1/19  Asahi Shimbun (p. 34), Japan Times (p. 2) on a sit-in by the 21 overstayers outside the Justice 
  Ministry building 
 Mainichi Shimbun (p. 26) on the overstayers’ plea to the Japan Bar Association 
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 1/23 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (p. 39), Japan Times (p. 2) on the Justice Ministry’s impending decision to 
  grant special residency to seven overstayers 
 
1/27 Asahi Shimbun (p. 1), Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 4, Evening edition) on the Justice Minister’s  
 impending decision to relax the criteria for special residence permission. 
 
1/28 Mainichi Shimbun (p. 2, p. 28), Nihon Keizai Shimbun (p. 18), Asahi Shimbun (p. 22, Evening 
edition) on the Justice Minister’s decision to issue special resident permission 
 
1/29 Japan Times (p. 2) on the granting of special residency to 12 overstayers 
2/3 Asahi Shimbun (p. 39), Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 34), Japan Times (pp. 1-2), Daily Yomiuri (p. 2),  
 Mainichi Shimbun (p. 28) on the issuance of special residence permission to three Iranians 
 
2/4 BS 22 on NHK BS1 (a feature segment entitled “Changing Policy on the Acceptance of  
 Foreigners” [kawaru gaikokujin ukeire seisaku]), Mainichi Shimbun (Chiba edition)  
 
2/5 Scoop (a news program on TV Asahi) broadcast a feature program on the campaign under the title 
“Give Special Residence Permission to Children Born in Japan!: A Documentary on the 21 Illegal 
Aliens” [nihon sodachi no kodomo ni zairyū kyoka o! fuhō taizai gaikokujin 21nin no kiroku] 
 
2/10 Asahi Shimbun (p. 38), Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 38), Nihon Keizai Shimbun (p. 38), Mainichi  
 Shimbun (p. 39), Sankei Shimbun (p. 26), Japan Times (p. 2) on the granting of special residence  
 permission to two Iranian families 
 
2/11 Mainichi Shimbun (Gunma edition) on an Iranian family residing in Gunma who was granted  
 residency permission on February 10 
 
2/12 Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 23) printed a review of the booklet Visa Overstayers and Special Residence 
Permission  
 
2/15 Asahi Shimbun (p. 38), Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 1), Japan Times (p. 3) on granting special residence  
 permission for another Iranian family  
 
2/20   Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 1, Gunma edition) contained an interview with an visa overstayer who was 
  given special residence permission. 
 Yomiuri Shimbun (p. 4) carried a commentary on the special residence permission campaign. 
 
2/22 Japan Times (p. 3) printed an interview with Yoshinari.  
2/23 Asahi Shimbun (p. 4) A reporter reflected on the campaign and called for more transparent  
 immigration policies. 
 
3/11 Japan This Week on NHK BS 1 (a segment of this English-language news program featured the 
  issue of special permission for residency.) 
 
 
 
Note:  The list was complied from APFS’s newspaper clipping collection, the academic group’s official  
website, and my own archival research.  
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 However, the media’s favorable coverage of the campaign did not necessarily reflect 
public opinion at that time.  On the contrary, the general public was increasingly hostile to visa 
overstayers (see Chapter 4).  In fact, Watado (2000) wrote in retrospect that when NHK aired a 
feature program on the campaign, the majority of the viewers who called in to the station reacted 
negatively to the overstayers’ action (p. 87).  He was told by the NHK director that the callers 
were mostly against regularizing the status of irregular foreigners under any conditions (personal 
communication, May 19, 2004).  Kaoruko Yamamoto’s report on the academic group’s joint 
statement in November also testified to this point.  In attending a press conference following the 
release of the joint statement, she (1999b) was surprised to witness a small number of supporters 
relative to a large crowd of reporters (n.p.).   
These pieces of anecdotal evidence suggest that the special residence permission 
campaign did not succeed in mobilizing as much public support as the media reported.  In other 
words, public approval expressed in the media was more representation of public opinion than 
representative of it.  This highlights the indirect yet pivotal roles the media played in the 
campaign.  That is, the media did not so much confer legitimacy on the campaign as helped to 
make it a legitimate public issue to which the government had to respond.  If the campaign had 
not been favorably and constantly covered, the Justice Minister might not have changed his 
staunch attitudes.  Moreover, although the media might not have generated enough public 
support for the campaign, they enabled the overstayers and their supporters to reach wider 
publics.  By appealing to the general public, they at least succeeded in projecting an air of 
popular support before immigration authorities.  This is to say that even if the overstayers and 
their supporters were unable to craft a very persuasive message to the general public, their 
symbolic struggle should not be construed as a failure.  For appeals to sectors of the entire 
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 population were necessary to project an air of public support whether or not these sectors were 
actually moved by the appeals.   
In addition to forging close ties with journalists in the mainstream media, APFS also 
managed to gain access to the publishing industry, especially such independent publishers as 
Akashi Shoten and Gendai Jimbun Sha.  APFS published two books on the special residence 
permission campaign, one from Akashi Shoten (Overstaying Foreigners and Special Residence 
Permission, 2000) and the other from Gendai Jimbun Sha (Give an Amnesty for Children, 2002).  
The former book was based on papers for a symposium APFS and the academic group held in 
December 1999; the latter volume contained retrospective reports on the special residence 
permission campaign.  Notably, the publication of the first book was strategically timed to raise 
public awareness of the campaign before the Justice Minister announced his decisions.  As 
Komai recalls it, the idea for the publication occurred to APFS and the academic group in a 
preparatory meeting in November 1999 (personal communication, August 26, 2004).  Soon after 
the meeting, he approached two Akashi Shoten editors with a proposal for publishing a book on 
special residence permission in January 2000.  Prior to its publication, Komai had put out 
numerous works on the subjects of foreign workers and immigration from Akashi Shoten.  His 
personal connections supposedly helped to get the book published in a timely manner.   
Last but not least, APFS and the academic group made effective use of the internet in 
order to garner public support.  Both of them created websites to solicit donations and 
endorsements for the campaign as well as to mobilize people across the nation for a variety of 
activities and events.  APFS opened its website on October 27, 1999 and provided semi-weekly 
updates on the campaign.  A total of 22 updates and several other special reports were posted 
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 through December 2000.58  Besides, APFS announced major events and activities online and 
asked visitors to join and support them.  The profiles and voices of the 21 overstayers were put 
up on the website as well.  Importantly, the internet allowed the overstayers to appeal directly to 
the public while remaining anonymous.  APFS’s website also carried a selection of comments 
from those who signed petitions for legalizing the status of the 21 overstayers.  Similarly, the 
academic group’s website ran endorsements from prominent immigration scholars.  Together, 
they gave visitors to the websites the impression that a good number of citizens and researchers 
championed the cause of the campaign.  The academic group’s use of the internet was even more 
intriguing because its activities were mostly “internet-based.”  The group’s use of the internet is 
to be elaborated later.   
 
 
5.8 RHETORICAL STRATEGIES IN THE SPECIAL RESIDENCE PERMISSION 
CAMPAIGN 
 
The assessment of rhetorical strategies in the campaign requires attention to two major 
constraints imposed upon the overstayers and the support groups.  First and foremost, they were 
faced with a daunting task of crafting a persuasive message to the general public, while making a 
compelling case for their plea before immigration authorities.  Although the Justice Minster had 
the ultimate authority to grant special residence permission, it was still important to make 
rhetorical appeals to the public.  For immigration authorities were unlikely to grant special 
residency to the overstayers unless they saw enough public pressure mount.  At least, Yoshinari 
and other supporters believed so.  The overstayers could have filed administrative suits if they 
had been denied special residence permission.  But their chance of winning a court case was slim 
                                                 
58 The Burmese family who was denied special residency in February 2000 filed an administrative suit, and APFS 
continued to provide updates on the campaign after the Justice Minister handed out his decisions. 
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 because a 1979 Supreme Court ruling stipulated that a long-time overstay “is nothing more than 
a continuous illegal state and thus should not be considered a reason to provide legal protection 
for visa overstayers, even if they are living in peace and quiet” (Tanaka, 2004, p. 3).  Actually, 
the Justice Ministry had lost few cases in the past (Ijū Rōdōsha To Rentai Suru Zenkoku 
Nettowāku, 2003, p. 21).  Having recognized that legal challenge was not a viable option, 
Yoshinari (1999a) felt that the only way to win concessions from immigration authorities was “to 
present the meaning of this movement to the public, and make this issue known as a large social 
problem, thus forcing the Immigration Bureau and Ministry of Justice to act” (n.p.).   
 To further complicate matters, the campaign was confronted with severe time constraints.  
The investigations and hearings of all the overstayers were completed by November 18, which 
meant that the Justice Minister’s decisions could be handed down at any moment.  The 
investigations and hearings proceeded much faster than the support groups had expected.  Until 
then, it took at least six months before an overstayer was even summoned for investigation.  
Mohammed Tarak Iqbal, an APFS member married to a Nikkei Brazilian woman, had to wait for 
two years and half to obtain special residence permission (Happy House, Islam, and Iqbal, 1999, 
p. 208).  Yoshinari suspected that immigration authorities were deliberately speeding up the 
process so that the matter would be resolved before stirring up a social controversy (Matsubara, 
1999, November 4, p. 3).59  Whether his allegation was grounded or not, the overstayers and the 
support groups were certainly hard pressed to garner public support in a short time period.  
 In a nutshell, the principal goal in the campaign’s rhetorical strategies was to document 
the undocumented in ways that would incline the public to see them as deserving residents.  As 
                                                 
59 Yoshinari’s allegation may not be founded because the Justice Ministry decided to speed up the procedures for 
special residence permission in 1998 in response to an upsurge in applications. Ōnuki pointed out in August 1999, a 
month before the campaign, that the streamlined procedures enabled some overstayers to obtain special residence 
permission within seven to eight months (Shibuya, 1999, n.p.).  Nevertheless, APFS frequently invoked this line of 
argument to attack the Justice Ministry’s harsh immigration policy and to support the cause of the campaign. 
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 the previous chapters have shown, undocumented migrants have been typically portrayed as 
“helpless victims” at best and “(potential) criminals” at worst.  The biggest problem with the 
rhetoric of vulnerability and criminality is that it hampers undocumented migrants’ ability to 
speak out in public.  As Asen (2002) puts it in more general terms, these forms of representation 
are disabling because they absent the represented from public discourse yet present them through 
negative images (p. 360).  The unsavory media portrayals of undocumented migrants, above all, 
induce the public to perceive them as not belonging to their country of residence, which could in 
turn “produce feelings of being ‘invaded’ by the ‘other,’” to borrow Sassen’s (1999) words (p. 
149).    
 Against the backdrop of the growing anti-immigrant sentiment, APFS formulated a series 
of rhetorical strategies to reconfigure the identity of the 21 overstaying foreigners.  To begin 
with, the overstayers were pictured as courageous social actors who stood up to demand 
regularization despite the risks of detention and deportation.  To this end, an appealing story was 
crafted to mark the “beginning” of the special residence permission campaign.  As APFS 
narrated it, the campaign took off because the overstayers remained resolved to fight for their 
rights even after they were informed that they had little chance of obtaining special residence 
permission.  For instance, Yoshinari (1999a) heralded the campaign as “a true self-supported 
movement initiated by the undocumented foreigners themselves” (n.d.).  In his account, the 
overstayers took the lead in the struggle for special residency and the supporters’ role was 
merely to assist them in carrying through the campaign.   
 Related to this, APFS also maintained that the overstayers were selflessly involved in the 
campaign for the sake of their children and other undocumented migrants who had to endure 
their sufferings in silence.  Many Japanese people embrace self-sacrifice and altruism as essential 
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 aspects of the society.  APFS invoked these moral ideals as rhetorical commonplaces to 
reconfigure the images of the overstayers.  For example, Yoshinari (1999b) recounted how an 
Iranian mother decided to fight for special residence permission: 
One Iranian mother who has a baby and a young daughter stated that they have decided 
to appear at the Immigration Bureau because of their children, since she just cannot 
bear to keep living under the present circumstances any longer, and she and her family 
does [sic] not mind being sacrificed even if her family is detained or deported, if this 
movement could advance to the next step.  No one can change her decision. (n.p.) 
 
Thus, “[t]heir action this time,” he continued, “should be evaluated in light of their sacrifice for 
the benefit of the other 270,000 undocumented foreigners” (n.p.).  As this quotation illustrates, 
Yoshinari and other supporters often tapped into such cultural norms as self-sacrifice to evoke an 
emotional, emphatic response for the overstayers. 
This does not necessarily mean that the overstayers actually played a leading role in the 
campaign as concerned activists.  In reality, it was APFS that brought up the idea of collective 
campaigning for special residence permission.  Yoshinari (2004) writes in retrospect that he first 
broached the idea to two long-time Iranian members in January 1999 (p. 182).  However, this 
was rarely pronounced as the “beginning” of the campaign.  Moreover, many applicants shied 
away from speaking out in public.  Even when the overstayers spoke to crowds in the street or to 
journalists, they did little more than express their wishes and talk about their life histories.  Most 
of the time, their voices were filtered through the support groups’ interpretive framework.  
Considering the overstayers’ unstable status of residence, limited Japanese proficiency, and lack 
of legal knowledge, this was understandable.   
Whether the 21 applicants actually led the campaign or not, the support groups were at 
least successful in getting the media to project a positive image of the visa overstayers to their 
audiences.  For example, the Japan Times reported on September 2, 1999:  
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 “Because of today’s action, these people may be sent back to their native country,” 
Yoshinari told the press before visiting the immigration office. “But they decided to 
take the risk because they believe the current conditions for similar people who have 
overstayed needs to be changed.” (p. 2) 
 
Along the same line, Asahi Shimbun’s editorial on September 3 read: “[I]t is said that [the 21 
visa overstayers] dared to come out [and surrender to the Immigration Bureau] for raising public 
awareness of their conditions” (p. 5).  The editorial then stressed “the need for giving positive 
consideration to this issue in order to build an open Japanese society amenable to ‘differences’” 
(p. 5).  These media portrayals of the overstayers as courageous and dedicated actors probably 
mattered as much, if not more, to the outcome of the campaign as the actual role they played.     
Secondly, the support groups put up a symbolic resistance to the negative images 
attached to the label of “illegal aliens.”  Since the label “not only results in depriving them of 
legitimacy, but makes it easy for them to be criminalized” (Herbert, 1992, p. 117), the projection 
of a new, positive identity was a prerequisite for getting the overstayers’ status normalized.  To 
overcome the unsavory images of “illegal aliens,” the support groups employed a different set of 
terms.  Most telling was the use of the term “visa overstayers” in lieu of “illegal aliens.” The 
support groups deployed the term, hoping that the overstayers’ offenses would be compared 
more to such traffic violations as driving with expired licenses than to criminal offenses like 
homicide.  As the following Japan Times article illustrates, this rhetorical strategy worked to get 
the press to depict the overstayers in a more positive light:  
The leading counselor for the group, Satoshi Murata, also urged the government to 
consider amnesty. “Although they have overstayed their visas,” he said, “these people 
have contributed to Japan’s economy by taking on severe and dangerous physical labor 
but still have no welfare or guarantee against injuries.” (September 2, 1999, p. 2) 
 
In Murata’s estimation, the overstayers’ contributions to the Japanese economy by far 
outweighed their breaches of immigration laws. 
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 Yet another rhetorical strategy was to focus on children as they were largely immune to 
the stigma of “illegal aliens.”  This rhetorical strategy was intended not so much to empower the 
overstayers as to represent them as innocent victims of the rigid immigration policies.  Initially, 
the support groups put forward four lines of argument to legitimize the campaign for special 
residency.  First, they advocated that visa overstayers deserved regular status of residence 
because they had worked hard and contributed to the Japanese economy.  This narrative thread 
highlighted adult male migrants and portrayed them as “diligent workers.”  Second, the support 
groups held that those overstayers who had established their living bases as “upright citizens” 
(zenryō na shimin) should be allowed to stay in Japan.  Together, they sought to alter the image 
of undocumented migrants from potential criminals jeopardizing Japanese society to decent 
residents doing considerable good to the society.  Third, the support groups argued that those 
children who were born or raised in Japan were entitled to stay because they would encounter 
severe difficulties if deported back home.  By extension, their parents should also be permitted to 
live in Japan.  Lastly, they claimed that those overstayers who needed continued medical 
treatment in Japan should be granted special residence permission on humanitarian grounds.  
The support groups did not prioritize one argument over the others until halfway through 
the campaign.  For example, when APFS and the SMJ requested other NGOs to endorse the 
overstayers’ action, an attached letter addressed to the Justice Minister made all the four 
arguments to defend the overstayers’ action.  What follows is the beginning of the English 
version of the letter: 
Twenty-one persons . . . appeared at Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau at Kita-ku 
on September 1, 1999 seeking Special Permission for Residence.  They have                        
established now their living bases in Japan and leading stabilized lives.  Some of 
them go to the Public Primary School and the Junior and Senior High School and 
spending everyday [sic] the same as  Japanese pupils.  Also there are the persons who 
have injured [sic] seriously by the accident while they were working at the company 
 236
 and need to continue medical treatment for the rest of their lives.  (Steering 
Committee of “Give Ordinary Living in Japan to 21 Persons—270,000 Signatures,” 
n.d., n.p.) 
 
The letter then cited both the International Covenants on Human Rights and the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of Child to call on the government to protect the human rights of “every person 
including undocumented foreigners” (n.p.).  Some applicants in the overstayers’ group advanced 
similar arguments during a petition drive in Tokyo’s Ikebukuro area on November 21: “Since we 
are living as good citizens, we would like to be accepted into Japanese society” (Shibanuma, 
1999, p. 26).  Supporters who took part in the petition drive also urged the Justice Ministry to 
grant special residency to the 21 overstayers on the grounds that they “helped Japan become an 
economic powerhouse by doing the ‘dirty and dangerous’ jobs that Japanese workers avoided 
during the so-called bubble economy in the late 1980s” (Karasaki, 1999, p. 4).         
 However, the government’s lukewarm response to the campaign pushed the support groups 
to alter their rhetorical strategy and to spotlight children and, to a less extent, mothers (Yoshinari, 
personal communication, October 27, 2003).  According to Karasaki (1999), the support groups 
emphasized, above all, the welfare of children during the petition drive in November:  
They [supporters] also said the foreign nationals have paid taxes to the government.  
But they mostly [italics added] voiced concerns about the future, especially for their 
children.  They stressed that their children have grown accustomed to Japanese culture 
and some have spent all their lives in Japan.  The youngsters would have difficulties 
adjusting to life in their country of origin, they said. (p. 4)   
 
At the height of the campaign Yoshinari (2000, January 13) also pleaded for the Justice 
Minister’s “conscientious judgment” especially for the sake of children (p. 5).  Some applicants 
echoed this view as well.  For instance, Hiroshi Matsubara (1999) of the Japan Times quoted 
Taghibeigloo Shahroklt, a member of the overstayers’ group, as saying that “he and his wife may 
deserve their current situation, when the fact that they have been staying in Japan illegally is 
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 taken into account, but it is unfair that his children, for whom Japan is home, have to live without 
fundamental rights and future prospects” (p. 3).    
Related to this, the image of a mother worrying about the future of her child made for 
compelling news coverage.  Pictures carried in the media during the campaign are good 
indications of a shifting focus on the mother-child bond.  Asahi Shimbun of September 2, 1999, 
for example, carried a picture of the overstayers and their supporters entering the Tokyo 
Immigration Bureau building (see Figure 5.2).  Notice that men were marching in the front and 
women and children could be barely seen in the background.  The text of the article began with 
emotive remarks made by Adel Ghebi, leader of the overstayers’ group, in a press conference.  It 
is telling that he made no mention of children and mothers:  
We have taken on so-called 3-K jobs and sustained the bottom of the Japanese 
economy.  We were welcomed to fill in job vacancies during the bubble economy.  It 
does not make sense to tell us to go back now that the Japanese economy has plunged 
into depression.  A friend of mine died because he was not eligible for health insurance 
and unable to go to hospital due to his illegal status. (p. 39)    
   
 
 
 
            Source: AS, 1999, September 2, p. 39.  Reprinted with permission of Asahi Shimbun Sha and APFS. 
 
Figure 5.2: Picture of the Overstayers and Their Supporters Entering the Immigration Bureau 
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 By contrast, pictures printed on later dates tended to foreground the children and their 
mothers.  On January 28, 2000, Mainichi Shimbun carried a feature article on special residence 
permission; an attached picture displayed the overstayers and their supporters staging a sit-in 
outside the Justice Ministry’s building on January 18.  Included in the picture was an overstayed 
woman sitting down with a placard reading “Don’t Detain Children!”  The article echoed her 
plea with the subheading “Children Born in Japan are Innocent” (p. 25).  A similar sit-in was 
staged outside the Tokyo Immigration Bureau on February 9.  The picture of the sit-in in Figure 
5.3 epitomizes the discursive shift from adult male workers to mothers and children that took 
place over the course of the campaign. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Yoshinari, 2002, p. 17.  Reprinted with permission of APFS and Gendai Jimbun Sha 
 
Figure 5.3: APFS-led Sit-in outside the Tokyo Immigration Bureau on February 9, 2000 
 
 
Even more telling are the two pictures carried in the February 25, 2000 issue of Weekly Asahi 
(see Figure 5.4 on the next page).  Notice that the larger picture showed a close-up shot of an 
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 Iranian mother and her two daughters outside the Immigration Bureau after obtaining special 
residence permission.  The picture of the father, by contrast, appeared at a much smaller size in 
the lower left-hand corner.   
 
                             
 
 
 
Source: Shūkan Asahi, 2000, February 25, p. 6.  Reprinted with permission of APFS and Asahi Shimbun Sha 
Figure 5.4: Iranian Family Congratulated by Their Supporters and the Press after Being Granted 
Special Residence Permission
 
 
 
Similarly, the Japan Times of February 10 printed a picture of a 13-year-old Iranian girl “wiping 
tears of joy” when greeted by her friends at the Immigration Bureau (p. 2).  
The support groups made this shift mainly for legal and rhetorical reasons.  From a legal 
standpoint, Japan has been a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child since 1994.  
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 This and other related U.N. conventions gave the support groups great leverage in making a 
compelling case for normalizing the status of undocumented children and, by extension, their 
parents.  Besides, when a revision to the Immigration Control Act was passed in August 1999, a 
non-binding resolution was adopted calling for special consideration to overstayers’ family ties.  
Rhetorically, children and, to a less extent, mothers were detached from the negative 
images associated with “illegal aliens.”  The images of mothers and children have particularly 
strong rhetorical forces when they are suffering.  As Chavez (2001) explains, “[m]others and 
children are generally not considered ‘dangerous’; they are innocents in a world of danger” (p. 
73).60  The increased profiles of children and mothers encouraged journalists to portray the visa 
overstayers beyond the typecast images of “illegal” foreign workers.  In fact, Yoshinari deplored 
the media’s lukewarm interest in a recent special residence permission campaign by and for eight 
single male Bangladeshis (Komai, October 3, 2004, participant observation).  Even when they 
were all deported on January 21, 2005, it hardly made the news. 
Not only did the support groups and the overstayers come to spotlight the children amid 
the campaign, but they also stressed their “Japanese-ness.”  In their account, the children should 
be allowed to stay in Japan because they spoke Japanese as their native language and identified 
strongly with Japanese society.  For example, Karasaki (1999) interviewed an Iranian woman in 
the group who claimed that her daughters deserved regular status of residence because “[m]y 
daughters know nothing about their own country . . . . They both consider themselves Japanese” 
(p. 4).  It followed that she and her husband should also be permitted to stay for the good of their 
children.  Near the end of the article, the woman was quoted again as pleading: “I feel guilty 
                                                 
60 In Chavez’s estimation, this is partly why women and children figure predominantly on refugee-related magazine 
covers.  Through an elaborate analysis of cover images from 10 popular American magazines during 1965 and 1999, 
he found that “[t]he combination of at least one woman and at least one child is featured prominently on four of the 
thirteen refugee-related magazine covers (31 percent)” (p. 72).  The percentage is disproportionately high, given that 
only three of the sixty-three covers about non-refugee immigration featured women and children (p. 72).   
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 about having overstayed (my visa) . . . . We are not trying to stay for the money or work like 
before.  We want to stay for the sake of our children” (p. 4).     
The children themselves sometimes wrote and recited letters at the request of the press.  
As the following excerpts illustrate, the letters often emphasized their “Japanese-ness”:  
I have been in Japan for almost 9 years.  At first, I wanted to go back almost every day 
as I didn’t speak any Japanese.  As I studied Japanese very hard, I became comfortable 
speaking the language in a year or two.  But I have always thought that I would not be 
able to live normally like the Japanese because I don’t have a visa. (a girl in the first 
year of high school, cited in Tsukuba, 2000, p. 18) 
 
If I am deported back to Iran, I may have to give up many important things like school 
work, friends, and learning Japanese culture.  We just want to live an ordinary life in 
this country Japan.  Is it wrong?  Is it wrong for overstayed children like us to think 
this way?  We are now pulling ourselves together to answer that question.  I love Japan 
and want to stay in Japan from the bottom of my heart. (an Iranian girl in the first 
grade of junior high school, cited in Tsukuba, 2000, p. 20) 
 
My whole existence is in Japan.  But I don’t know anything about the language, 
writing, culture, religion in my country of origin. (a boy in the first year of high school, 
cited in Tsukuba, 2000, pp. 21-22)   
 
These letters supposedly pulled at the heartstrings of many Japanese regardless of their views on 
the issue of foreign workers.  A letter-writing campaign like this was a particularly viable tactic 
in this grassroots movement as it allowed the children to express their opinions without revealing 
their identities. 
Last but not least, the visa overstayers and their supporters called into question the 
conventional idea of special residence permission as benevolent dispensation granted from 
immigration authorities.  Alternatively, they sought to recast it as a right every long-term resident, 
legal or illegal, was entitled to.  To borrow Fraser’s (1989) words, they strived to translate 
“needs talk” (i.e. irregular migrants need to stay) into “rights talk” (i.e. they have a right to stay) 
(p. 183).61   Actually, the leader of the overstayers’ group made explicit appeals for special 
                                                 
61 For an illuminating analysis on human rights in Japan, see Feldman, 2000. 
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 residency “as a right to live safely in Japan” (APFS, “Zairyū,” n.p.).  By framing special 
residence permission as a residential right, those involved in the campaign ultimately tried to re-
define the government’s responsibility regarding immigration politics.  That is, they argued that 
the government should take responsibility for turning a blind eye to the illegal employment of 
undocumented migrant workers and leaving them and their families in horrible situations for a 
long time.  This re-interpretation of the government’s duty ran counter to the prevailing view that 
the government should make every effort to expel “illegal aliens” from the country.   
 
5.9 COLLECTIVE, COLLABORATIVE, AND CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT BY 
RESEARCHERS  
 
5.9.1 The Formation of the Academic Group 
 
 
A major strength of the special residence permission campaign was that the lawyers’ group, 
APFS, and the academic group brought together their own expertise, networks, and experiences 
in advocating the regularized status of the 21 overstayers.  While the lawyers’ group and APFS 
worked together as a unit, the academic group performed collaborative yet autonomous functions.  
As Shipper (2001) put it, APFS provided the energy and organizational know-how, whereas the 
academic group supported the campaign by providing a compelling intellectual reasoning (p. 
379).  Although it is hard to ascertain the degree to which each group contributed to the 
campaign, it is safe to say that the involvement of diverse actors in different fields helped to 
ensure that the campaign received favorable and sustained news coverage.    
While the special residence permission campaign was arguably the first social movement 
ever in which immigration scholars in Japan got collectively involved, this does not mean that 
they had confined themselves to the role of detached observers until then.  On the contrary, a 
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 good number of immigration researchers have intervened in immigration politics, notably by 
joining advisory councils to local or national governments.  As Pak (1998) observes: 
Japanese academics have enthusiastically involved themselves in the debates about the 
new international migration to their country.  Many combine active research agendas 
with explicit support for specific policy programs.  These academics favoring the 
progressive internationalization agenda of increasing the openness of Japanese society 
often view local government as the best venue for realizing this goal.  (p. 186) 
 
Immigration scholars have also collaborated with social activists at many different levels 
from coordinating a joint workshop to conducting a survey on the lives of unregistered foreigners.  
At the institutional level, the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN) 62  “holds 
regular international conference to bring researchers, NGOs and policy-makers together to 
analyze migration issues” (Hirano, Castles, and Brownlee, 2000, p. 244).  Likewise, the SMJ 
organizes bi-annual National Forum in Solidarity with Migrant Workers.63  Over 800 activists, 
scholars, and journalists took part in the Third National Forum in 1999 (Shipper, 2001, p. 320).  
Many immigration scholars, including Ichiro Watado, Naoto Higuchi, Kaoruko Yamamoto, and 
Nanako Inaba, participated in the past forums.  At the personal level, a good number of 
academics have developed long-term, reciprocal relationships with foreign worker support 
groups.  According to Shipper (2001): 
Professor Tanaka Hiroshi of the Hitotsubashi University and Professor Komai Hiroshi 
of the Tsukuba University —both of whom are prolific researchers on foreigners in 
                                                 
62 The APMRN is a transnational research project launched under the Management of Social Transformations 
Programme of UNESCO in 1995.  Although the APMRN is billed as a research project, its activities are not entirely 
research-oriented; there are also political aspects to the project.  According to the APMRN’s website, its overall aim 
is “to promote acceptance of the protection of human rights for migrants by means of gaining wider acceptance of 
the 1990 UN Convention on Migrant Workers” (n.d.).  To this end, the APMRN underscores the importance of 
“encourag[ing] dialogue in the region among researchers, policy makers and NGOs.”  For details on the history, 
goals, and activities of the APMRN, visit its website at http://www.unesco.org/most/apmrn_unconv.htm.   
63 The National Forum in Solidarity with Migrant Workers has its origin in the Kantō Forum on Foreign Workers 
(Kantō Gaikokujin Rōdōsha Fōramu) in 1991 (Okamoto, 2004, p.217).  Such Kantō-based foreign worker support 
groups as Karabaw No Kai and Gaikokujin 119 Nettowāku took the lead in holding the event (Okamoto, 2004, p. 
217).  As a growing number of foreign worker support groups were established all over Japan, the event developed 
into a national forum in 1996.  The national forums have been held so far in Fukuoka (1996), Aichi (1997), Tokyo 
(1999), Osaka (2001), and Fukuyama (2004).  The number of participants grew from 400 in the first forum to about 
1100 in the fourth (Okamoto, 2004, p. 219, p. 223).   
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 Japan—are board members of the JCLU [Japan Civil Liberties Union].  Professor 
Komai, in fact, often uses materials from the foreigners support groups in his research.  
These influential academics introduce their colleagues and students to support some of 
the activities of these support groups. (p. 375)   
 
Additionally, scholarly research and grassroots activism are not entirely separate 
enterprises when it comes to the issue of global labor migration.  In the past decade, foreign 
worker support groups have proven helpful for those researchers who are interested in studying 
the working and living conditions of undocumented migrants (for example, see Kanegae, 2001).  
As researchers enlisted the help of support groups, many of them began to feel discontent to treat 
undocumented migrants only as their research objects without reciprocating for them (Ishii, 
Sadamatsu, and Ikeda, 2000, n.p.).  This was particularly true for those scholars who actually 
witnessed the sufferings of undocumented migrants and the struggles of support groups (Shipper, 
2001, p. 375).  As Ishii, Sadamatsu, and Ikeda (2000) see it, the formation of the scholarly group 
for the 21 overstayers was partly an outgrowth of awakening political consciousness among 
academics.   
 Initially, Yoshinari intended to solicit the help of the immigration scholars he personally 
knew in hope that they would articulate the significance of the campaign and provide a 
theoretical justification for it.  Once the campaign took off, more researchers turned out to get 
involved in the campaign than he had expected.  According to Hirano (2001), the idea for the 
release of a joint statement was first proposed during the international symposium on “New 
Trends in Asia-Pacific Migration and Consequences for Japan” in late September (pp. 2-3).  The 
symposium, along with the annual conference of the Japan Sociological Society in October, 
occasioned the formation of an academic group.  Komai, Watado, and Yamawaki, all of whom 
had long-standing relationships with APFS, facilitated its formation.  Immediately after the 
symposium, they relayed APFS’s call for help to 160 researchers via the EMSJ (Yamawaki, 
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 2000, p. 89).  In response to APFS’s request, 12 scholars volunteered to join the academic group 
(for the members of the academic group, see Table 5.6).  The majority of them were sociologists 
who specialized in the issues of immigration and foreign workers.    
 
Table 5.6: A List of Members of the Academic Group 
 
KOMAI, Hiroshi (Coordinator, University of Tsukuba) 
WATADO, Ichirō (Deputy Coordinator, Meisei University) 
HIGUCHI, Naoto (Tokushima University) 
INABA, Nanako (Ibaraki University) 
ITŌ, Ruri (St. Paul University) 
KAJITA, Takamichi (Hitotsubashi University) 
KO, Sun Hui (University of Kagoshima) 
KONDŌ, Atsushi (Kyushu Sangyō University) 
SADAMATSU, Aya (Hiroshima Kokusai Gakuin University) 
SAKUMA, Kōsei (Tokyo Women’s Christian University) 
YAMAMOTO, Kaoruko (Doctoral Student, Tokyo Metropolitan University) 
YAMAWAKI, Keizō (Meiji University) 
Source: Komai, Watado, and Yamawaki, 2000 
 
 
 
5.9.2 The Role of the Internet in the Academic Group’s Campaign 
 
 
One notable feature of the academic group’s activities was that they were mostly facilitated via 
the internet.  In particular, the EMSJ, or an online network of researchers in the fields of ethnic 
and immigration studies, became a channel for soliciting endorsements as well as a venue for 
conducting discussions (Hirano, 2001, p. 3).  For example, the EMSJ was instrumental in 
drafting and distributing a joint statement urging the Justice Minister to grant special residency to 
the overstayers.  Watado, Komai, and Yamawaki gathered in APFS’s office on October 4 to draft 
a joint statement.  The initial draft was completed on October 8 and distributed during the annual 
conference of the Japan Sociological Society on October 11 (Yamawaki, 2000, pp. 89-90).  
 246
 Heated discussions ensued mostly via the EMSJ.  Komai, Yamawaki, and Watado held another 
meeting on October 14; Sakuma and Kondō also attended the meeting (Yamawaki, 2000, p. 91).  
They made significant revisions to the initial draft based on the input they received through the 
mailing list.  After soliciting additional feedback, they finalized and distributed the joint 
statement on October 17.  The statement was translated in English and Spanish as well and 
posted on the website the academic group opened on October 8 (Yamawaki, 2000, p. 91, p. 
93).64  Thanks to the academic group’s painstaking efforts, a total of 593 migration scholars, 
including more than 100 from abroad, endorsed the statement in three weeks (Yamawaki, 2000, 
p. 93).  Importantly, the internet enabled researchers across the globe to give symbolic support to 
the special residence permission campaign in such a short period.   
 An excerpt from the English version of the statement reads: 
We, concerned researchers, call for the Ministry of Justice to authorize special 
permission for residence to the members of the group cited below as soon as 
possible. . . .  Although they wish to continue living in Japan, they are ‘illegal 
immigrants’ with no rights, and can no longer bear to continue living under the present 
circumstances.  That is why, after long deliberation and at the risk of deportation, they 
took the decision to appear at the Immigration Bureau to request special permission for 
residence. (Komai, et al., 2000,65 n.p.)  
 
The remainder of the statement underscores, among others, the following points: 
1. The visa overstayers are not criminal offenders.  They only violated administrative 
laws; 
 
2. They have contributed to Japanese society as diligent workers and taxpayers, which 
prove that they are “good citizens” of Japanese society; 
 
3. Children’s rights are protected under the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child the Japanese government ratified in 1994.   
 
4. The children have become fully integrated into Japanese society, have close 
Japanese friends, and speak only Japanese.   
                                                 
64 An English version of the website was launched on October 28 (Yamawaki, 2000, p. 93). 
65 The original statement was released on November 11, 1999.  The English translation was last revised on April 8, 
2000. 
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 5. In the past, the Japanese government granted special residency to hundreds of 
Korean smugglers on the humanitarian grounds that they had established their 
living bases in Japan.  
 
As these snippets of the joint statement illustrate, the academic group basically subscribed to the 
views of other support groups.  What contributions, then, did the academic group make to the 
special residence permission campaign?  This question is to be addressed in the next section.  
 
5.9.3 Reviewing and Assessing the Academic Group’s Activities   
 
 
While an evaluation of the academic group’s engagement in the campaign is partly speculative, 
APFS and other support groups generally agree that the academic group played a significant, if 
not critical, role in altering the Justice Ministry’s conservative posture.  A member of Kalabaw 
No Kai, for instance, told Shipper (2001) that “[w]ithout the interaction of the academic group . . 
. the petition would have appeared merely as another passionate activity of Japanese activists” (p. 
379).  Yoshinari also offered a positive, albeit more modest, assessment of the academic group’s 
role in the campaign.  He speculated that the signatures from 593 researchers probably exerted as 
much pressure on the Justice Ministry as about 34,000 signatures APFS collected on the street 
(personal communication, October 27, 2003).  Inaba expressed more critical views on the 
academic group’s role in the campaign.  She said that the group’s contribution was limited and 
ephemeral at best (personal communication, August 17, 2004).  In general, she had serious 
reservations about academia’s power to influence elite-dominated politics in Japanese society.  
Inaba surmised that scholars’ input in governmental advisory committees might have had a 
greater impact on the Justice Minister’s decision than the academic group’s grassroots 
engagement itself.   
 My assessment of the academic group’s contribution is close to Yoshinari’s.  To begin 
with, many members backed up the campaign by “putting research findings into an accessible 
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 form,” to use Bourdieu’s words (2001/2003, p. 36).  For instance, Sun Hui Ko, an expert on 
Korean immigrants in Japan, documented the historical precedents in the 1960s and 1970s in 
which illegal entrants from South Korea were granted special residence permission on the 
ground that they had established their living bases in Japan.  As a sociologist who specialized in 
the issue of immigration in France, Inaba elaborated on the sans-papiers movement66 in the late 
1990s and its implications for the special residence permission campaign.  Moreover, Atsushi 
Kondō, a law professor at Kyushu Sangyō University, set forth major amnesty programs carried 
out in other countries.   
The important point is that these scholars made strategic use of their expertise by linking 
their findings to the special residence permission campaign.  To this end, they did not simply re-
print their academic studies but translated them in language accessible to wider audiences.  Inaba, 
Kondō, and Ko each contributed brief reports to the academic group’s website; more extensive 
versions of the reports were included in the book published from Akashi Shoten in January 2000.  
Particularly useful was Inaba’s reference to the sans-papiers movement and the execution of 
amnesty the movement led up to.  As she recalls it, nobody had mentioned France’s amnesty 
program until she brought it up in a meeting with other group members (personal communication, 
August 17, 2004).  Inaba’s input was reflected in the joint statement and helped to bolster the 
academic group’s endorsement of the special residence permission campaign.  Specifically, the 
situation in France was cited in the joint statement as follows. 
In France, to take only one example, children enrolled in schools are not deported. The 
French Government attaches great importance to the fact that strong ties to French 
society are created through school education. As a result, the parents are also granted 
permission to stay, since consideration is given to family ties before legal status. 
(Komai, et al., 1999/2000, n.p.) 
 
                                                 
66 The sans-papiers movement was a political struggle for amnesty organized by large numbers of immigrants and 
asylum seekers “without papers” (sans-papiers) in France.   
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 The academic group then urged the Japanese government to take the same measure as a 
signatory country to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.  While Inaba was careful 
not to draw a parallel between the sans-papiers movement and the special residence permission 
campaign, her report still gave the support groups a boost to make a more compelling case for 
their plea.  Komai surmised that the support groups’ repeated reference to France’s case had a 
certain impact on the Justice Ministry’s decision (personally communication, August 26, 2004).   
Although some researchers in the academic group contributed new insights to the 
campaign, this does not mean that the group made strikingly new arguments.  As a matter of fact, 
many foreign worker support groups had already made similar points before the academic group 
issued the joint statement.  Still, the media were inclined to lend more credence to them when 
uttered by university professors.  Accordingly, their “professional” opinions were given more air 
time and space.  Komai told me that the campaign might have received less media attention if he 
did not serve as the representative of the academic group; for he was not only a prominent 
immigration scholar, but also a well-respected public figure to whom the media often turned for 
commentary pertaining to the issue of immigration (personal communication, August 26, 2004).  
In 1996 alone, Komai appeared in newspapers 12 times for comments, book reviews, and articles 
(for a comprehensive bibliography of his works, see the 2004 March issue of Tsukuba Journal of 
Sociology).  In short, APFS was able to capitalize on Komai and other scholars’ cultural capital 
as well as their connections with the mainstream media.  One such example is Komai’s essay on 
the meaning of the campaign printed in Asahi Shimbun’s opinion column on December 29, 1999.  
Since anyone is welcome to send his or her opinion to the column, Asahi Shimbun receives a 
large volume of letters every day.  Thus the acceptance rate is quite low.  However, since Komai 
was a trusted intellectual, Asahi Shimbun offered to carry his article in the opinion column 
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 without going through the usual screening procedures (Komai, personal communication, August 
26, 2004).   
The academic group’s appeal at the Immigration Bureau is another notable example.  On 
November 11, several members visited the Immigration Bureau to submit a petition bearing 
signatures of nearly 600 researchers at home and abroad.  The petition was handed in along with 
supporting views from three world-renowned immigration scholars—Tomas Hammar of 
Stockholm University in Sweden, Wayne Cornelius of the University of California at San Diego, 
and Stephen Castle of the University of Wollongong in Australia.  Yoshinari arranged a press 
conference later on that day, predicting that journalists would find the academic group’s political 
action newsworthy (Komai, personal communication, August 26, 2004).  Indeed, he proved to be 
right.  Most national newspapers promptly and favorably reported the group’s appeal.  For 
example, Mainichi Shimbun covered the group’s action the following day under the headline 
“Give Special Residence Permission to Illegally Staying Foreigners: 593 University Professors 
and Others Issued a Joint Statement” (p. 26).   On the same day, The Japan Times ran an 
extensive article on the academic group’s petition:    
Tsukuba University Prof. Hiroshi Komai, president of the researchers’ group 
supporting the appeal, said that if the minister refuses to grant permission, it will draw 
criticism from both domestic and international academic circles. He claimed his group 
will file an administrative suit against the ministry unless the minister grants them 
amnesty. (November 12, 1999, p. 2) 
 
In a similar vein, Asahi Shimbun stressed the significance of the academic group’s action by 
stating that it was among rare political interventions by immigration scholars in Japan (p. 15).  
These articles probably fostered the impression among the readers that a good number of 
immigration experts endorsed the campaign for special residence permission.  
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  In another attempt to bring the campaign to public attention, the academic group and 
APFS jointly held a symposium at Itabashi Sambun Hall on December 11.  The symposium, 
entitled Japan’s Immigration Policy at the Crossroads: Overstaying Foreigners and Special 
Permission to Stay, included Komai’s keynote speech and a panel discussion (see Table 5.7 for  
the program).   
 
Table 5.7: Program of the Symposium (Japan’s Immigration Policy at the Crossroads) 
 
Keynote speech by Prof. Komai of Tsukuba University, “Settlement of Foreigners and Special Residence  
Permission” 
Panel discussion (moderated by Prof. Watado of Meisei University and Prof. Keizō Yamawaki of Meiji University) 
KO, Sun Hui (Kagoshima University), “Experiences of Koran Migrants in Japan” 
INABA, Nanako (Ibaraki University), “Undocumented Foreigners in France and Amnesty” 
KOIDO, Akihiro (Sophia University), “Immigration Control in the US and Amnesty” 
KONDŌ, Atsushi (Kyushu Sangyō University), “Regularization and the International Law on Human Rights.”  
 
          Sources: Komai, Watado, and Yamawaki, 2000; the academic group’s website at  
               http://www.geocities.co.jp/CollegeLife-Labo/8108/overstay.htm
 
 
 
Thanks to the support groups’ PR efforts, the room was packed with audience members that 
included journalists (Watado, 2000, p. 87).  As Shipper (2001) observed, approximately 400 
people were in attendance (p. 377).  Although the symposium did not draw as many lay people 
as the organizers had expected (Inaba, personal communication, August 17, 2004), it made the 
headlines in several newspapers.  For example, Yomiuri Shimbun carried a four-column report on 
the symposium on December 21.  After referring to the implementation of amnesty in France, the 
report quoted a symposium participant as calling for special consideration to the welfare of 
children (p. 23).  In this way, the symposium helped to raise public awareness about the plight of 
undocumented migrants.  On January 31, 2000, the academic group published a book about 
special residence permission and related subjects from Akashi Shoten at a very affordable rate 
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 (900 yen, roughly $8).  Each member and several others contributed a short article to the book.  
Its publication was another PR attempt to draw public attention to the campaign.   
 Not only did the academic group’s engagement generate publicity on the campaign, but it 
also helped to create public pressure for a response from the government.  For instance, on behalf 
of the academic group, House Member Nobuto Hosaka of the Social Democratic Party submitted 
written questions to then Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi in a Diet session on December 15, 
1999.67  The questions “concerning the immigration politics that attracts growing attention from 
the international public” first asked the prime minister to express his view on the joint statement 
issued by about 600 scholars at home and abroad.  Prime Minister Obuchi released a written 
response on January 28, 2000, stating that the Justice Ministry took into consideration this 
“expert opinion” along with other views on the overstayers’ action (cited in Hosaka, 1999, n.d.).   
To sum up, the academic group contributed to the special residence permission campaign 
on at least two counts.  For one thing, the group helped the campaign to receive frequent and 
favorable news coverage.  For another, the group’s involvement served to make the campaign a 
legitimate public issue to which the government had to respond.  This might have been an 
unintended “authority effect”; nevertheless it was not a trivial point because an authority effect 
needs to be countered with an equally powerful authority effect (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 54).  In fact, 
Komai (2004) was later told by an ex-immigration official—who used to work with Komai’s 
colleague at Tsukuba University—that the academic group’s appeal emboldened progressive 
immigration officials to have more say within the Justice Ministry (personal communication, 
August 26, 2004).  Since this conversation took place during an informal drinking party, we 
should not take it at face value.  Nevertheless, this anecdotal evidence hints that the academic 
group was successful in exerting pressure on immigration authorities.  
                                                 
67 The Cabinet is obligated to provide answers to submitted questions within 7 days. 
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 5.10  RECONCILING CRITICAL REFLEXIVITY WITH COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
To take an active part in a social movement while submitting it to critical reflexivity is an 
extremely difficult task, which, in Bourdieu’s view, is uniquely assigned to intellectuals.  
Bourdieu holds that the collective and critical social engagement of intellectuals is indispensable 
for promoting “a Realpolitik of Reason” (for example, see Bourdieu, 1989; Bourdieu, 1998).  To 
this end, he calls on intellectuals to collaborate with social activists and labor unions not by 
catering to their demands but by contributing academic findings and scientific reasoning to their 
movements (for a discussion of Bourdieu’s views on intellectuals, see Stabile and Morooka, 
2003).  Yet the critical and collective involvement of intellectuals may not always yield good 
results because internal criticism of social activism could undercut its momentum, undermine 
solidarity among the members, and jeopardize an otherwise “successful” movement.  Thus, any 
intellectuals who are interested in the idea of “scholarship with commitment” must ask 
themselves a series of questions Bourdieu (2001/2003) posed in a keynote address to the Modern 
Language Association Meetings in December 1999:  
Must intellectuals . . . intervene in the political world, and if so, under what conditions 
can they interject themselves efficiently?  What roles can they play in the various social 
movements active today, at the national level and especially at the international 
level?. . . .  Can they contribute to inventing a new manner of doing politics fit for the 
novel dilemmas and threats of our age. (p. 17)  
 
Initially, I intended to apply Bourdieu’s views of critical and collective intellectuals in 
appraising the contributions of the academic group to the special residence permission campaign.  
Yet few scholars seemed to have pondered their roles as intellectuals while engaging in the 
campaign.  Komai (2004) actually told Yoshinari that his contribution might be limited as he 
pursued scholarly work, not social activism (personal communication, August 26, 2004). 
Although all the three scholars I interviewed drew a clear line between scholarly work and social 
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 activism, that did not seem to discourage them from getting involved in the campaign.  Watado 
and Komai supposedly acted out of personal connections with APFS.  Conversely, their 
commitment to the campaign did not necessarily reflect awakening political consciousness in 
Japan’s academia.  In fact, the academic group yielded little beyond the campaign as it ceased to 
function soon after the Justice Minister announced his decisions in early 2000.  According to 
Inaba, the academic group’s activities generated neither heated discussions nor reflective works 
on the roles of intellectuals with a few exceptions (personal communication, August 17, 2004).  
Indeed, Komai said to me that I was the only researcher who had interviewed him on the 
campaign (personal communication, August 26, 2004). 
This is partly because the academic group was formed under severe time constraints and 
forced to act without much planning.  Also, as Inaba puts it, the social roles of intellectuals are 
rather different in Japan and France.  That is, while intellectuals in France are expected to 
intervene in social problems, the critical and collective engagement of intellectuals is not the 
norm in Japan (personal communication, August 17, 2004).  As Masao Maruyama, a prominent 
scholar and public intellectual in postwar Japan, laments, the sectionalism and 
compartmentalization of the Japanese intellectual world has discouraged the intelligentsia from 
producing “an independent community of scholars who are free to think in what he calls 
universalistic terms” (cited in Koschmann, 1993, p. 396).  If anything, conservative intellectuals 
have been more successful “in seizing the political megaphone provided by the media” 
(Koschmann, 1993, p. 423).   
  Nevertheless, it is worth fashioning a critical analysis of the academic group’s social 
engagement in light of Bourdieu’s views of intellectuals because several scholars attempted to 
get both actively and critically involved in the campaign.  To begin with, Kaoruko Yamamoto, 
 255
 then a doctoral student at Tokyo Metropolitan University, took issue with the idea of “good-
natured (zenryō) or wholesome (kenzen) foreigners,” claiming that it could be taken to mean 
those who were fully “Japanized.”  As noted earlier, the overstayers and their supporters often 
invoked the “Japanese-ness” of the children as a rationale for special residency.  Yamamoto 
(2000) registered her concern about this rhetorical move; for it could legitimize the cultural 
assimilationist idea that only those foreigners who thought and behaved like “normal Japanese” 
deserved to live in Japan (p. 99).  At least, political authorities could interpret such vague 
concepts as “good-natured” and “wholesome” so arbitrarily that they could refuse to legalize the 
status of anyone they construed as “bad foreigners.”  Instead, Yamamoto (1999a) subscribed to 
the opinion that special residence permission should be given to overstayers as a residential right 
(n.p.). 
Regarding this matter, a couple of scholars exchanged a series of arguments via the 
mailing list.  Kondō (1999), for instance, suggested that “good-natured” was synonymous with 
“law-abiding” (i.e. those who paid taxes and had no criminal records) in this context (n.p.).  In 
other words, he claimed that the term should be understood strictly in a legal sense.  Yoshinari 
found little value in this argument (personal communication, October 27, 2003).  Yet he would 
not enter the fray chiefly because the debate was confined to a small circle of academicians.  
This indicates that he tried not to fuel disagreement in academia, but was primarily interested in 
utilizing the concerted voices of scholars as political leverage to pressure immigration authorities.      
In my view, what is missing from this thread of argument is the recognition that APFS 
attempted to question the tacitly accepted equation of “overstayers = illegal aliens = bad 
foreigners.”  In addition, Yamamoto and other scholars who made this case failed to pay 
adequate attention to the rhetorical audience the overstayers and the support groups aimed to 
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 influence.  That is, their messages were directed not only to the general public but also to 
immigration officials who had authority to grant special residence permission.  As Kondō 
pointed out, the proof of “good nature” was a de facto requirement for obtaining special 
residence permission.  Granted that the call toward “good foreigners” could re-legitimize the 
assimilationist view.  For want of a better rhetorical commonplace, however, the support groups 
had to invoke the notion of “good foreigners” to win concessions from immigration authorities. 
 Moreover, Yasumasa Igarashi68 (2001) wrote in retrospect that he was dissatisfied with 
the support groups’ excessive emphasis on family ties.  As the support groups began to highlight 
the plight of children, they came to concede that undocumented migrant workers might be 
“guilty,” which, in Igarashi’s view, was detrimental to the two unaccompanied applicants in the 
group.  According to Yoshinari (2004), some people actually accused the campaign of 
“abandoning” (misuteru) single unregistered migrants (p. 173).  Alluding to the media coverage 
of Proposition 187 in California, Ono and Sloop (2002) decry this line of argument as 
infantilizing rhetoric (pp. 93-94).  In their estimation, infantilizing rhetoric is problematic 
because it reduces the image of unauthorized migrants to that of those who are in need of 
protection and assistance.  Ono and Sloop (2002) argue that “[e]very invocation of the terms 
‘children,’ ‘kids,’ and ‘juveniles’ might point to, and effect [sic], the understanding of all 
undocumented people as misguided and in need of tutelage and other forms of paternalistic 
authoritative control” (p. 106).   
 There is some truth to this criticism.  As the campaign progressed, the issues of family 
ties and child rights began to figure prominently in the support groups’ discourse.  And this 
rhetorical strategy was not empowering to single undocumented migrants.  But my objection to 
                                                 
68 Although Igarashi was not a member of the academic group, he had joined its mailing list during the campaign 
and posted several comments regarding the issues discussed in this section. 
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 this charge is that rhetorical acts are but “strategic deployments of symbolic resources within an 
ideological frame” (Cloud, 1994, p. 158).  In other words, social actors are often required to 
adapt their purposes to reality by using the very categories and languages of their opponents.  As 
Soysal (1996) astutely observes, “[a]s they [Islamic activists] engage in political conflicts and 
public debate, they join in the same ‘discursive medium and  frames,’ and use the same 
‘symbolic packages’ that are available as public discourse independent of their original carriers” 
(p. 12).  Along similar yet distinct lines, Said (1993) writes:  
For the intellectual, to be ‘for’ human rights means, in effect, to be willing to venture 
interpretations of those rights in the same place and with the same language employed 
by the dominant power, to dispute its hierarchy and methods, to elucidate what it has 
hidden, to pronounce what it has silenced or rendered unpronounceable. (p. 198) 
 
This rhetorical act is not the same as co-optation.  As Ono and Sloop (2002) hold, using the logic 
of dominant discourse does not necessarily result in reproducing it; rather, one can use the logic 
of dominant discourse to change that logic (p. 23).  In other words, it is possible to wage a 
symbolic battle within the prevailing discursive framework, while striving to challenge the 
dominant discourse at a more fundamental level.  Indeed, the special residence permission 
campaign was a quintessential case of “limited, tactical resistance” (Ono and Sloop, 2002, p. 
116) without forsaking the possibility of a more radical social change, namely forcing the 
government to implement a general amnesty program.  For many actors involved in the 
campaign, the Justice Minister’s decisions to grant special residence permission to the 16 
overstayers was a step forward to this larger, if not revolutionary, social change.  Even Yoshinari 
who spearheaded the campaign acknowledges that “there is a long way to go before the human 
rights of all foreigners with established lives in Japan are guaranteed” (Matsubara, 2000, 
February 22, p. 3).  In a Japan Times interview, he argues: 
Residence status is the most fundamental human right that must be granted to anyone 
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 who has established his or her life here . . . .  We must further work to push the 
government to establish clear standards for amnesty for those saddled with visaless 
status.  (Matsubara, 2000, February 22, p. 3)  
 
In sum, social activists must set high but reachable goals to effect social change.  It 
follows that grassroots movements should be assessed in light of what was possible under given 
social and historical conditions.  As Piven and Cloward (1976) stress: 
Opportunities for defiance are not created by analyses of power structures.  If there is a 
genius in organizing, it is the capacity to sense what it is possible for people to do under 
given conditions, and to then help them do it.  In point of fact, however, most 
organizing ventures ask that people do what they cannot do, and the result is failure. (p. 
22) 
 
 
 
5.11  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
All in all, the success of the campaign is attributable to the following three factors.  First of all, 
APFS was able to tap into the existing networks of civic engagement.  If it were not for the 
national networks of community workers’ unions, immigration researchers, and foreign worker 
support groups, the government may not have taken the overstayers’ plea so seriously.  Equally 
important was the trusting, reciprocal relationship APFS had developed with both mainstream 
and progressive media over time.  APFS’s close links with concerned journalists and editors 
were critical in raising public awareness for the campaign and exerting pressure on immigration 
authorities.  Last but not least, APFS successfully channeled lawyers’ experiences, visa 
overstayers’ desire for legal status, other support groups’ enthusiasm, and immigration 
researchers’ expertise into a collective social movement.  
 While it is impossible to measure the effects of the campaign beyond the Justice 
Minister’s decisions to grant special residency to the 16 overstayers, a series of anecdotal 
evidence indicates that the campaign served as a catalyst for several important changes.  On a 
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 short-term and personal level, the campaign encouraged more unregistered migrants to follow 
suit and fight for legal status of residence.  For example, when APFS held an orientation on 
special residence permission on March 20, 2000, its office (with a capacity of 50) was packed 
with nearly 100 people (Shiratori, 2002, p. 64).  The campaign has also unleashed a series of 
similar actions.  According to Migration News, “[s]ince September 1, 1999, some 64 foreigners, 
including 20 children, have publicly identified themselves as being in Japan illegally and asked 
for permission to remain” (“Japan: Children”).  
The special residence permission campaign appears to have impinged on the 
government’s immigration policies as well.  Worthy of mention is the Justice Ministry’s Second 
Basic Plan for Immigration Control released on March 23, 2000.  The plan, designed to lay out 
“realistic and effective measures against illegal foreigners in order to further secure safety of the 
society,” entertained the possibility of extending special residence permission to the 
unauthorized migrants who had strong links to Japanese society, not Japanese people (Ishii, 
2003, p. 30; Komai, 1999/2001, p. 160; Matsubara, 2003, December 31, n.p.).  An excerpt from 
the provisional English translation of the Second Basic Plan reads: 
Basically the policy described in the above section (1) shall be applied in full force to 
quickly remove illegal residents including illegal foreigners.  On the other hand, as for 
an illegal resident who is recognized to have a civil status or position with a Japanese 
national, a permanent resident or a special permanent resident and has close 
connection with the Japanese community [italics added], appropriate measures shall 
continue to be taken in individual cases with humanitarian consideration. (n.d.) 
 
Although there remain severe limits, the new plan is a step forward to legalize the status of more 
undocumented migrants.    
At the discursive level, the campaign helped to heighten the media’s sensitivity to the 
issue of special residence permission.  As Table 5.8 reveals, Yomiuri Shimbun carried more 
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 articles on special residence permission in the two years (2000-2001) after the campaign than 
those from 1984 to 1998 combined.  
 
 
Table 5.8: Number of Yomiuri Shimbun Articles about Zairyū Tokubetsu Kyoka (Special Residence 
Permission) 
 
Year 1986-91 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number 1 3 4 9 1 3 3 3 3
          
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total    
Number 26 10 15 18 19 135    
 
Source: Yomidasu Bunshokan  
 
 
More importantly, when the media addressed the issue of special residence permission, 
they tended to portray undocumented migrants in a positive light.  The following three pictures 
were printed alongside newspaper articles featuring the topic of special residence permission (see 
the next page).  Notice that all the pictures defied the stereotypical images of “illegal aliens.”
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Source: AS, 2003, March 1, p. 35. Reprinted with                    Source: YS, 2000, July 28, p. 7.  Reprinted with  
Permission of APFS and Asahi Shimbun Sha.  permission of APFS and Yomiuri Shimbun Sha. 
   
Figure 5.5: Pictures of a Burmese Family Demanding Special Residence Permission                                 
(in their apartment room [left] and pleading for the release of her father [right]) 
 
 
 
 
                                Source: YS, 2000, July 28, p. 7.  Reprinted with permission of Yomiuri Shimbun Sha.  
 
Figure 5.6: Schoolgirls Reporting to the Immigration Bureau in July 2000 
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 On top of that, undocumented migrants are beginning, albeit slowly and sporadically, to 
be represented as active agents who are able and willing to come forward and speak up for their 
rights.  For example, the May 1, 2000 issue of Asahi Shimbun reported on the APFS-led May 
Day Rally for Migrant Workers.  Notably, “illegally staying foreigners” were depicted as 
courageous social actors speaking out against racial discrimination and ethnic bias in Japanese 
society:  
“Please give visas [to us]!”  About 200 illegally staying foreigners who had lived 
clandestinely for fear of apprehension paraded in plea for special residence permission 
in Tokyo’s Ginza on [April] 30. . . .  Holding up placards and donning [their own] 
ethnic costumes, about 200 marched in hope that “disclosing our faces will help to 
eradicate [the Japanese’s] discrimination and bias.” (p. 26)    
  
An even more telling example is a picture of the May Day Rally printed in Asahi Shimbun’s 
feature article on the settlement of foreign workers on May 3, 2000 (see Figure 5.7). 
 
 
 
 
Source: AS, 2000, May 3, p. 13.  Reprinted with permission of APFS and Asahi Shimbun Sha 
Figure 5.7: Undocumented Migrants Demanding Visas in the APFS-led May Day Rally 
 263
 The picture showed a group of overstayed foreigners rallying for the normalization of their status 
in central Tokyo.  By holding up placards in various languages and wearing their own ethnic 
clothing, they sought to gain more visibility, appeal to international audiences, and dispel the 
myth of Japan as a homogeneous society.  This visual image, along with those shown in Figures 
5.5-6, is evidently at odds with the dominant understanding of undocumented migrants as 
deviant and dangerous.  Although the support groups did not deliberately stage any “image 
events for mass media dissemination” to borrow DeLuca’s terms (1996, ix), Figures 5.6-8 
indicate that visual images could be potent sources of rhetorical power for counterposing against 
the dominant discursive frame an alternative one through which the sexualized and criminalized 
images of undocumented migrants are rendered absurd.  Not only did the Asahi Shimbun article 
carried the empowering image of visa overstayers, but it also quoted Komai and Watado as 
criticizing the current immigration policy and calling for the relaxation of the criteria for special 
residence permission.  On the whole, the article typifies the effects of the special residence 
permission campaign on the news coverage of visa overstayers.  Although I don’t mean to claim 
that these positive portrayals of undocumented migrants have overridden the negative ones in the 
media, the special residence permission campaign has demonstrated that the dominant discourse 
could be challenged at the grassroots level. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION  
 
“Just look at me.  Look at my friends.” (a 26-year-old Bangladeshi overstayer69) 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
On May 1, 2000, Asahi Shimbun ran an article on the APFS-led annual May Day Rally for 
Migrant Workers.  About 200 undocumented migrants reportedly marched in Tokyo’s shopping 
street in plea for amnesty.  The banners they carried read: “We are not criminals” and “Give  
residential rights to undocumented migrants” (p. 26).  Another article on the same page, by 
contrast, reported on foreign crime with the sensational headline “foreigners’ crimes have hit the 
highest rate, according to the National Police Agency” (p. 26).  On October 12, 2003, Happy 
House held the 10th Asian Fair outside the Itabashi Metropolitan Tax Office.  The fair celebrated 
the multiculturalism taking root in Japanese society.  On the same day, several members of the 
ultra-rightist Restoration Party “New Wind” (Ishin Seitō Shimpū) delivered an anti-immigrant 
spiel to pedestrians outside the Shinjuku station, urging the government to expel “bad foreigners” 
(participant observation, October 12, 2003).  The handbill they passed out stated: “The problem 
of foreign crime is no longer just another social problem, but [it is] a life-and-death matter to us 
the Japanese.”   
  These conflicting representations of visa overstayers are jumbled together in current 
public discourse on the foreign worker problem in Japan.  Indeed, one aim in this dissertation 
                                                 
69 His remark was quoted from the Japan Times on May 1, 2000 (p. 2). 
 265
 was to show that the mass media are sites of symbolic struggles rather than ideological state 
apparatuses.  While the anti-immigration rhetoric has by far overshadowed the pro-immigration 
rhetoric in public discourse (Chapter 4), various social actors have been contesting such 
xenophobic rhetoric at the grassroots levels (Chapter 5).   
 This does not mean, however, that possibilities for symbolic struggles are unlimited.  On 
the contrary, a critical analysis of discourse on Japan’s foreign worker problem requires close 
attention to the workings of unequal power relations and economic forces along national, ethnic, 
gender, and class lines.  Specifically, the dissertation has scrutinized the political, economic, 
socio-cultural, and historical conditions that have shaped the dominant discourse on the issue of 
foreign workers over the last two decades.  On the whole, this materialist-bent critical rhetoric 
project has proven useful in analyzing rhetorical dimensions of the foreign worker problem in 
Japan.  The vast majority of unregistered foreigners are forced to remain silent due to their 
unstable status of residence despite the fact that they are susceptible to egregious social 
injustices.  Besides, their supporters have far fewer resources and opportunities than state 
officials and business corporations to get their dissenting voices heard in public.  Consequently, 
the “illegality” of overstaying foreigners has been deemed to be a more serious problem than 
labor discriminations and human rights violations against them.  Critics/rhetors must recognize 
the importance of these material forces in order to appreciate the liberatory potential of 
discourse.    
The dissertation has also demonstrated that the methods of quantitative analysis, 
participant observation, and interviewing can be usefully combined with textual analysis.  For 
instance, one of the key arguments in Chapter 5 was that sustained and favorable media attention 
was critical in bringing the special residence permission campaign to success.  The frequency 
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 counts of relevant news reports in Table 5.5 evidenced the print and broadcast media’s persistent 
interest in the campaign.  Added to this quantitative approach, a rhetorical analysis of the news 
reports revealed that most media outlets covered the campaign in a positive light.  Neither of 
these quantitative and qualitative approaches, by itself, could adequately account for the 
discursive strategies enacted in the campaign.  Moreover, the interviews with Katsuo Yoshinari 
of APFS and then-Tsukuba University professor Hiroshi Komai, among others, greatly expanded 
my understanding of how APFS and the 21 overstayers enlisted the help of journalists and 
researchers in reaching wider publics and generating pressure on immigration officials.  Put 
differently, interviewing enabled me to understand the process in which their dissenting voices 
made inroads into the mainstream media.   
Methodologically, this dissertation may differ from most other works in rhetorical 
studies; still, it has important implications for the field.  As McGee (1990) puts it, “whether we 
conceive it in an Aristotelian sense as the art of persuasion, or in a Burkean sense as the social 
process of identification, rhetoric is influential” (p. 279).  By drawing partly on methods and 
theoretical insights used in other disciplines, the dissertation has sought to show that the 
influence of rhetoric in contemporary society can be best understood by looking into not only 
features of discourse but also those of discourse production and dissemination.  Quantitative 
approaches, observational studies, and interview surveys afford rhetoric scholars great insights 
into the latter.  They are particularly useful for explaining how grassroots activists get their 
messages out and exercise counter-hegemonic influence in and through the mass media.  Studies 
of how and what of counter discourse certainly overlap, but they cannot be equated because the 
former includes an examination of how grassroots organizations establish connections with 
journalists and publishers inside or outside the mainstream media.   
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6.2 CHAPTER SUMMARIES AND IMPLICATIONS 
   
Chapter 3 has shown that since migrant women are triply disadvantaged for being women, 
“illegal aliens,” and, in some cases, trafficking victims, they are particularly vulnerable to 
various forms of symbolic violence.  Despite the fact that the influx of female migrant workers 
marked the first wave of labor migration in postwar Japan, it was recognized as a peculiar issue 
of Japayuki-san distinct from the foreign worker problem.  Importantly, the term Japayuki-san 
functioned as a terministic screen to fixate the stereotyped image of female migrants as young 
sex workers from poor Asian countries.  Moreover, as the mass media took notice of the massive 
inflow of male foreign workers, they no longer found much news value in reporting the 
Japayuki-san problem.  As with Japayuki-san, the term gaikokujin rōdōsha (foreign worker) 
served as a terministic screen to (mis)lead the public to think that Japan had never experienced a 
foreign worker problem before.  While women’s groups contested the distorted media images of 
migrant women and depicted them as victims of human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and 
physical abuse, their counter discourse did not help migrant women to be recognized as 
legitimate workers.  Although the rhetoric of protection is useful in highlighting the 
institutionalized violence inflicted on migrant women, we should also strive to invent a form of 
discourse conducive to their labor rights.  According to Mackie (2003), Japanese feminists made 
a strategic shift from “rhetorics of protection” to “rhetorics of rights” in the 1980s:  
Feminists argued for equality with ‘guarantees’ (hoshō), and that, instead of removing 
so-called protective provisions from female workers, these provisions should be 
extended to cover all workers. . . .  On the part of feminists, there was thus a strategic 
shift from the language of bosei hogo, whereby women are positioned as being weak 
and in need of protection (hogo), to a view of women as workers with rights which 
must be guaranteed (hoshō).  (pp. 182-183)   
 
 268
 There are many strands of feminist thought, so I don’t mean to accuse feminists of applying a 
double standard.  After all, unlike those who championed the view of “women as workers with 
rights” in the 1980s, the most outspoken advocates for migrant women were Christian groups 
that had long objected to the commercialization of sex on moral grounds.  As Mackie (2002) 
suggests, “[w]hile the decriminalization of prostitution has recently been debated by feminists in 
Japan, this argument is seldom heard from advocates working with immigrant workers, who 
recognize the coercive conditions many of these women work under” (p. 214).  Still, I believe 
that a similar rhetorical move should be made to picture migrant women as both trafficking 
victims and legitimate workers.  Beyond the victim/worker dichotomy, female migrants should 
ideally be represented in manifold ways so that they would not fit into any single stereotypical 
image.  This dissertation offers a modest step forward in this direction.  
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that “illegal aliens” are too often portrayed as posing a grave 
threat to the public safety, social order, and moral fabric of Japanese society.  While crimes by 
“illegal aliens” are on the rise, only 0.4% of all the crimes in Japan involved “illegal aliens” in 
2002.  Plus, the vast majority of their offenses comprise larcenies, thefts, and shoplifting.  
Nevertheless, the popular media tend to depict “illegal aliens” as brutal criminals who are willing 
to kill anybody for money.  In addition, the data on foreigners’ crimes should be put in 
perspective as crimes by Japanese nationals are also increasing due to the protracted economic 
slump.  Yet the mass media and the state alike generally cast more sympathetic eyes on Japanese 
criminals.  This indicates that those who are “beyond the pale of discourses of citizenship” 
(Mackie, 2000, p. 253) are susceptible to the stigma of being criminals.   
 Chapter 4 has also elucidated the shortcomings of both conspiracy theory and propaganda 
model to account for the sensational news coverage of foreign crime in Japan.  That is, the media 
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 do not simply report the problem of foreign crime; they simultaneously construct and crystallize 
foreign crime as a frightening social problem in popular imagination.  The media’s repeated use 
of the term “Chinese Mafia,” for instance, creates an atmosphere in which people feel that they 
have to guard against atrocious crimes by ruthless Chinese criminal syndicates.  The news media 
must recognize that unsavory media portrayals of undocumented migrants take serious tools on 
their lives when few Japanese have first-hand knowledge of them.  
Furthermore, journalists and researchers alike should be more attentive to the politics of 
language involved in framing the news.  As van Dijk (1985) astutely observes:  
Large parts of the news appear to be pre-formulated already by influential news 
sources, such as the police or other state or corporate institutions.  Their accounts, in 
documents or press releases, of their own action, already provide the journalist with a 
dominant definition of the situation. (p. 72) 
 
Unfortunately, most Japanese media outlets are too willing to accept law enforcement agencies’ 
definitions of terms in official crime reports and frame the issue of foreign crime very much as 
the “primary definers” frame it for them.  Accordingly, the official narrative frame for foreign 
crime has gone largely unchallenged.  Conversely, critical inquiry into the official frame and its 
consequences could unmask the constructed nature of “foreign crime as an unprecedented 
security threat.”  To take one example, Stabile (2001) suggests in her study of the U.S. media’s 
crime coverage that the public might perceive the crime situation differently if increases in crime 
rates were understood as “arrest waves” rather than “crime waves” (p. 274).  For such a 
discursive shift would evoke an insight in which the alleged crime rate increases would be linked 
more to stepped-up police activity than to increased amount of crime (p. 274).  Similarly, a 
critical analysis of the prevailing discursive frame for foreign crime in Japan could help to raise 
public awareness of a discrepancy among the actual level of crime, official crime data, and crime 
news concerning “illegal aliens.”   
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  Chapter 5 has underscored the importance of collective symbolic struggles.  When 
political and economic hegemony operates in favor of dominant discourse, the media are 
generally predisposed to reproduce the definitions of the powerful.  Under these circumstances, 
social activism owes its efficacy to collective advocacy and concerted action among diverse 
social actors, including researchers, journalists, and activities.  Even though the special residence 
permission campaign was a Tokyo-based movement with a particular goal, that did not diminish 
a need for nationwide networks of foreign worker support groups for effective communication 
and collective action.   
 Also highlighted in Chapter 5 was the role the mass media played in the outcome of the 
special residence permission campaign.  In particular, while Chapter 4 focused on the repressive 
functions of the media, Chapter 5 examined their positive potential.  One important implication 
of my analysis of the campaign’s media strategies is that journalists in the mainstream media do 
not necessarily perceive grassroots activists as disturbers of law and order.  On the contrary, 
some of them are willing to lend sympathetic ears to their causes and pay close attention to their 
movements.  Grassroots activists for their part are able to enlist the help of these progressive 
reporters to elicit public support and call on policy makers to respond to their demands.  This 
finding further attests to the need for making an analytical distinction between journalists and 
media institutions.  At present, most media research conflates the work of journalists with the 
workings of media institutions (van Dijk, 1985; Schudson, 2000).  However, such conflation is 
theoretically simplistic and empirically inadequate.  Although it is important to probe into the 
structural and ideological dimensions of news production, it does not justify a lack of attention to 
the activities of journalists because the link among the political economy of society, the structure 
of news organizations, and day-to-day practices in journalism is not so clear and rigid (Schudson, 
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 2000, p. 178).  As Schudson (2000) holds, “[j]ournalists at mainstream publications everywhere 
accommodate to the political culture of the regime in which they operate.  Still, ideals of 
journalistic professionalism may incline journalists toward acting to support freedom of 
expression” (p. 187).  At least, it is not fruitful to ignore how journalists operate within a set of 
constraints as if appraisals of their autonomy necessitate the downplaying of political and 
economic forces as determining factors in news production.  As van Dijk (1985) suggests:  
Daily interactions between journalists, or between journalists and other newspersons 
such as newsactors, sources, witnesses, or representatives of organizations, need to be 
further analyzed for their strategies, routine acts, commonsense categories, or other 
principles of understanding.  Detailed observation and analysis is necessary of decision 
making processes in e.g. editorial meetings, also to make explicit the understanding and 
the uses of the well-known newsvalue criteria in the selection or the (re-)construction of 
news events as news items. (p. 6)  
 
Although the dissertation investigated neither decision-making processes inside newsrooms nor 
interactions between journalists, it explored how several journalists interacted with grassroots 
activists to challenge the restrictive immigration policies in Japan.  Such “detailed, micro-studies 
of media processes” help to advance our understandings of news discourse (van Dijk, 1985, p. 
6).   
 Overall, the dissertation has demonstrated that discourse of “foreign worker” is deeply 
problematic because the very characteristics that make foreign workers desirable for 
employers—lower wages, fewer fringe benefits, harsher working conditions—could render them 
undesirable from the perspective of membership in a receiving country (Zolberg, 2000, p. 318).  
As long as the current discursive framework persists, undocumented migrants continue to be 
trivially represented as “economic units, significant only insofar as they contribute to the 
efficient operation of the state’s economy,” to borrow Ono and Sloop’s (2002) phrases (p. 28).  
Accordingly, even those who favor the employment of unskilled migrant laborers tend to regard 
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 them “as a shock absorber or adjustment valve between peaks and troughs of the economy, so 
that Japanese workers’ jobs and their wages remain secure during recessions” (Yamanaka, 2000, 
p. 140). 70   In analyzing German media reports on foreigners, political science professor 
Christoph Butterwege argues that the reduction of foreigners to economic units is but a form of 
covert racism: 
Whoever focuses on the cost-benefit calculus in the sense of a “functional anti-racism” 
[“we must be nice to foreigners as long as they are useful”] appeals to the egoism of 
potential enemies of foreigners.  Unintentionally with the competition orientation, he 
[sic] sues for a mechanism triggering racism under certain circumstances and the 
prosperity chauvinism constitutive of rightwing extremism in Germany. (n.p) 
 
In view of this, many scholars and activists call for the enactment of a comprehensive 
immigration policy in Japan.  Along a similar line, I would suggest that a rhetorical move should 
be made from “foreign worker” discourse to “immigration” discourse so that full-blown public 
discussions about immigration could take place.  I believe that communication scholars could 
make modest contributions to this discursive shift by filling the reservoir of discursive resources 
on which progressive scholars, journalists, and activists are able to draw.  As Hargreaves (2001) 
argues, if more positive images of undocumented migrants are produced and circulated in the 
media, they can “reduce the reservoir of racism and xenophobia on which extremist parties are 
able to draw” (p. 35).   
  
 
6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study has focused upon dominant media discourse and the attempts by one group of 
activists to combat it.  As a consequence, it left untouched three communicative arenas of 
                                                 
70 Although Yamanaka made this point in reference to the Nikkeijin “guest worker” system, her observation holds 
good for unskilled foreign workers in general. 
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 significance, which future research might fill in.  To begin with, this work did not pay sufficient 
attention to alternative rhetoric—or outlaw rhetoric in Ono and Sloop’s terminology—that 
operates outside the dominant framework of discourse.  In my defense, this was not the goal of 
the dissertation.  Instead, I intended to critique dominant discourse and to examine social 
activists’ symbolic struggles within the prevailing discursive framework.  Still, I am mindful of 
the importance to invent discourses that are “incommensurable” with the logics of dominant ones 
(Ono and Sloop, 2002, p. 14).  For example, it would greatly benefit irregular foreigners if the 
system of special residence permission were anchored in the discourse of human rights.  For such 
a discourse would enable them to demand special residency as a right they deserve rather than a 
dispensation they are granted under special circumstances.  Equally worth exploring is the 
possibility of casting unregistered foreigners in truly positive terms as they have always been 
defined negatively as unregistered, undocumented, irregular, unauthorized, and illegal.  In other 
words, “illegal” immigrants are mired in the binary oppositions of legal/illegal and 
citizens/immigrants in which the latter in the pairs are seen as a falling away from the former.  
Ultimately, the positive portrayals of irregular foreigners require us to think beyond these binary 
pairings.  For unless undocumented migrants, legal residents, and citizens are defined in equal 
terms, they are unlikely to be treated on equal terms.   
Second, the dissertation falls short of recounting the lives of undocumented migrants in 
all their rich diversity and vigor.  When the media by and large reinforce the unsavory images of 
unregistered foreigners, it is imperative to go beyond simple media criticism (i.e. semiotic 
analysis of media texts or the practice of using certain media to counter others) and to attend to 
the strategies they adopt in the ordinary conduct of their lives.  Vital to this task is the 
incorporation of ethnographic techniques into media/rhetorical criticism.  Admittedly, this 
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 dissertation used the methods of participant observation and interviewing only as supplemental 
tools for analyzing media texts.  Since I am a communication scholar with only basic training in 
field methods, this approach was critical in keeping the project both worthwhile and manageable. 
More rigorous ethnographic observations would yield further insights into alternative social 
contexts for the rhetoric of Japan’s foreign worker problem.  Particularly, more efforts should be 
made to allow undocumented migrants to articulate their concerns in their own voices, which is, 
according to West (1993), a primary goal of ethnography (p. 215).  Even my limited fieldwork 
has made me realize that the actual lives of many unregistered foreigners were a far cry from the 
media portrayals of “illegal aliens.”  For example, after the Tokyo District Court overruled the 
Justice Minster’s decision to deport an overstayed Iranian family in September 2003, I saw a 15-
year-old daughter crying under her mother’s arm with joy outside the courtroom.  Although this 
Iranian girl was technically an “illegal alien,” she was not even remotely associated with the 
stereotyped images of undocumented migrant women.  Also, many supporters of diverse 
nationalities attended the court on that day, and I witnessed them talking about the court ruling in 
fluent Japanese.  Although I don’t mean to idealize ethnography, I believe that a combination of 
ethnographic fieldwork with textual analysis provides invaluable perspectives on both discursive 
and non-discursive dimensions of Japan’s foreign worker problem  
Lastly, the dissertation generally posited the state as a monolithic institution; but it is 
actually marked by fierce internal struggles and sharply conflicting interests.  In fact, as Pak 
(1998) pointed out, the revision to the immigration laws in 1990 was partly a product of the 
intense turf wars between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Labor (p. 34).  Besides, as 
Komai (2004) suggested, the academic group’s social engagement might have encouraged 
progressive immigration officials to have more say in the matter of special residence permission.  
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 If so, it is worthwhile to pay closer attention to internal struggles among state authorities and to 
consider their implications for immigration politics and discourse.  In this respect Bourdieu et al. 
(1993/1999)’s Weight of the World offers a useful perspective as a chapter of this critical-
ethnographic work illuminates the agony of junior public servants who are abandoned inside the 
system.  Ironically, these “insiders” (the “left hand of the state” to use Bourdieu’s words) are 
constantly undermined and betrayed because they abide by the very norms of public institutions.  
The volume serves as a caveat for social movements scholars who are inclined toward a 
simplistic worldview of “state officials vs. citizens” or  “bureaucrats vs. marginal groups.”  As 
Remi Lenoir, a co-author of the volume, argues, the use of such general designations as “power” 
or “crisis” “leads people to overlook the fact that the actions involved in the maintenance of 
order are very diverse and that their crises or difficulties result from different factors” (p. 223).  
In any case, a more nuanced understanding of the state is needed.  As Bourdieu (1998) puts it, 
“[t]he state is an ambiguous reality. . . .  The state is certainly not completely neutral, completely 
independent of the dominant forces in society, but the older it is and the greater the social 
advances it has incorporated, the more autonomous it is.  It is a battleground” (pp. 33-34).  Just 
as it is counter-productive to posit the media as a unitary organization, a simplistic view of state 
authorities may unduly limit the liberatory potential of discourse.  Again, rhetoric is about human 
agency and rhetorical criticism entertains possibilities for action.  Communication/rhetoric 
scholars should tap into any discursive resources to consider what intervention strategies are 
appropriate to effect social change.  
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